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Page 10fB 
Judicial District Court - Ada Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2006-23517 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
John F Noak M.D vs. Prison Health Services Inc, etal. 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
John F Noak M.D vs. Prison Health Services Inc, Idaho Department Of Correction, Richard D Haas 
Date Code User Judge 
12/15/2006 NCOC CCEARLJD New Case Filed - Other Claims Kathryn A. Sticklen 
COMP CCEARLJD Complaint Filed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
SMFI CCEARLJD (3) Summons Filed Kathryn A. Sticklen 
12/18/2006 ACCP CCBARCCR Acceptance Of Service 12-18-06 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/8/2007 ANSW CCWOODCL Defendant Prison Health Services's Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Answer to Complaint (Zahn for Prison Health) 
1/9/2007 MOTD CCWRIGRM Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Richard D. Haas's Motion To Dismiss 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Richard D. Haas's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion 
1/12/2007 ACCP CCMAXWSL Acceptance Of Service 12-22-2006 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTC CCMAXWSL Notice of Hearing (March 7, 2007 @ 3:30pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCMAXWSL Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss Kathryn A. Sticklen 
03/07/200703:30 PM) 
1/2412007 ACCP CCBARCCR Acceptance Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/21/2007 MOTN CCTEELAL Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint Kathryn A. Sticklen 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
MEMO CCTEELAL Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Leave to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial 
MEMO CCTEELAL Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendants Idaho Department of Corrections' and 
Richard Haas' Motion to Dismiss 
AFFD CCTEELAL Affidavit of John A Bush Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOHG CCTEELAL Notice Of Hearing 3.7.07 @ 3:30 pm Kathryn A. Sticklen 
2/28/2007 MISC CCNAVATA Defendants Idaho Dept of Correction & Richard Kathryn A. Sticklen 
D. Haas' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Leave 
to Amend Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial 
AFFD CCNAVATA Affidavit of Steven Wolf Kathryn A. Sticklen 
AFFD CCNAVATA Affidavit of Thomas J. Beauclair Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/2/2007 RPLY CCWRIGRM Plaintiffs Reply Defendants Idaho Department of Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Correction and Richarch D. Haas Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Bush Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/5/2007 RPLY CCTEELAL Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Richard D Haas' Reply Brief in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss 
3/7/2007 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
03/07/200703:30 PM: Hearing Held 000003 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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3/13/2007 OBJC CCBARCCR Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Richard D Haas' Objection to Notice of 
Submission of (Proposed) 2nd Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial Complaint 
4/11/2007 DEOP CCKENNJA Memorandum Decision & Order Kathryn A. Sticklen 
4/13/2007 NOTC CCKENNJA Notice of status conference Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Status 06/04/2007 03:30 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
PM) Phone w/stipulation 
4/25/2007 MOTN CCWRIGRM Defendant Idaho Dept of Correction and Richard Kathryn A. Sticklen 
D. Haas Motion for Reconsideration 
MEMO CCWRIGRM Defendant Idaho Dept of Correction and Richard Kathryn A. Sticklen 
D. Haas Memorandum in Support of Motion 
5/9/2007 NOHG CCCHILER Notice Of Hearing Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCCHILER Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Kathryn A. Sticklen 
06/05/200709:30 AM) Motions 
5/29/2007 RSPS CCCHILER Plaintiff's Response to Defendants Idaho Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Department of Correction and Richard D Haas' 
Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative 
Clarification, of Order on Motion to Dismiss 
6/1/2007 STIP CCCHILER Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MISC CCNAVATA Defendants Idaho Dept of Correction & Richard Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Haas' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration, or in the Alternative Clarification, 
or Order on Motion to Dismiss 
6/4/2007 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Status held on 06/04/2007 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Phone w/stipulation 
6/5/2007 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
06/05/2007 09:30 AM: Hearing Held Motions 
6/6/2007 ORDR CCKENNJA Order Governing Proceedings & Seting Trial Kathryn A. Sticklen 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Kathryn A. Sticklen 
10/14/200804:30 PM) By Phone 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/27/200809:00 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
AM) 10 Days--excluding 11/4/08 & 11/11/08 
6/13/2007 NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/15/2007 MODQ CCBARCCR Motion To Disqualify Kathryn A. Sticklen 
MOTN CCEARLJD Motion to Disqualify Judge McKee Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/20/2007 ORDR CCKENNJA Order to DQ (G.o. Carey) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTS CCCHILER Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/22/2007 NOTS CCCHILER (2) Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
6/26/2007 ORDR CCKENNJA Order to DQ Duff McKee Kathryn A. Sticklen 
7/13/2007 NOTD CCDWONCP Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of John F Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Noak MD 
Kathryn A. sQcQ~ 0 0 4 7/24/2007 NOTS CCPRICDL Notice Of Service 
7/25/2007 NOTS CCWRIGRM (2) Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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Date 
7/30/2007 
8/112007 
8/2/2007 
8/6/2007 
8/8/2007 
8/10/2007 
8/14/2007 
8/16/2007 
9/19/2007 
12/4/2007 
12/5/2007 
12/31/2007 
112/2008 
1/7/2008 
1/11/2008 
2/13/2008 
2/19/2008 
2/20/2008 
2/25/2008 
4/10/2008 
4/21/2008 
Code 
NOTS 
NOTS 
NOTC 
NOTS 
STIP 
ORDR 
AMEN 
NOTS 
AMEN 
NOTS 
NOTC 
NOTS 
AMEN 
NOTS 
NOTS 
NOTS 
AFOS 
STIP 
HRVC 
HRVC 
ORDR 
HRSC 
ORDR 
HRHD 
HRSC 
HRSC 
ORDR 
MISC 
User Judge 
CCBLACJE Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCBOYIDR Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCTOWNRD Notice Vacating the Deposition of John F. Noak, Kathryn A. Sticklen 
M.D. 
CCSTROMJ Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCBLACJE Stipulation Re: Order of Confidentiality Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCKENNJA Order of Confidentiality Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCTOONAL Amended Notice of Deposition of John F. Noak, Kathryn A. Sticklen 
M.D. 
CCBURGBL Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CCCHILER 
CCWRIGRM 
CCWRIGRM 
MCBIEHKJ 
CCTOWNRD 
CCMCLlLi 
CCDWONCP 
CCMCLILI 
CCEARLJD 
CCSTROMJ 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCKENNJA 
CCPRICDL 
Second Amended Notice of Deposition of John F Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Noak, MD 
(4) Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Notice Vacating the Deposition Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Amended Notice of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Kathryn A. Stick len 
Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Affidavit Of Service 2.4.08 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Stipulation to Vacate Trial and Scheduling Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Deadlines 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 10/27/2008 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 10Days--excluding 
11/4/08 & 11/11/08 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
10/14/200804:30 PM: Hearing Vacated By 
Phone 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Order vacating trial and setting status conference Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Kathryn A. Sticklen 
04/09/2008 04:30 PM) Chambers 
Order Governing Proceedings and Setting Trial 
Hearing result for Status by Phone held on 
04/09/200804:30 PM: Hearing Held Chambers 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
06/04/200904:00 PM) phone 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/15/2009 09:00 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
AM) 10 Days 
Order re: June 5, 2007 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Defendant's Idaho Department of Correction and Kathryn A. S~~005 
Richard D. Haas Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint UUU 
and Demand for Jury Trial 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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6/23/2008 NOSC CCTEELAL Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel (Naylor & Stoll Kathryn A. Sticklen 
for Zahn for Prison Health) 
7/25/2008 AMEN CCGWALAC Third Amended Notice of Deposition Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/6/2008 NOTD CCGARDAL Fourth Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Kathryn A. Sticklen 
8/18/2008 NOTS MCBIEHKJ Notice Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/3/2008 STIP MCBIEHKJ Stipulation to Modify Order of Confidentiality Kathryn A. Sticklen 
9/9/2008 ORDR CCKENNJA Order modifying order of confidentiality Kathryn A. Sticklen 
1/8/2009 CHRT CCKENNJA Changed Assigned Judge: Retired (batch 
process) 
1/22/2009 STIP CCCHILER Stipulation to Vacate Trial and Scheduling Richard D. Greenwood 
Deadlines 
1/26/2009 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Kathryn A. Sticklen 
06/04/200904:00 PM: Hearing Vacated phone 
HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 06/15/2009 Kathryn A. Sticklen 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 10 Days 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
03/09/200903:00 PM) Chambers 
ORDR CCKENNJA Order Vacating Trial & Scheduling Deadlines & Richard D. Greenwood 
Setting Conference 
3/4/2009 NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
3/9/2009 HRHD CCKENNJA Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
03/09/2009 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Chambers 
STIP CCKENNJA Stipulation to Obtain Leave of Court to take the Richard D. Greenwood 
deposition of Inamte Norma Hernandez 
ORDR CCKENNJA Order granting leave to take deposition of inmate Richard D. Greenwood 
Nora Hernandez 
3/10/2009 ORDR CCKENNJA Amended Order Governing Proceedings and Richard D. Greenwood 
Setting Trial 
3/11/2009 HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Richard D. Greenwood 
03/29/201003:00 PM) Plaintiff's to initiate call 
HRSC CCKENNJA Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/12/201009:00 Richard D. Greenwood 
AM) 12 Days 
NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
4/29/2009 NOTS CCANDEJD Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
6/16/2009 NOSV CCBOYIDR Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
8/25/2009 NOTS CCSIMMSM Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
9/3/2009 MOTN CCSIMMSM Defendant' prison Health Services, Inc's Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
for Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCSIMMSM Affidavit of Bruce J. Castleton in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCSIMMSM Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Richard D. oYfotj'b 6 
Judgment 
NOHG CCSIMMSM Notice Of Hearing (RE: Defendant Prison Health Richard D. Greenwood 
Services, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment) 
Date: 8/4/201 0 Judicial District Court - Ada Cou User: CCLUNDMJ 
Time: 12:03 PM ROA Report 
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John F Noak MD vs. Prison Health Services Inc, Idaho Department Of Correction, Richard D Haas 
Date Code User Judge 
9/3/2009 HRSC CCSIMMSM Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 10/22/200903:30 PM) 
MOSJ CCBOURPT Defendant richard 0 Haas Motion For Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
AFSM CCBOURPT Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
AFSM CCBOURPT Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
AFSM CCBOURPT Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
AFSM CCBOURPT Affidavit In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCBOURPT Defendant Richard Haas Memorandum in Richard D. Greenwood 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
STMT CCBOURPT Defendants Joint Statement of Undisputed Richard D. Greenwood 
Material Facts 
NOHG CCBOURPT Notice Of Hearing re Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment (10.22.09@3:30pm) 
9/4/2009 ORDR DCTHERTL Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Take Richard D. Greenwood 
Out of State Deposition 
MOTN CCBOURPT Plaintiff's Motion for Order to Take Out of State Richard D. Greenwood 
Deposition 
9/10/2009 HRVC CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 10/22/2009 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated. 
Reset 11/12/09 @ 3:00 pm, counsel to re-notice 
for hearing. 
HRSC CCAMESLC Notice of Hearing (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 11/12/2009 03:00 PM) 
9/11/2009 NOTS CCWRIGRM Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
9/15/2009 NOHG CCLATICJ Defendant Richard D. Haas' Amended Notice Of Richard D. Greenwood 
Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment 
(11/12/2009 @ 3:00 p.m.) 
10/5/2009 NOTS CCDWONCP Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
10/15/2009 MOTN CCGARDAL Defendant Idaho Department of Corrections Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCGARDAL Affidavit of Emily A MacMaster in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCGARDAL Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 
NOHG CCGARDAL Notice Of Hearing 11.12.09 @ 3 pm Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCGARDAL Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary Richard D. Greenwood 
Judgment 11/12/200903:00 PM) 
10/26/2009 NOTS CCMCLlLI Notice Of Service Richard D. Greenwood 
10/30/2009 STMT CCAMESLC Plaintiff's Statement of Facts Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Exceed Page Limitation Richard D. Greenwood 
MOTN CCAMESLC Motion to Strike Richard D'g~O:Q1j~7 
AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit of John A Bush Richard D. r e woo 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Richard D. Greenwood 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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10/30/2009 MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Opposition to PHS Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Opposition to Hass Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO CCAMESLC Memorandum in Opposition to IDOC Motion for Richard D. Greenwood 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCAMESLC Affidavit of John F Noak Richard D. Greenwood 
NOTH CCAMESLC Notice Of Hearing (Notice Of Hearing 11 .12.09 @ Richard D. Greenwood 
3 pm) Motion to Strike 
11/5/2009 RPLY CCCHILER Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc's Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum in Reply to the Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to PHS's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD CCCHILER Second Affidavit of Bruce J Castleton in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
of Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
ORDR CCRANDJD Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Exceed Page Richard D. Greenwood 
Limitation 
11/6/2009 OPPO CCWRIGRM State Defendants Joint Opposition to Plaintiffs Richard D. Greenwood 
Motion to Strike 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Jason Urquhart Richard D. Greenwood 
AFFD CCWRIGRM Affidavit of Emily A MacMaster Richard D. Greenwood 
BREF CCWRIGRM Defendant Idaho Department of Corrections Richard D. Greenwood 
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
BREF CCWRIGRM Defendant Richard D Haas Reply Brief in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
of Motion for Summary Judgment 
11/12/2009 DCHH CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 11/12/200903:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
DCHH CCKENNJA Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
held on 11/12/200903:00 PM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
AFFD CCKENNJA Supplemental Affidavit of John A. Bush Richard D. Greenwood 
12/1/2009 REPT CCMASTLW Joint Status Report Richard D. Greenwood 
12/15/2009 MISC CCNELSRF Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosures Richard D. Greenwood 
12/28/2009 DEOP CCKENNJA Memorandum Decision & Order Richard D. Greenwood 
12/31/2009 NOSV CCGARDAL Notice Of Service R~chard D. ~n~«~8 
1/4/2010 NOSV CCNELSRF Notice Of Service Richard D. 0 
1/14/2010 STIP CCTOWNRD Stipulation Re: Expert Witnesses Richard D. Greenwood 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
Page 7of8 
Judicial District Court - Ada 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-OC-2006-23517 Current Judge: Richard D. Greenwood 
John F Noak M.D vs. Prison Health Services Inc, etal. 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
John F Noak M.D vs. Prison Health Services Inc, Idaho Department Of Correction, Richard D Haas 
Date Code User Judge 
1/25/2010 MOTN CCNELSRF Defendants Prison Health Services Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Reconsider 
AFSM CCNELSRF Affidavit of Bruce Castleton In Support Of Motion Richard D. Greenwood 
MEMO CCNELSRF Defendants Prison Health Services Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
In Support 
1/27/2010 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order Re: Expert Witness Disclosures Richard D. Greenwood 
1/28/2010 NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (02/22/10 @ 11 :15am) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
02/22/2010 11 :15 AM) Motion to Reconsider 
2/1212010 MEMO CCWATSCL Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition ot Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant Prison Health Services Motion for 
Reconsideration 
AFFD CCWATSCL Supplemental Affidavit of John A Bush in Support Richard D. Greenwood 
of Memorandum in Opposition 
2/16/2010 CONT TCJOHNKA Continued (Hearing Scheduled 03/05/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
11 :00 AM) Motion to Reconsider 
NOTH TCJOHNKA Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
3/2/2010 MOTN CCNELSRF Defendants Prison Heath Services Motion to Richard D. Greenwood 
Reconsider Reply Brief 
AFFD CCNELSRF Second Affidavit of Bruce Castleton in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants Prison Heath Services Motion to 
Reconsider Reply Brief 
AFFD CCNELSRF Affidavit of Richard Dull Richard D. Greenwood 
3/5/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
03/05/2010 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
3/29/2010 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Richard D. Greenwood 
03/29/201003:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Plaintiff's to initiate call 
4/6/2010 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 04/12/2010 Richard D. Greenwood 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 12 Days 
4/28/2010 STIP CCWRIGRM Stipulation for Dismissal of Defendant Prison Richard D. Greenwood 
Health Services Inc 
5/5/2010 ORDR TCJOHNKA Order of Dismissal of Defendant Prison Health Richard D. Greenwood 
Services, Inc. with Prejudice 
CDIS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Prison Health Richard D. Greenwood 
Services Inc, Defendant; Noak, John F M.D, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/5/2010 
HRSC TCJOHNKA Hearing Scheduled (Status by Phone Richard D. Greenwood 
07/29/201004:30 PM) 
NOTH TCJOHNKA Notice Of Hearing Richard D. Greenwood 
5/7/2010 MOTN CCLATICJ Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. GrOWl:O 0 9 
Richard D. Haas' Motion for Attorneys Fees 
Date: 8/4/2010 
Time: 12:03 PM 
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5/7/2010 MEMO CCLATICJ Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Greenwood 
Richard D. Haas' Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
AFFD CCLATICJ Affidavit of James D. Carlson in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and 
Richard D. Haas' Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
AFFD CCLATICJ Affidavit of Emily A. MacMaster in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
State Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
5/18/2010 NOWD CCTOWNRD Notice Of Withdrawal of Co Counsel for Plaintiff Richard D. Greenwood 
(VanderVelde for Plaintiff) 
5/24/2010 OBJT CCWRIGRM Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants Idaho Richard D. Greenwood 
Department of Corrections and Richard D Haas 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
6/1/2010 NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (07/26/10 @ 4:30pm) Richard D. Greenwood 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Richard D. Greenwood 
07/26/201004:30 PM) Objection to Defendants 
Memorandum of Costs 
6/7/2010 JDMT TCJOHNKA Judgment Richard D. Greenwood 
CD IS TCJOHNKA Civil Disposition entered for: Haas, Richard D, Richard D. Greenwood 
Defendant; Idaho Department Of Correction, 
Defendant; Noak, John F M.D, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 6/7/2010 
6/14/2010 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Richard D. Greenwood 
6/18/2010 AMEN CCCHILER Amended Notice of Appeal Richard D. Greenwood 
6/28/2010 RQST CCWRIGRM Request for Additional Transcript and Clerks Richard D. Greenwood 
Record 
7/15/2010 RPLY CCGARDAL Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum of Costs 
AFFD CCGARDAL Affidavit of Kristine Coffman in Support of Richard D. Greenwood 
Memorandum of Costs 
AFFD CCGARDAL Affidavit of Emily A MacMaster in Memorandum Richard D. Greenwood 
of Costs 
7/26/2010 DCHH TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Richard D. Greenwood 
07/26/201004:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 50 pages 
7/29/2010 HRVC TCJOHNKA Hearing result for Status by Phone held on Richard D. Greenwood 
07/29/201004:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and ) 
DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE~OY DC 0623517 ... 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
Filing Fee: A-I S88.00 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, John Noak, by and through his counsel of 
record, and hereby complains and alleges against the above-named Defendants as follows: 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 000011 
PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff, John Noak, is and has been a resident of, 
Canyon County, Idaho. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant Idaho DepaI1ment of Correction, is and 
has been a subdivision of the State of Idaho. 
3. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc., was doing 
business in the State of Idaho and is a corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of 
Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State of Tennessee. 
4. At all times relevant hereto, Defendant David Richard Haas, upon infomlation and 
beliefwaslis a resident of the State ofIdaho residing in Ada County. Mr. Haas was an employee 
of the Idaho Department of Correction in Ada County, Idaho, during all times relevant herein. 
5. At all times relevant herein, Defendants John Does I through X are all unidentified 
persons or entities who were involved in the acts contained in this Complaint. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
6. All of the events giving rise to this action occurred in Ada County, Idaho making 
jurisdiction proper in this court. 
7 . Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
8. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limit of $1 0,000.00. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
9. Defendant Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC") has jurisdiction and control 
over all of the detention facilities in the State ofIdaho. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2 000012 
10. Defendant Prison Health Services ("PHS") is a provider of correctional healthcare 
services in the United States and was the contractual provider of medical services for the inmate 
patients at the IDOC correctional facilities at all times relevant to this action. 
11. The acts of the various individuals contained in this Complaint were committed 
while they were employed with either IDOC or PHS. Each and every act complained of was 
committed during the course and scope of their employment for which PHS and/or IDOC are 
lawfully responsible under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
12. The Plaintiff, Dr. John Noak ("Noak"), is a physician licensed to practice medicine 
in the state of Idaho. 
13. On or about April 2002, Noak began working part time as a doctor for PHS 
providing medical services to the inmate population at various IDOC facilities including the 
South Boise Women's Correctional Center in Ada County, Idaho. 
14. In October of 2002, Noak was asked by PHS to become the full time Medical 
Director. He accepted the position. 
15. Noak and PHS executed an employment contract which, inter alia, contained an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
16. IDOC knew that Noak had been promoted by PHS and was fU11her aware of the 
tem1S of his employment. 
17. As Medical Director, Noak was charged with overseemg all medical serVIces 
provided by PHS to the various IDOC facilities. Noak diagnosed and medically treated the 
inmate population at various IDOC facilities on behalf of PHS and directly supervised the 
physician assistants and correctional medical specialists employed by PHS. 
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18. Noak was also responsible for prescribing controlled substances to the inmate 
population. Pursuant to this requirement, Noak was required to acquire a site specific certificate 
issued by the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. Noak received such certification for four of 
IDOC's facilities including the South Boise Women's Correctional Center. 
19. As Medical Director, Noak was an innovative employee who met all the 
requirements of the job and received positive employment evaluations from Richard D. Dull 
("Dull"), the Idaho Regional Vice President for PHS. During his tenure as Medical Director, 
Noak did not receive any warnings or complaints nor was there any written documentation in his 
employee file indicating that there were any problems with the perforn1ance of his duties. 
20. On or about January 30, 2004, Noak examined/treated an inmate patient named 
Norma Hernandez ("Hernandez") at the South Boise Women's Correctional Center. Inmate 
Hernandez had been sick for several days and Dr. Noak had been apprised and was familiar with 
her condition. He examined her at the clinic in the prison on January 30, 2004,. Following the 
examination, and while charting, he indicated that inmate Hernandez could be returned to her 
room and she left accompanied by Jana Nicholson ("Nicholson") a Correctional Medical 
Specialist in the employ of PHS. 
21. As Hernandez and Nicholson were leaving, Noak heard a comment that Hernandez 
was gomg to faint. Noak immediately left the examination room and stepped between 
Hernandez and Nicholson and assumed the proper position for supporting Hernandez to protect 
her in the event she did faint. 
22. Hernandez did not faint. Noak then assisted her to her room, taking her by the arn1 
in an effort to support her. 
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23. After the incident, Nicholson complained about Noak's actions and loudly 
proclaimed that she was quitting her job. 
24. Thereafter, inmate Hernandez was contacted by vanous IDOC and/or PHS 
employees. Several hours after the incident, and after meeting with Nicholson, and perhaps 
others, Hernandez submitted a complaint to IDOC, claiming that he had battered her. 
25. IDOC initiated an investigation of the incident by and through Steven Wolf 
("Wolf') an investigator employed by the Office of Professional Standards for IDOC. 
26. On or about February 3, 2004, Wolf recommended to IDOC that the case be 
investigated for criminal prosecution by the Ada County Sheriffs Department. These 
recommendations were made largely in part due to statements made by Nicholson who reported 
that Noak inappropriately grabbed inmate Hernandez and pushed Nicholson in the process. 
27. Noak was never advised that an investigation was being conducted nor was he 
interviewed or asked to give a statement regarding the allegations as part of IDOC's internal 
investigation prior to Wolf making the recommendations referenced above. 
28. On or about Febmary 5, 2004, at the request of IDOC, the Ada County Sheriffs 
Department began an investigation. 
29. On February 11,2005, Wolf was contacted by Detective Don Lukasik ("Lukasik") 
from the Sheriffs Department and was inforn1ed that the County needed the reports that had 
been generated as part of the internal investigation. That same day, both Lukasik and Wolf 
interviewed Hernandez together. They also interviewed a Physicians Assistant named Karen 
Barrett. Again, Noak was not contacted or interviewed to discuss or address any of the 
allegations leveled against him by IDOC or PHS employees. 
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30. On February 12, 2004, Noak was advised that he would have to leave the facility 
and he was escorted out of the Idaho Maximum Security Institution by IDOC personnel and told 
that he was not allowed back. 
31. After being escorted out of the Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Noak went to 
the PHS regional office and met with Dull who infonned him that he was being placed on 
administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. To this point, 
Noak was unaware that an investigation of him was being conducted. 
32. On February l3, 2004, Noak met with Lukasic. This was the first attempt by 
investigators to discuss the incident with Noak. During the interview Noak denied that he 
battered inmate Hernandez. Subsequently, and on several occasions, Noak advised that the 
incident should have been recorded on IDOC closed can1era system and he specifically requested 
that Lukasic request a copy of the video tape from moc. Noak also requested a copy of the 
medical chart to further reflect upon what occuned that day. Noak was not permitted access to 
the medical chart and, to Noak's knowledge, IDOC has refused and/or failed to obtain or provide 
a copy of the video tape. 
33. On or about March 1, 2004, Wolf called Noak and asked him to participate in an 
interview. Noak consented to the interview, but asked that it wait until the criminal investigation 
was complete. Wolf never contacted Noak again for an interview. 
34. On or about March 9, 2004, Dull contacted Lukasic and learned that the Ada 
County Prosecutor's Office had declined to prosecute the alleged battery against Noak. 
35. Despite the fact that no criminal charges were to be filed and that IDOC"s internal 
investigation was apparently not yet completed, IDOC contacted PHS and directed them to 
tenninate Noak's employment as Medical Director. 
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36. On or about March 10,2004, Noak met with Dull. Dull inforn1ed Noak that he had 
received a memo from IDOC requesting that PHS take immediate action to replace Noak as 
Medical Director. Dull informed Noak that he had to follow moC's request. 
37. Despite Noak's outstanding record of service on behalf of PHS, PHS refused to 
support Dr. Noak and it implicitly accepted the spurious allegations made by IDOC and PHA 
employees and tenninated Noak's employment. 
38. Thereafter, and despite Noak's termination, Wolf continued his investigation. On 
March 11, 2004, Wolf interviewed Victoria Weremecki, a Correctional Medical Specialist. 
During this interview, Wolf was seeking out inforn1ation regarding how Noak may have violated 
IDOC's policies while employed with PHS. 
39. On March 12,2004, Wolf conducted an interview with Lisa May, a registered nurse 
who worked with Noak. During the interview, Wolf was seeking information regarding how 
Noak may have violated moc's policies while employed with PHS. 
40. On March 15,2004, with the knowledge that Noak had been cleared of any criminal 
charges stemming from the incident at IDOC, David Haas ("Haas") an IDOC employee, sent a 
letter to the Idaho State Board of Medicine infom1ing them of Hernandez's allegations and 
requesting that the Board investigate Dr. Noak .. 
41. After Noak's termination, and despite several requests for their return, PHS and 
IDOC unlawfully continued to use Noak's DBA certificates for the prescription of controlled 
substances from March 10, 2004, until May 6, 2004, when the certificates were recovered by an 
employee of the Board of Pharmacy. PHS and IDOC also maintained control of his prescription 
pads and Form 222's, and it is believed that these defendants improperly obtained, andJor stored 
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and/or dispensed medication under Noak's license and DEA certificates without authority and 
consent. 
COUNT I 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract 
42. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 41 as if set 
forth in full herein. 
43. There existed an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Plaintiffs 
employment agreement with Defendant PHS. Defendant IDOC similarly had certain duties and 
obligations under the contract and similarly was bound by the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
44. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant herein, perfOlmed in good faith, his obligation 
imposed by the contractual agreement. 
45. The defendants violated and significantly impaired the Plaintiffs ability to meet his 
contractual obligations and to receive the benefits of the contract, by terminating his 
employment. 
46. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the defendants, Plaintiff has 
suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than $10,000. 
COUNT II 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
47. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 46 if set forth 
in full herein. 
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48. As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, outrageous, malicious, reckless 
and/or negligent conduct of Defendants IDOC and/or PHS as alleged hereinabove, Plaintiff has 
inculTed severe mental suffering, manifested by substantial loss of sleep, headaches, stress 
disorders and/or other physical symptoms. 
49. As such, in addition to the relief requested hereinabove, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
recover monetary damages representing fair and reasonable compensation for all damages 
including emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the wrongful conduct alleged 
hereinabove in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT III 
Defamation Per Se 
(As to all Defendants) 
50. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained 111 Paragraphs 1 
through 49 of this Complaint as ifthey were fully set forth herein. 
51. Defendants' by and through their agent and/or employees, knowingly, unlawfully, 
and/or with improper intent solicited and/or encouraged and/or made false allegations of criminal 
and other unprofessional conduct against the Plaintiff. 
52. The allegations and accusations that the Plaintiff acted unprofessionally or 
criminally are false. 
53. Defendants published the remarks to third parties with knowledge of the falsity of 
the statements or in a reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. 
54. The publication was not privileged. 
55. The publication of these remarks has resulted in damages to the Plaintiffs 
reputation, general heath, and economic status. 
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56. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff has 
suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than $10,000. 
COUNT IV 
Tortuous Interference with Contract andlor Prospective Economic Advantage 
(As against Defendant IDOC) 
57. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained In Paragraphs 1 
through 56 of this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 
58. The Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy in his contract with PHS; Defendants 
had knowledge of this expectancy. The Plaintiff also had a valid prospective economic 
advantage given his background and training as a physician, should he ever leave the employ of 
PHS. 
59. The Defendants IDOC, by and through its agents and/or employees, with 
knowledge, intentionally, maliciously and/or without justifiable cause, wrongfully interfered 
with the Plaintiffs contractual relationship with PHS by pressuring PHS to tem1inate his 
employment with them. Further, IDOC, after Noak was terminated, took further steps to 
interfere with Noak's prospective employment opportunities by contacting the Idaho Board of 
Medicine and urging that it conduct an investigation into the false allegations made against 
Noak. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant, the Plaintiff has 
suffered general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than 
$10,000. 
/II 
/II 
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COUNT V 
Conversion 
61. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained 111 Paragraphs 1 
through 60 of this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 
62. Defendants PHS and IDOC disturbed the Plaintiffs rightful possession of his DEA 
site certificates, Form 222's, and prescription pads, by taking them from his control and 
exercising control and authority over them. 
63. The taking of the Plaintiffs property was done knowingly and without legal 
justification. 
64. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff has 
suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
As a result of the Defendants' actions as set forth above, Plaintiff has been required to 
retain the services of an attorney. to prosecute this action and has incurred and will continue to 
incur costs and attorney fees for which Plaintiff is entitled to a separate award pursuant to Idaho 
Code §§ 12-120 and -121, and Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as 
other applicable statute or rule, in an amount to be determined by the Court, or, if judgment is 
rendered by default, in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffprays and requests entry of judgment against both Defendants as 
follows: 
1. For special damages and lost earnings and benefits in an amount to be proven at 
trial; 
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2. For general and emotional damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
3. For attorney fees in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) if judgment 
IS taken by default, or in an amount the Court deems reasonable and just if this matter is 
contested; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by ajury composed of no less than twelve (12) persons on 
all issues so triable, pursuant to LR.C.P. 38(b). 
fW 
DATED this 12 day of December, 2006. 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Colleen D. Zahn [ISB No. 6208] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintit1~ 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES GROUP, 
INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
DEFENDANT PRISON HEALTH 
SERVICE'S ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL 
Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS"), by and through its attorneys of 
record, Naylor & Hales, P.e., answers Plaintiffs Complaint on file herein as follows: 
1. 
This Defendant denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs Complaint 
not herein specifically and expressly admitted. This Defendant reserves the right to amend this and 
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any other answer or denial stated herein, once it has had an opportunity to complete discovery 
regarding the allegations contained in Plaintiffs Complaint. 
2. 
Answering paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently 
without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and 
so denies the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
3. 
This Defendant admits paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
4. 
Answering paragraphs 4 and 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently 
vv1thout sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and 
so denies the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, infonnation or belief. 
5. 
Answering paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, entitled "Jurisdiction and 
Venue," this Defendant acknowledges that this Court has jurisdiction over properly pled matters; 
however, in making this acknowledgment, Defendant does not admit that any such matters are 
actually properly pled in Plaintiffs Complaint, or that the facts set forth in Plaintift's Complaint 
actually justifY the exercise of such jurisdiction. To the extent this Court has jurisdiction over these 
matters venue is proper. 
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6. 
Answering paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so denies 
the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
7. 
Answering paragraph 10 of Plaintiff s Complaint, this Defendant admits only that it 
is a provider of correctional healthcare services in the United States. This Defendant further admits 
and during the 2002-2004 time period, this Defendant was under contract with the State of Idaho 
Department of Corrections ("IDOC") to provide healthcare services to Idaho's offender population 
housed at correctional facilities maintained by IDOC. 
8. 
Answering paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein regarding IDOC 
and its employees, and so denies those allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or 
belief. Regarding the remaining assertions relating to "various individuals," those assertions appear 
to contain Plaintiffs legal assertions and to the extent a response is required to those assertions, this 
Defendant denies said assertions. 
9. 
Answering paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits only that while 
employed by this Defendant, Plaintiff was a physician licensed to practice medicine in the state of 
Idaho. 
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10. 
Answering paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that in 
April 2002, Plaintiff began working for this Defendant on a part-time basis. 
11. 
Answering paragraph 14 of Plaintiff' s Complaint, this Defendant admits only that in 
August 2002, Plaintiff applied for full-time employment with this Defendant as medical director. 
This Defendant admits that Plaintiff was offered employment in this position, which employment 
Plaintiff accepted. Plaintiff started work as medical director in October 2002. 
12. 
This Defendant denies paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
13. 
Answering paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so denies 
the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
14. 
Answering paragraph 17 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
Plaintiff's general duties while employed by this Defendant as Statewide Medical Director included 
providing health care to inmates and consultation to health staff, monitoring the provision of health 
care services, and supervising clinical services rendered by all health care providers, including 
physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, registered nurses, etc. 
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15. 
Answering paragraph 18 of Plaintiff's Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
Plaintiff s general duties while employed by this Defendant as Statewide Medical Director included 
providing health care to inmates and consultation to heal th staff. This Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 
18, and so denies those allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
16. 
This Defendant denies paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
17. 
Answering paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that on 
or about January 30, 2004, Plaintiff examined an offender named Norma Hernandez at the South 
Boise Women's Correctional Center. This Defendant further admits that prior to January 30, 
Plaintiffhad been made aware of Hernandez's condition by PHS staff. This Defendant admits that 
following Plaintiff s examination of Hernandez, he indicated Hernandez could return to her cell and 
that Hernandez left, accompanied by PHS employee Jana Nicholson. 
18. 
Answering paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained in the first sentence of 
paragraph 21, and so denies those allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
Answering the second sentence of paragraph 21, this Defendant admits that subsequent to Plaintiff 
indicating Hernandez could return to her cell, Plaintiff shoved Nicholson away and grabbed 
Hernandez's arm. 
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19. 
Answering paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
after Plaintiff grabbed Hernandez's arm, Plaintiff walked Hernandez back to her cell. 
20. 
Answering paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits that 
following Plaintiffs acts of grabbing Hernandez's arm and walking her to her cell, Nicholson 
complained about Plaintiff s actions. This Defendant is presently without sufficient information 
upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 23, and so denies 
those allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
21. 
Answering paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained therein, and 
so denies the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
22. 
Answering paragraphs 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
IDOC initiated an internal investigation of the incident involving Plaintiff and Hernandez. This 
Defendant is presently without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 25, and so denies those allegations at present for lack of 
knowledge, information or belief. 
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23. 
Answering paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so denies 
the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
24. 
This Defendant denies paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
25. 
Answering paragraph 28 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and so denies 
the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
26. 
Answering paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
PHS employee Karen Barrett was interviewed at some point by representatives ofIDOC and the Ada 
County Sheriffs Department. This Defendant is presently without sufficient information upon 
which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 29, and so denies the 
allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
27. 
Answering paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits it was 
informed that Plaintiff was escorted out of an IDOC facility on February 12,2004. This Defendant 
also admits that IDOC personnel informed this Defendant on that same date that Plaintiff would not 
be allowed to enter any IDOC sites until further notice. 
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28. 
Answering paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that 
PHS employee Richard Dull informed Plaintiff on February 12, 2004 that Plaintiff was being 
suspended with pay on a weekly basis until IDOC came a resolution in its internal investigation of 
the incident involving Plaintiff and Hernandez. This Defendant denies the remaining assertions 
contained in paragraph 31. 
29. 
Answering paragraphs 32 and 33 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant is presently 
without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and 
so denies the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
30. 
Answering paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that on 
March 9, 2004, Dull contacted the Ada County Sheriffs Office and learned that charges had not 
been filed against Plaintiff and that the prosecutor had declined the case. 
31. 
Answering paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits only that in 
a letter dated March 9, 2004, IDOC stated that it was exercising its right, as provided in IDOC's 
contract with this Defendant, to direct this Defendant to take immediate action to replace Plaintiff 
as Statewide Medical Director. 
32. 
This Defendant admits paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
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33. 
This Defendant denies paragraph 37 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
34. 
Answering paragraphs 38 and 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, this Defendant admits 
only that a representative oflDOC interviewed PHS employees Victoria Weremecki and Lisa 
May. 
35. 
Answering paragraph 40 of Plaintiff s Complaint, this Defendant is presently 
without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the allegations contained therein, and 
so denies the allegations at present for lack of knowledge, information or belief. 
36. 
This Defendant denies paragraph 41 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
37. 
Answering paragraph 42, which purports to repeat and incorporate prior allegations, 
and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, this Defendant reasserts and 
incorporates by this reference its prior responses to all of such allegations. 
38. 
This Defendant denies paragraphs 43, 44, 45, and 46 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
39. 
Answering paragraph 47, which purports to repeat and incorporate prior allegations, 
and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, this Defendant reasserts and 
incorporates by this reference its prior responses to all of such allegations. 
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40. 
This Defendant denies paragraphs 48 and 49 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
41. 
Answering paragraph 50, which purports to repeat and incorporate prior allegations, 
and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, this Defendant reasserts and 
incorporates by this reference its prior responses to all of such allegations. 
42. 
This Defendant denies paragraphs 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
43. 
Answering paragraph 57, which purports to repeat and incorporate prior allegations, 
and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, this Defendant reasserts and 
incorporates by this reference its prior responses to all of such allegations. 
44. 
Answering paragraphs 58, 59 and 60, these paragraphs relate solely to other 
Defendants, and as such no response is required from this Defendant. However, to the extent a 
response is required, this Defendant denies the allegations contained in said paragraphs. 
45. 
Answering paragraph 61, which purports to repeat and incorporate prior allegations, 
and to the extent any response is required to such allegations, this Defendant reasserts and 
incorporates by this reference its prior responses to all of such allegations. 
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46. 
This Defendant denies paragraphs 62, 63, and 64 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
47. 
This Defendant denies that paragraph in Plaintiffs Complaint entitled "Attorneys' 
Fees." 
48. 
Plaintiffs Complaint last contains what is commonly referred to as the Plaintiffs 
"Prayer for Relief," and to the extent any answer is required thereto, this Defendant denies the 
allegations contained therein, denies that the Plaintiff has stated any valid cause of action, or that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested therein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That this Defendant has not been able to engage in sufficient discovery to learn all 
of the facts and circumstances relating to the matters described in the Plaintiffs Complaint and 
therefore request the Court to permit this Defendant to amend its Answer and assert additional 
affirmative defenses or abandon affirmative defenses once discovery has been completed. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against this Defendant 
upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That some or all of the Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiff has failed to act reasonably or to otherwise mitigate his damages, 
if any. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That some or all ofthe Plaintiffs claims are barred by the Plaintiffs contributory or 
comparative negligence. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the Plaintiffs injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the 
negligent or careless misconduct and acts or omissions of other persons or entities, who this 
Defendant has no legal relationship with or responsibility for. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
That the acts and/or omissions, if any, of Defendant were privileged. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Any statements made by Defendant and/or Defendant's employees are protected by 
both absolute and qualified privileges. 
JURY DEMAND 
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 3 8(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby 
demand a trial by jury of the Plaintiffs action for damages. 
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ATTORNEY FEES 
This Defendant has been required to retain attorneys in order to defend this action and 
is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to LC. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for judgment against the Plaintiff as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that the 
Plaintiff take nothing thereunder. 
2. That Defendant be awarded its costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees 
pursuant to I.c. § 12-121 and LR.C.P. 54. 
3. That judgment be entered in favor of Defendant on all claims for relief. 
4. F or such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under 
the circumstances. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 2007. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c. 
By __ ~~ ________ ~~ __________ __ 
Colleen D. Zahn, Oqhe Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of January, 2007, I caused to be served, by 
the methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
White Peterson, P .A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, ID 83687-7901 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
John A. Bush 
Comstock & Bush 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, ID 83701-2774 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Emily A. MacMaster 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Attorneys for Defendant Hass 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Federal Express 
Fax Transmission 
466-4405 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Federal Express 
Fax Transmission 
344-7721 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Federal Express 
Fax Transmission 
334-2830 
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Deputy Attorneys General 
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Boise,ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emily.macmaster@ag.idaho.gov 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
) AND RICHARD D. HAAS'S MOTION 
) TODISMISS 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------------------
COME NOW Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. 
Haas ("Haas") (collectively, "the State Defendants"), by and through their attorney of 
record, Emily A. Mac Master, Deputy Attorney General, and file this Motion to Dismiss. 
The State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, filed December 15, 2006, ("Complaint") against the State Defendants pursuant to 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(I), (2) and (6) on the following grounds: (1) 
DEFENDANTS IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND 
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Plaintiff's lawsuit is barred, in its entirety, by the two-year statute of limitations under the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act ("LT.C.A."), at Idaho Code § 6-911~ (2) Plaintiff's claims that 
arose or reasonably should have been discovered prior to March 7, 2004, are barred by 
the notice of claim requirements under the LT.C.A., at Idaho Code §§ 6-905, 6-908~ 
(3) the State Defendants are immune from liability under the Idaho Medical Practice Act, 
Idaho Code § 54-1806A(12), and under the LT.C.A., Idaho Code § 6-904(3); (4) Counts I 
through V of the Complaint fail to state a claim against Haas; and (5) Counts I and III of 
the Complaint fail to state a claim against IDOC. 
This motion is based upon Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and 
Richard D. Haas's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and the Affidavit of 
Miren E. Artiach and Exhibit A thereto, both filed herewith, and on the pleadings on file 
with the Court in this action. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: Wt ~l[)cfr 
EMILY A. Mj..c MASTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of January, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
COLLEEN D ZAHN 
NAYLOR HALES 
950 W BANNOCK STE 610 
BOISE ID 83702 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
800 W IDAHO STE 300 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON5700 E 
FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
DU.s. Mail 
o Hand Delivery 
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
o Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile: 
o Statehouse Mail 
r;rG. S. Mail 
'8 Hand Delivery 
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile: 
o Statehouse Mail 
f/t'U.S. Mail 
~ Hand Delivery 
o Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
o Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile: 
o Statehouse Mail 
~()~_r4~ 
~ACMASTER 
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Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
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Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
AFFIDA VIT OF 
MlREN E. ARTIACH 
I, Miren E. Artiach, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state upon 
personal knowledge as follows: 
1. I am employed as a Deputy Secretary of State for the Idaho Secretary of 
State's Office. 
AFFIDA VIT OF MIREN E. ARTIACH - 1 
2. My functions and duties include compiling and maintaining the records and 
files of the Secretary of State's Office pertaining to claims filed against the State and its 
employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. This includes notice of tort claims filed 
with the office pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905 and copies of summons and complaints in 
civil litigation served upon this office pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-916. I am the 
designated custodian of these records. 
3. I have reviewed the files maintained by this office in an attempt to locate 
any and all documents filed by, or on behalf of, Plaintiff John F. Noak. 
4. I have located a "Notice of Tort Claim" filed with this office on behalf of 
Plaintiff on September 3, 2004. A true and COlTect copy of this tort claim filing is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
5. Other than attached Exhibit A, the Secretary of State has no record of 
Plaintiff filing any other tort claims with this office. 
This concludes my affidavit. 
Miren E~tiach 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this '\~ day of January, 2007. 
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uC'~ ¥", ~.~:)v~~C\~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
My Commission Expires: \ \ '9<. 15 . \!l:\ 
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BOISE ID 83702 
JOHN ABUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
800 W IDAHO STE 300 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON5700 E 
FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
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D Overnight Mail 
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D Statehouse Mail 
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EMILY k. MAC MASTER 
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DAVID D. MANWEILER 
MANWEILER, MANWEILER, BREEN & BALL, PLLC 
Attorneys at Law 
290 Bobwhite Court, Suite 300 
P.o. Box 937 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0937 
Telephone: (208) 424-9100 
Facsimile: (208) 424-3100 
Idaho State Bar No. 3588 
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RISK MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM 
Deputy Secretary of State 
NOTICE OF TO 
TO: STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
COMES NOW, JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., by and through his attorney 
of record, David D. Manweiler of the firm MANWEILER, MANWEILER, 
BREEN & BALL, PLLC, and pursuant to Title 6, Chapter 9, Idaho 
Code, hereby submits the instant Notice of Tort Claim. 
1. CONDUCT AND CIRCUMSTANCES CAUSING INJURY AND DAMAGES. 
On or about March 13, 2004, in Boise, Ada County, Idaho the 
Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D. was terminated from his employment 
with Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS") at the request of the 
Idaho Department of Corrections. The basis of this action was 
an alleged incident on January 30, 2004 at South Boise Women's 
Correctional Center ("SBWCC") that Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D. 
pushed a staff member and grabbed an offender/patient. A 
criminal investigation was initiated by the Ada County Sheriff's 
Office which resulted in no charges against Claimant, John F. 
Noak, M.D .. At all times material hereto, the State of Idaho 
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM - Page 1 
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Department of Corrections was responsible for the compliance of 
contracts between itself and II PHS II • At all times material 
hereto t the administrators t employees and staff of the State of 
Idaho, Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC") were charged 
with compliance with the subject contract between IDOC and PHS, 
and the security and control of offenders/patients. 
Said State and its agency IDOC negligently and wrongfully 
caused the termination of Claimant t John F. Noak, M.D. and the 
same was without sufficient grounds or basis. IDOC's, 
administrators, employees and staff were negligent in that they 
failed to comply wi th the covenant of good fai th and fair 
dealings which created a hostile work environment. Their 
actions were retaliatory against the Claimant, John F. Noak, 
M.D. IDOC was negligent in their supervision of certain 
offenders/patients, including at the time of the incident. IDOC 
was negligent in the transfer and unauthorized use of Claimant 
John F. Noak's DEA registration. Claimant I S injuries were 
proximately caused by the negligence and wrongful acts and 
omissions of the State of Idaho, and its agency IDOC and its 
administrators, employees and staff. 
2. DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGES AND INJURIES. 
As a direct and proximate result of the conduct described 
above, Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D., suffered and will continue 
to suffer tortuous interference to his right to contract, loss 
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM - Page 2 
of wages and benefits, libel, slander and defamation of this 
character and reputation, humiliation, embarrassment and anguish 
and other consequential damages. 
3. TIME AND PLACE INJURY AND DAMAGES OCCURRED. 
As set forth in Section 1 above, the injuries and damages 
occurred on March 13, 2004 in Boise, Ada County, Idaho. 
Claimant's injuries and damages are ongoing. 
4 . NAMES OF ALL KNOWN PERSONS INVOLVED. 
Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D. 
Lois Hart 
Karen Barrett 
Norma Rodriguez 
Jenna (LNU) 
Rick Dull 
R.D. Haas 
Beverly Kendrick 
Corey Riggs 
Rodney Roe 
Tom Beauclair 
Vern McCreedy 
Det. Lukasic 
Jan Atkinson 
5 . AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED. 
Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D.: $500,000 
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM - Page 3 
6. ACTUAL RESIDENCE OF CLAIMANTS. 
Claimant, John F. Noak, M.D. 's address is P.O. Box 907, 
Homedale, Idaho 83628. 
DATED this ~~ day of September, 2004. 
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM - Page 4 
David D. Manweile 
MANWEILER, MANWEILER, BREEN & 
BALL, PLLC 
Attorneys for Claimant, 
John F. Noak, M.D. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMILY A. MAC MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emily.macmaster@ag.idaho.gov 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
v. 
) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
) AND RICHARD D. HAAS'S 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
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COME NOW Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. 
Haas (,'Haas") (collectively, "the State Defendants"), by and through their legal counsel, 
the Office of the Idaho Attorney General, and hereby present this Memorandum in 
support of their Motion to Dismiss, filed concurrently herewith. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint"), filed on December 15, 
2006, Plaintiff John F. Noak, M.D. ("Plaintiff') alleges that he was an employee of 
Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS"). Plaintiff claims that, as a PHS 
employee, he provided physician services to inmates at IDOC correctional facilities. 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 10, 2004, after an incident involving his physical 
handling of a female inmate, IDOC requested that PHS replace Plaintiff's services, and 
PHS terminated Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff also alleges that Haas sent a letter to 
the Idaho Board of Medicine regarding the inmate's allegations, for investigation. 
All of Plaintiff's Counts in the Complaint (Counts I through V) against the State 
Defendants are time-barred pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations mandated by 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("I.T.C.A.") in Idaho Code § 6-911. Accordingly, on this 
basis alone, this Motion to Dismiss should be granted. 
However, should the Court determine to assess additional grounds for dismissal of 
this lawsuit, Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants further fail for the following 
additional reasons: 
• Plaintiff did not file a Notice of Tort Claim with the Idaho Secretary of 
State until September 3, 2004. The I.T.C.A. requires a notice of claims to be filed within 
180 days of when the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered. Idaho 
Code §§ 6-905, 6-908. Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants that 
arose or reasonably should have been discovered prior to March 7,2004, are barred. 
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• The Idaho Medical Practice Act grants immunity to the State Defendants 
for claims arising out of Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. See Idaho Code § 54-
1806A(12). Also, the I.T.C.A. grants immunity to the State Defendants on Plaintiff's 
claims for defamation and tortuous interference. See Idaho Code § 6-904(3). 
• Count I of the Complaint for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract fails to state a claim against 
the State Defendants because neither of them were parties to Plaintiff's alleged 
employment contract with PHS, or in privity with it. 
• Count III of the Complaint for Defamation Per Se fails to state a claim 
against the State Defendants. Neither IDOC's request that PHS replace Plaintiff's 
services nor Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine constitute defamation per se. Also, as 
it is true on the face of the Complaint that an inmate made allegations about Plaintiff, 
Count III cannot be maintained based upon Haas' letter. 
II. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
On September 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Tort Claim against IDOC. See 
Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach, ~[ 4 and Exhibit A, filed herewith.! On January 30, 2006, 
Plaintiff filed a federal action against several defendants, including IDOC and Haas, in 
the United States District Court, District of Idaho (Case No. CV 06-00039). On 
November 17, 2006, the federal court entered judgment in the action on an Order of 
Dismissal, dismissing Plaintiff's federal law claims with prejudice and dismissing 
Plaintiff's state law claims without prejudice. This Court may take judicial notice of the 
/ / / 
I Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege that he filed a Notice of Tort Claim. Rather than object to Plaintiffs 
Complaint in its entirety on that basis, the State Defendants have provided Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim herewith 
for the Court's convenience. Should judicial notice be required for this motion, the State Defendants hereby make a 
request for judicial notice pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. 
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federal lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. See Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 117 
Idaho 192, 193,786 P.2d 583,584 (Ct. App. 1990). 
On December 15, 2006, Plaintiff filed this state court lawsuit. The Complaint 
alleges five Counts: (1) Count I for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract; (2) Count II for Intentional and/or 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; (3) Count III for Defamation Per Se 
(expressly pled against all of the defendants); (4) Count IV for Tortuous Interference with 
Contract and/or Prospective Economic Advantage (expressly pled against IDOC only); 
and (5) Count V for Conversion. 
"I 
Following is a summary of the material factual allegations in the Complaint:"" 
1. PHS was the contractual provider of medical services for inmate patients in 
IDOC correctional facilities. Complaint, <]I 10. 
2. Haas acted during the course and scope of his employment with IDOC. 
Complaint, ~[ 11. 
3. Plaintiff is a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Idaho. 
Complaint, ~[ 12. 
4. In or about April 2002, PHS Plaintiff began working as a doctor for PHS, 
providing medical services to the inmates at various IDOC facilities. In October 2002, 
PHS asked Plaintiff to become the full-time Medical Director. Complaint, ~[~[ 13-14. 
5. Plaintiff and PHS executed an employment contract. Complaint, ~[ 15. 
6. IDOC knew that PHS had promoted Plaintiff and was aware of the terms of 
Plaintiff's employment with PHS. Complaint, ~[ 16. 
') ~ The State Defendants disagree with many of the factual allegations made in the 
Complaint. However, solely for purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the facts must be liberally 
construed in Plaintiff's favor and assumed to be true. 
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7. As Medical Director, Plaintiff oversaw all medical services provided by 
PHS at IDOC facilities, diagnosed and treated inmates at various IDOC facilities on 
behalf of PHS and supervised other PHS medical staff employees. Complaint, ~[ 17. 
8. Plaintiff acquired a federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) certificate for 
four IDOC facilities. Complaint, ~[ 18. 
9. On or about January 30,2004, Plaintiff examined inmate Norma Hernandez 
("Hernandez"). Plaintiff then indicated that Hernandez could retum to her room and she 
left accompanied by Jana Nicholson ("Nicholson"), a PHS Correctional Medical 
Specialist. As they were leaving, Plaintiff heard a comment that Hernandez was going to 
faint. Plaintiff stepped between Hernandez and Nicholson and assumed the position for 
supporting Hernandez to protect her in the event she fainted. Hernandez did not faint, 
and Plaintiff assisted her to her room by taking her arm. Complaint, ~[~[ 20-22. 
10. After the incident, Nicholson and Hernandez complained about Plaintiff's 
actions and IDOC initiated an internal investigation. Complaint, ~[~r23-25. 
11. On or about February 3, 2004, IDOC investigator Steven Wolf 
recommended to IDOC that the case be investigated for criminal prosecution. On or 
about February 5, 2004, the Ada County Sheriff's Department began an investigation. 
Complaint, ~[~[ 26-28. 
12. On February 12, 2004, Plaintiff was asked to leave an IDOC facility, was 
escorted from the facility and was not allowed to retum. PHS placed Plaintiff on 
administrative leave with pay pending the criminal investigation. Complaint, ~[~[ 30-31. 
13. On or about March 9, 2004, PHS learned that the Ada County Prosecutor's 
Office had declined to prosecute the alleged battery against Plaintiff. Complaint, ~[ 34. 
14. IDOC directed PHS to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Complaint, 
~[~[ 35-36. 
15. PHS terminated Plaintiff's employment. Complaint, ~[ 37. 
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16. On March 15, 2004, with knowledge that Plaintiff had been cleared of 
criminal charges, Haas sent a letter to the Board of Medicine informing the Board of 
Hernandez's allegations and requesting an investigation of Plaintiff. Complaint, ~[ 40. 
17. From March 10,2004, until May 6,2004, PHS and IDOC continued to use 
Plaintiff's DEA certificates for the prescription of controlled substances despite several 
requests for their return, and PHS and IDOC maintained control of Plaintiff's prescription 
pads and Form 222's. Complaint, ~[ 41. 
III. 
STANDARDS TO GRANT A MOTION TO DISMISS 
The standard for considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) 
entitles the non-moving party to have all inferences from the record and pleadings viewed 
in his favor; only then may the question may be asked whether a claim for relief has been 
stated. Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 578, 
850 P.2d 724, 729 (1993). The motion may be granted when it appears that the plaintiff 
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Ernst v. Heminway & Moser, Co., 120 
Idaho 941, 946, 821 P.2d 996, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991), modified, 126 Idaho 980, 895 P.2d 
581 (1995). The only facts which a court may properly consider on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim are those appearing in the complaint, supplemented by those 
facts of which the court may properly take judicial notice. See I.R.C.P. 12(b); Hellickson 
v. Jenkins. 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. The Two-Year Statute of Limitations Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act Bars 
Plaintiff's Claims Against the State Defendants 
Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants fall under the I.T.C.A., Idaho Code 
§§ 6-901, et seq. Idaho Code § 6-911 governs the statute of limitation for filing a claim 
under the I.T.C.A., stating: "Every claim against a governmental entity permitted under 
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the provisions of this act or against an employee of a governmental entity shall be forever 
baITed, unless an action is begun within two (2) years after the date the claims arose or 
reasonably should have been discovered." Idaho Code § 6-911. Idaho Code § 6-911 bars 
all of Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants. 
Plaintiff's only factual allegation in the Complaint naIlllng Haas is in 
paragraph 40. Plaintiff alleges that on March 15, 2004, Haas sent a letter to the Board of 
Medicine regarding Hernandez' allegations and requesting an investigation. Complaint, 
~[40. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-911, Plaintiff needed to file any lawsuit against Haas 
based upon the March 15, 2004, letter within two years, by March 15, 2006. However, 
Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until December 15, 2006, nine months after the two-year 
deadline for filing a claim. As Plaintiff did not comply with the limitations period under 
Idaho Code § 6-911, his claims against Haas should be dismissed. 
The Complaint does not allege any wrongful conduct by IDOC after May 6, 2004, 
when Plaintiff concedes that his DEA certificates were returned. Complaint, ~[ 41. As 
the Complaint does not allege any conduct by IDOC after May 6, 2004, the latest date for 
Plaintiff to file a lawsuit against IDOC was May 6, 2006. See Idaho Code § 6-911. 
However, Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until December 15, 2006, more than seven 
months after the two-year deadline. As Plaintiff did not comply with the limitations 
period under Idaho Code § 6-911, his claims against IDOC should be dismissed. 
The two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 6-911 is dispositive of all 
of Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants. For this reason alone, IDOC and Haas 
should be dismissed from this lawsuit. However, Plaintiff's claims against the State 
Defendants fail for additional reasons as well, as discussed below. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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B. Even if This Lawsuit Were Not Time-Barred in its Entirety, Plaintiff's 
Claims Against the State Defendants That Arose Prior To March 7, 2004, for 
Which Plaintiff Did Not File a Timely Notice of Tort Claim, Are Barred 
All claims against the State of Idaho or its employees under the I.T.C.A. must be 
"filed with the Secretary of State within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the 
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered." Idaho Code § 6-905. "No 
claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless the 
claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this act." Idaho 
Code § 6-908. Compliance with Idaho Code § 6-905 is mandatory~ the failure to comply 
bars a lawsuit. See Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 518, 50 P.3d 1004, 1013 
(2002). 
On September 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Tort Claim against IDOC. 
Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach, 1 4 and Exhibit A. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-905, the 
ISO-day period covered by Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim was March 7, 2004, through 
September 7, 2004. 
Plaintiff's allegations against the State Defendants that occurred, if at all, after 
March 7, 2004, are in Paragraphs 34 through 41 of the Complaint, as follows: (1) after 
March 7, 2004, IDOC directed PHS to terminate Plaintiff's employment and asked PHS 
to replace Plaintiff; (2) on or about March 11 and 12, 2004, an IDOC investigator 
continued IDOC's investigation by conducting two more interviews; (3) on or about 
March 15, 2004, Haas sent a letter to the Board of Medicine informing the Board of 
Helnandez's allegations and requesting an investigation~ and (4) from March 10, 2004, 
until May 6, 2004, after PHS terminated Plaintiff's employment, PHS and IDOC 
continued to use Plaintiff's DEA certificates and maintained control of Plaintiff's 
prescription pads and Form 222's. Complaint,1135-40. Idaho Code § 6-908 bars all of 
Plaintiff's other claims against the State Defendants because they arose or should have 
been reasonably discovered before March 7, 2004. 
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c. Under the Idaho Medical Practice Act, the State Defendants Are Immune 
from Liability Based Upon Haas' Letter to the Board of Medicine 
The Idaho Medical Practice Act, Idaho Code § 54-1S01, et seq., provides 
immunity to an individual who provides information to the Board of Medicine without 
malice. Idaho Code § 54-1S06A(l2) provides: "There shall be no liability on the part of 
and no action for damages against ... Any person providing information or testimony to 
the board, the committee, or their staff or officials without malice and in reasonable belief 
that such information is accurate." Idaho Code § 54-1S06A(l2). 
Haas' March 15, 2004, letter to the Board of Medicine falls squarely within the 
scope of Idaho Code § 54-1S06A(l2). On the facts alleged in the Complaint, the letter 
merely provides information to the Board of Medicine (i.e., of allegations by Hernandez) 
and requests an investigation. The information provided to the Board of Medicine in 
Haas' letter-that Hernandez had brought allegations against Plaintiff-was accurate, 
because Hernandez had complained to IDOC about Plaintiff. Complaint, ~[~[ 24, 40. 
Count III of the Complaint does not allege that the State Defendants acted with 
malice in making any alleged defamatory remarks. Complaint, ~[~[ 50-56. Thus, Idaho 
Code § 54-1S06A(l2) bars any defamation claim in Count III of the Complaint that arises 
out of Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. 
Count II (the emotional distress claims) and Count IV (the interference claims) do 
allege that IDOC acted maliciously. Complaint, ~[~[ 4S, 59. However, the facts alleged 
concerning Haas' March 15, 2004, letter to the Board of Medicine do not support 
Plaintiff's bare allegations of malice in Counts II and IV. Instead, at most, Plaintiff 
alleges that Haas sent the letter with knowledge that Noak had been cleared of criminal 
charges and that Haas asked for an investigation into Hernandez' allegations, which 
Plaintiff contends were false. Complaint, 1~[ 24, 40, 59. 
Neither allegation is sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute malice. The Idaho 
Medical Practice Act requires the Board of Medicine to receive, investigate and prosecute 
DEI<'ENDANTS IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND RICHARD D.000056 
HAAS'S lVIEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS· 10 
complaints concerning a wide range of physician misconduct, to protect the public health 
and safety. See Idaho Code §§ 54-1806, 54-1806A, 54-1814. Idaho Code § 54-1814 
enumerates multiple grounds for discipline in addition to physicians' crimes, such as 
failing to meet the local standard of care and engaging in abuse or exploitation of a 
patient. Idaho Code § 54-1814(7), (22); see also IDAPA 22.01.01.101. 
Accordingly, Haas did not need to confirm a criminal conviction or criminal 
conduct prior to informing the Board of Medicine of Hernandez' allegations. Likewise, 
Haas' did not need to first determine whether Hernandez' allegations were true or false. 
The facts alleged in the Complaint concerning Haas' letter are insufficient to constitute 
malice. Thus, all of Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants that are based upon 
Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine (in Counts II, III and IV) should be dismissed. 
D. Under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, the State Defendants Are Immune From 
Plaiutifl"s Defamation and Tortuous Interference Claims 
As discussed above, Plaintiff's claims in his Notice of Tort Claim are limited to 
alleged facts occurring on or after March 7, 2004. See Idaho Code § 6-905. Thus, 
Plaintiff's defamation and interference claims are limited to his factual allegations that 
IDOC directed PHS to terminate his employment, that Haas sent a letter to the Board of 
Medicine and that IDOC and PHS delayed in returning Plaintiff's DEA certificates to 
him. Complaint, <][~[ 34-41. 
Under the I.T.C.A., Idaho Code § 6-904(3) provides immunity to state agencies 
and their employees against defamation and interference claims. "A governmental entity 
and its employees while acting within the course and scope of their employment and 
without malice or criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... 3. Arises 
out of ... libel, slander, ... or interference with contract rights." Idaho Code § 6-904(3). 
The statutory immunity provided by Idaho Code § 6-904(3) bars Plaintiff's 
defamation and interference claims against the State Defendants. In the Complaint, 
Plaintiff alleges that all IDOC employees acted within the course and scope of their 
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employment. Complaint, <J[ 11. Neither Count III (the defamation claim) nor Count IV 
(the interference claims) alleges that the State Defendants acted with criminal intent. 
And, as discussed above, Plaintiff's defamation claim does not allege malice. Thus, on 
the face of the Complaint, Idaho Code § 6-904(3) provides immunity to the State 
Defendants against all of Plaintiff's defamation claims. For this reason, Count III against 
IDOC and Haas should be dismissed. 
Count IV (the interference claims) alleges that IDOC acted maliciously, by 
allegedly pressuring PHS to terminate his employment and urging the Board of Medicine 
to conduct an investigation. Complaint, ~[59. However, neither allegation rises to the 
level of malice under Idaho Code § 6-904. 
For purposes of Idaho Code § 6-904, the Idaho Supreme Court defines malice to 
mean "actual malice," which the Court defines as "the intentional commission of a 
wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether 
or not injury was intended." Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 182, 731 P.2d 
171, 187 (1987); Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 216, 796 P.2d 87, 93 fn. 6 
(1990). IDOC's demand that PHS replace Plaintiff's services does not rise to the level of 
a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or with ill will. Complaint, ~[~[ 10, 
35, 36, 59. Likewise, providing notice to the Board of Medicine that allegations against a 
physician have been made and requesting an investigation does not constitute actual 
malice. Plaintiff's allegation of malice in the Complaint is fatally insufficient. Under 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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Idaho Code § 6-904(3), Plaintiff's defamation and interference claims against the State 
Defendants should be dismissed. 
E. Count I Fails to State a Claim for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract Against the State 
Defendants Because Neither of Them Were Parties to Plaintiff's Employment 
Agreement 
Count I of the Complaint, for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract, is based upon an alleged 
employment agreement between Plaintiff and PHS. Complaint, ~[43. Plaintiff claims that 
all of the defendants violated the covenant in his alleged employment agreement with 
PHS, by the termination of his employment. Complaint, ~[45. 
Under Idaho law, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment 
agreement is a covenant in contract, not in tort. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley 
Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266, 288, 824 P.2d 841, 863 (1992), citing Burton v. Atomic 
Workers' Federal Credit Union, 119 Idaho 17,23,803 P.2d 518,524 (1990). A claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and/or public policy in an 
employment agreement therefore sounds in contract; the claim does not sound in tort. ld. 
On the allegations in the Complaint, IDOC and Haas were not parties to Plaintiff's 
alleged employment contract with PHS or in privity with it. Complaint, ~[15, 16, 43. 
Instead, Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff and PHS were the parties to his employment 
agreement; at most, IDOC was aware of the terms of his employment with PHS. ld. 
These allegations are insufficient to support Plaintiff's contract claims against the State 
Defendants. See Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253,260-61,92 P.3d 503,510-11 
(2004) (rejecting the plaintiff's contract claims, where the plaintiff was not a party to the 
contract); Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 953, 782 P.2d 1230, 
1235 (1989) (holding that absent tortuous conduct, the defendant company was not liable 
for inducing, ratifying or approving its employee's breach of a non-competition 
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agreement with a former employer); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 197-98, 983 P.2d 
848,851-52 (1999) (rejecting the plaintiffs claim, finding no privity in contract). 
Thus, Count I of the Complaint against the State Defendants should be dismissed. 
F. Count III Fails to State a Claim for Defamation Per Se Against the State 
Defendants Because the Alleged Statements Are Not Defamatory Per Se and, 
on the Face of the Complaint, Are True. 
In Count III of the Complaint for Defamation Per Se, Plaintiff claims that the 
defendants made false allegations of criminal and other unprofessional conduct by him. 
The only alleged statements by the State Defendants that are not barred by Idaho Code § 
6-908 (governing Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim) are IDOC's alleged direction to PHS 
to terminate Plaintiff s employment and Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. 
Complaint, ~l~[ 34-41. These alleged remarks are insufficient to state a defamation per se 
claim against either IDOC or Haas. 
For a statement to be defamatory per se, "[it] is not sufficient, standing alone, that 
the language is unpleasant and annoys or irks plaintiff, and subjects him to jests or banter, 
so as to affect his feelings." Weeks v. M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 637, 516 
P.2d 193, 196 (1973), quoting Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 179, 249 
P.2d 192, 195 (1952). Instead, the words must be of such a nature that the court can 
presume, as a matter of law, that they "will tend to disgrace and degrade the person or 
hold him up to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule or cause him to be shunned and 
avoided." [d. Here, none of the alleged statements rise to the level of defamation per se. 
Plaintiff alleges that on or about March 10, 2004, IDOC: (1) "contacted PHS and 
directed them to terminate Noak's employment as Medical Director;" and (2) sent a 
memo "requesting that PHS take immediate action to replace Noak as Medical Director." 
Complaint, ~m 35-36. Neither of these alleged communications rise to the level of 
defamation per se. There is nothing defamatory in IDOC's request to PHS, a contractor, 
/ / / 
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to replace services provided by a PHS employee to the state agency. Complaint, ~[~[ 35-
36. Plaintiff's defamation claim on this basis fails, as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff also alleges that "[o]n March 15,2004, with the knowledge that Noak had 
been cleared of any criminal charges stemming from the incident at IDOC, David Haas, 
an IDOC employee, sent a letter to the Idaho State Board of Medicine informing them of 
Hemandez's allegations and requesting that the Board investigate Dr. Noak." Complaint, 
~[20. However, merely informing the Board of allegations made by a patient against 
Plaintiff, which the Board may want to investigate, does not constitute defamation per se. 
Additionally, truth is a complete defense to Plaintiff's defamation claim. See 
Baker v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 99 Idaho 688, 690, 587 P.2d 829, 831 (1978). For the 
defense of truth to apply, the defendant need only prove that "the substance or gist of the 
slanderous or libelous statement is true." Id., citing Laughton v. Crawford, 68 Idaho 578, 
201 P.2d 96 (1948) and Prosser, Torts (4th ed.) § 116, p. 798. When the plaintiff's 
pleadings admit the truth of an alleged defamatory statement, the defendant is relieved of 
the burden of proving truth as a defense. Laughton v. Crawford, 68 Idaho at 582, 201 
P.2d at 98 (1948) (citation omitted). 
The gist of Haas' alleged statement III the March 15, 2004, letter about 
"allegations" by Hernandez was true, because, as pled by Plaintiff, Hernandez had 
"submitted a complaint to IDOC" about Plaintiff's conduct, claiming that he had battered 
her. Complaint, ~m 24, 40. Also, Haas' mere alleged request that the Board investigate 
Plaintiff is not defamatory per se. As Plaintiff fails to state a claim for defamation per se 
against either of the State Defendants, Count III against them should be dismissed. 
G. Haas Should Be Dismissed From this Lawsuit 
Plaintiff's only factual allegations in the Complaint naming Haas are in Paragraph 
40, which addresses Haas' March 15, 2004, letter to the Board of Medicine. The only 
Counts that identify Haas or his March 15, 2004 letter are Count III for defamation per se 
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and Count IV for tortuous interference with contract and/or prospective economIC 
advantage. On these allegations, Haas should be dismissed from this lawsuit. 
As discussed above, Haas is immune from liability on these tort claims. See Idaho 
Code §§ 6-904(3), 54-1806A. Moreover, Count III fails to state a claim for defamation 
per se against Haas because, on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the March 15, 2004, 
letter is not defamatory and the letter's alleged reference that Hernandez made allegations 
against Plaintiff was true. Therefore, Haas should be dismissed from this lawsuit. 3 
H. The Office Of The Attorney General Should Be Awarded Its Attorney's Fees 
And Costs 
The Office of the Attorney General should be awarded its costs and fees in 
defending this action on behalf of the State Defendants. Idaho Code § 12-121 provides 
that "[i]n any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) provides for an award of "reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party or parties" under Idaho Code § 12-121 when "the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, umeasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P.54(e)(1). 
The decision to award or not award attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Golder v. 
Golder, 110 Idaho 57, 61, 714 P.2d 26, 30 (1986). Further, an award of attorney's fees is 
not limited to private attorneys. See, e.g., Parsons v. Beebe, 116 Idaho 551, 553, 777 
P.2d 1224, 1226 (Ct. App. 1989) (attorney general awarded attorney's fees). 
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against IDOC and Haas without regard to the two-year 
statute of limitations under the I.T.C.A. See Idaho Code § 6-911. Also, many of 
Plaintiff does not name Haas as a defendant on any remaining Counts in this lawsuit. In any event, Haas' 
March IS, 2004, letter cannot be construed as a breach of any covenant in Plaintiff's alleged employment 
agreement, which PHS had already terminated on March 10,2004. Additionally, should Plaintiff allege that Haas is 
liable for any other torts based upon the March 15,2004, letter, Plaintiffs other tort claims fail along with Plaintiff's 
defamation claim and should be dismissed for duplicity. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 867 F.2d 1188, 
1193 fn. 2 (9th Cir. 1989), quoting Leidholdt v. L.F.P., 860 F.2d 890, 893 fn. 4 (9th Cir. 1988) ("An emotional 
distress claim based on the same facts as an unsuccessful libel claim cannot survive as an independent cause of 
action"); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1351 (Del. 1992) (listing jurisdictions refusing to allow intentional 
int1iction of emotional distress claims "where the gravamen of the complaint sounded in defamation"). 
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Plaintiff's claims against the State Defendants are barred by the LT.C.A.' s notice of tort 
claim requirements and by statutory immunities. See Idaho Code §§ 6-904(3), 6-905, 6-
90S, 54-1S06A(12)). Additionally, Counts I, II, III and IV fail to state a claim against the 
State Defendants. Plaintiff's Complaint was filed frivolously, unreasonably, and without 
foundation. Therefore, the Attorney General's Office, on behalf of the taxpayers of 
Idaho, should be awarded its attorneys' fees and costs in defending this action. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, the State Defendants respectfully request an 
order from the Court dismissing the Complaint as to them, with prejudice, and awarding 
the Attorney General's Office, on behalf of the taxpayers of Idaho, its attorneys' fees and 
costs incun'ed in this action. 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th da y of January, 2007, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
COLLEEN D ZAHN / /QU.S. Mail 
NA YLOR HALES D Hand Delivery 
950 W BANNOCK STE 610 D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
BOISE ID 83702 D Overnight Mail 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
800 W IDAHO STE 300 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON5700 E 
FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
~s.Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
o Facsimile: 
q?tatehouse Mail 
/(] U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
~do~ 
EMILY '. C MASTER 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974, 6023 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
dWilkinson@whitepeterson.com 
John A. Bush 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB No. 3925 
jabush@comstockbush.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
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PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
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· . 
The Idaho Department of Corrections (I DOC) and Richard Haas seek dismissal 
of the Plaintiff's complaint arguing, inter alia, that the statute of limitations has expired. 
For the reasons set forth below, that motion should be denied. 
BACKGROUND 
The essential allegations of the Plaintiff's complaint focus on several key points. 
First, Plaintiff was the medical director working for Prison Health Services (PHS) and 
was responsible for providing medical care to inmates under the control and supervision 
of the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC). Plaintiff had a comparatively long 
tenure and laudatory performance reviews with PHS. (Compl.,m 12-19). 
In January of 2004 an inmate, Norma Hernandez, was being treated by the 
Plaintiff. A nursing assistant, Jana Nicholson, had similarly been following inmate 
Hernandez. Dr. Noak examined inmate Hernandez on January 30. After the 
examination, and while charting, he indicated that inmate Hernandez could be returned 
to her room. As Hernandez and Nicholson were leaving, Dr. Noak heard a comment 
that Hernandez was going to faint. Dr. Noak left the examination room and noted that 
Nicholson was not in a proper position to support Hernandez if she did faint. He 
stepped between Hernandez and Nicholson and assumed the proper position for 
supporting Hernandez to protect the inmate. (Com pI. ,-r,-r 20, 21). 
Hernandez did not faint and Nicholson became upset at the actions taken by Dr. 
Noak. Dr. Noak escorted inmate Hernandez back to her cell. After Dr. Noak left 
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Hernandez, Nicholson went to Hernandez's cell and spent significant time discussing 
the incident with her. The consequence of the meeting between Nicholson and 
Hernandez was a complaint written by Hernandez, against Dr. Noak. It is Plaintiff's 
belief that inmate Hernandez was manipulated and/or coerced into filing the complaint, 
a fact which was known or should have been know to IDOC. (Compl.,-r,-r 22-25). 
The incident occurred in a hallway at an IDOC facility with video monitors so it 
was recorded. IDOC had control of the video tape. IDOC had notice that an incident 
had occurred immediately and IDOC had notice that a complaint had been made within 
hours. IDOC knew or should have known that the incident had been recorded and 
requests were made to preserve the video tape. Despite request, IDOC has not made 
the video available to any of the agencies investigating the Plaintiff nor to the Plaintiff. 
(Compl. ,-r 32). 
IDOC initiated an investigation. The matter was subsequently referred to Ada 
County who refused to prosecute. Importantly, even though Plaintiff had been cleared 
of criminal wrongdoing by an independent agency, IDOC demanded that PHS terminate 
its contract with the Plaintiff. (Compl.,-r,-r 34-35.) 
PHS terminated the plaintiff. However, even after Dr. Noak was terminated, 
IDOC continued to investigate the plaintiff, interviewing IDOC and PHS employees and 
inquiring as to whether Dr. Noak had ever violated any IDOC policies and procedures. 
IDOC's post termination actions were specifically designed to create a record, after the 
fact, supporting its demand and intentional interference with the NoaklPHS contract. In 
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that context, and throughout the investigations, it is believed that IDOC employees had 
conversations and communications with PHS and other agencies in which it 
communicated and perpetuated the false allegation of battery and otherwise solicited 
and implied that Dr. Noak had violated IDOC policies and procedures. (Compl. 1m 29, 
38,39). 
While searching for a record to support the decision to demand Plaintiff's 
termination, and despite the fact that Plaintiff had already been terminated, IDOC and/or 
Haas made unilateral contact with the Idaho Board of Medicine, inviting the Board to 
conduct an investigation of the Plaintiff, thereby putting his licensure at risk. (Com pI. 11 
40). After plaintiff's termination, and despite the plaintiff's informal and formal demand 
for return of his DEA certificates, IDOC, and others, continued to operate the medical 
facility at IDOC under the auspices of the plaintiff's license and drug certifications. Such 
actions were not only unlawful but similarly exposed the Plaintiff to reprimand and 
censure. (Compl. 11 41). 
As IDOC noted in its moving papers, the litigation was initially commenced in 
federal court. Plaintiff asserted federal statutory claims and state law claims. 
Ultimately, that action was dismissed based on stipulation of the parties. The federal 
court dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Order of the Court, 
attached to the affidavit of John A. Bush as Exhibit "A," specifically states that the 
dismissal of the federal claims eliminated its original jurisdiction which, in turn, 
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eliminated any basis and any reason to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
law claims. Consequently, the state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations on claims pending in 
federal court, which are dismissed without prejudice, is tolled while that litigation is 
pending and for thirty (30) days thereafter. The federal action was dismissed on 
November 17, 2006. The state court action was filed on December 15, 2006, or within 
twenty-eight (28) days of the federal dismissal and within the thirty day tolling provision. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Standard of Review 
Review of motion to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) requires that the all 
inferences in the record be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Miles v. Idaho 
Power Co., 116 Idaho 635,778 P.2d 757 (1989). After drawing all inferences in the non 
moving party's favor, the question is whether a claim for relief has been stated. Id. This 
issue is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled 
to offer evidence in support of the claims. See Orthman v. Idaho Power, Co., 126 Idaho 
960, 895 P.2d 561 (1995). 
2. Idaho Tort Claims Act 
In light of the tolling provisions noted above, IDOC's argument regarding the 
statute of limitations is essentially moot. There is no argument raised that the initial 
lawsuit filed in federal court was not timely. Thus, given the tolling provision, and the 
fact that the state court lawsuit was filed within the thirty (30) day proper time frame, the 
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state court lawsuit is timely. The same argument applies to Defendant Haas, who was 
a named defendant in the federal lawsuit. The defendant's argue that the complaint 
against defendant Haas needed to be filed by March 15, 2006. 1 The federal lawsuit 
was filed in January of 2006, well before the statute of limitations ran. Again, under 
application of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the statute of limitations was tolled while the case 
was pending in federal court and for an additional thirty days following dismissal. Thus, 
the complaint is timely. 
Although not raised in its initial motion, the State may argue that the tolling 
provisions do not apply to IDOC in light of Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 
534 U.S. 533, 122 S.Ct. 999 (2002). In that case the Supreme Court issued a narrow 
ruling that the supplemental jurisdiction statute did not toll statute of limitations for 
claims against non-consenting States filed in federal court but subsequently dismissed 
on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The ruling is narrow because in subsequent cases, 
the Supreme Court declined to extend the ruling to political subdivisions of the state. 
See Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456, 123 S.Ct. 1667 (2003). Similarly, the 
Supreme Court has specifically found that that the Eleventh Amendment does not erect 
a barrier to impose individual and personal liability on state officials. See Hafer v. Melo, 
502 U.S. 21,112 S.Ct. 358 (1991). 
1 The allegations of the state court complaint relative to IDOC necessarily relate and refer to actions by 
and through its agents/employees. Many of the allegations may very well involve Defendant Haas but, at 
this stage of the litigation, it is unknown. Plaintiffs do not concede that Defendant Hass's actions are 
limited to those identified in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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The decisions are important because there is no foundation for the argument that 
I DOC was dismissed from the federal action based solely on Eleventh Amendment 
grounds. IDOC sought dismissal of the federal action on numerous grounds, arguing, 
in addition to the Eleventh Amendment, that certain immunities applied and/or that the 
Plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim. The State Defendants also filed a motion for 
a more definite statement in response to Plaintiff's 118 page complaint. 
The federal court dismissed the case based on the parties' stipulation. It did not 
reach nor render an independent decision relative to the Eleventh Amendment or any 
other issue. Rather, the Court's order reflects that that the dismissal of the federal 
claims eliminated the Court's original jurisdiction. Both the stipulation of the parties and 
the Court's Order was premised on the fact that the federal court had subject matter 
jurisdiction rather than lacking the same. Indeed, had the federal court determined that 
the Eleventh Amendment was a complete bar, it could have crafted its own order 
indicating that it never had subject matter jurisdiction from the outset. 
Absent a specific finding by the federal court that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction based on the Eleventh Amendment, the Raygard case, supra, is simply not 
applicable. Indeed, as to certain of the claims asserted, at least as to the individual 
Defendants, it would appear, based on Hafer, that the Eleventh Amendment was never 
an issue. 
However, and even though the Order of dismissal does not specifically state the 
basis, should this Court find that the federal court dismissed for lack of subject matter 
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jurisdiction which would then implicate the tolling provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the 
Plaintiff has concurrently filed a Motion to Amend the complaint to add those individuals 
previously named as Defendants in place of the IDOC. The purpose of this 
amendment, and the substitution, as addressed in that motion, is to eliminate the 
procedural technicalities now at issue. Under Hafer, there is no issue as to the 
applicability of the tolling provisions, as related to the individuals. 
More importantly, under the liberal construction principles applicable to an 
I.R.C.P. Rule 15 motion to amend, the only issue before the Court is whether or not the 
parties sought to be added, or substituted, were on notice of the claims prior to time 
period in which the statute ran, absent the tolling provisions, and adding them to the 
complaint would not be prejudicial. Given that each of the individuals sought to be 
included were also named in the federal complaint, there is no argument as to notice. 
As to prejudice, any such argument would similarly fail as only a matter of months has 
passed since the federal claim was dismissed. In addition, the state has not raised 
prejudice relative to the statute of limitations issue and do so now would sound hollow in 
light this response. 
3. TORT CLAIM NOTICE 
IDOC next argues that even if this lawsuit is not generally time barred, any claims 
which arose prior to the six month period encompassed by Plaintiff's tort claim notice 
are time barred. There are several problems with the State's argument. First, IDOC 
does not identify any claims which are subject to the argument and is thus asking the 
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Court to operate in a vacuum, issuing a blanket ruling that applies both retrospectively 
and prospectively. Moreover, as IDOC points out, the necessity of filing a tort claim 
does not arise until the claim actually arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. Idaho Code § 6-905. Given the discovery exception, the Plaintiff fails to 
see how the Court could possibly rule that some claim, as yet identified, is dismissed for 
failure to file a tort claim regardless of when the tort claim was filed or when the facts 
supporting a claim were ultimately discovered. 
For example, IDOC conGludes that any claim, or conduct supporting a claim, 
which arose prior to March 7, 2004 is time barred because that is outside the window of 
the six month time period encompassed by Plaintiff's tort claim notice. However, if one, 
or more, of Plaintiff's claims is based on conduct that occurred prior to that time but 
such conduct was unbeknownst to the Plaintiff until a later date, the question before the 
Court may very well be different. In other words, if Plaintiff could not reasonably 
discover the basis of the claim until after March 7, 2004, but the conduct giving rise to 
the claim occurred before that date, it would presumably be covered by the timely filed 
tort claim notice. Absent such a record, there is no basis for the Defendants' argument 
nor a record upon which the Court can rule that there is a blanket barrier to any claim or 
conduct which occurred prior to March 7,2004. 
4. Idaho Medical Practice Act 
Plaintiff's complaint alleges the following conduct on the part of IDOC, its 
employees, and agents, which necessarily include defendant Haas: 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONS' AND RICHARD HAAS' MOTION TO DISMISS -P- 9 000073 
As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, outrageous, malicious, 
reckless and/or negligent conduct of Defendants IDOC and/or PHS as alleged 
hereinabove, Plaintiff has incurred severe mental suffering, manifested by 
substantial loss of sleep, headaches, stress disorders and/or other physical 
symptoms. (See paragraph 48) 
Defendants' by and through their agent and/or employees, knowingly, 
unlawfully, and/or with improper intent solicited and/or encouraged and/or made 
false allegations of criminal and other unprofessional conduct against the 
Plaintiff. (Com pI. 1f 51). 
The noted allegations, along with the general allegations of the complaint, assert 
claims for defamation and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the allegations arguing that the allegations are 
necessarily limited to contact between defendant Haas and/or other IDOC employees 
and the Idaho Board of Medicine and that they are immune from any claim based on 
that contact. In addition, the Defendants argue that the Plaintiff failed to include the 
word "malice" in asserting the defamation claim and that the claim must therefore fail. 
First, while it is known, and was specifically alleged, that IDOC and/or defendant 
Haas had contact with the Board of Medicine, it is not known, at this stage of the 
proceedings, how many contacts there were and whether there were other actions 
taken by IOOC and/or defendant Haas which similarly support the defamation and 
emotional distress claims. No discovery has been conducted. There is no factual 
record before this Court. 
As to what is known, regarding the contact between IOOC and/or defendant 
Haas, and as is alleged, the contact was initiated by IOOC through defendant Haas. 
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The Defendants claim that they are immune for any claim that arises out of such 
conduct. That is not an accurate nor a fair reading of the statute, however. 
First, Idaho Code § 42-1806A empowers the board of medicine to create a 
committee for professional discipline and it empowers the committee, under the control 
and supervision of the board, to conduct "professional disciplinary enforcement 
investigations" and to thereafter recommend action. As part of the powers granted by 
statute, the Committee can conduct investigations, conduct hearings, gather evidence, 
and take other action in conjunction and consistent with Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act. (See 54-1806A(6)(a)-(h). In the context of conducting investigations, 
hearings, or other activities authorized by the statute, an immunity for liability is provided 
to the board, the committee, any staff members or officials, and "any person providing 
information or testimony to the board, the committee, or their staff, without malice and in 
the reasonable belief that such information is accurate". I.C.54-1806A(12). 
The Defendants argue that they are totally immune from any liability relative to 
the report by defendant Haas to the Board of Medicine, regardless of intent, truth, or 
motive. Such a broad brushed application of the statute is clearly not envisioned. 
Rather, as is plain from a full reading of the statute, immunity is provided to those 
persons providing information to the committee, the board, or others associated with an 
investigation or other matter which is initiated by and/or pending before the board. In 
other words, if the committee, acting under the direction of the board of medicine, 
conducts an investigation or holds a hearing and calls an individual as a witness or 
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seeks other evidence from an individual, that person can testify or respond with 
immunity. However, where, as here, defendant Haas, and/or others from IDOC, 
initiated the contact with the board and essentially invited scrutiny of the Plaintiff's 
alleged conduct, there is no immunity granted by the statute as there was no action 
pending by the Board of Medicine nor was there any request by the board that 
Defendant Haas or anyone else from the IDOC respond to a request for evidence. 
To hold otherwise would simply not make sense as it essentially immunizes the 
world before the Board of Medicine takes any action, whatever that may be, and 
regardless of motive or intent. Certainly, there are valid policy reasons to protect the 
committee and the board, in carrying out its duty, and similarly, to protect persons from 
whom the board solicits information. However, there is no such policy, and no such 
language within the statute, which would similarly protect those who unilaterally contact 
the board when no proceeding, disciplinary or otherwise, is already pending. Given the 
standard of review of this motion, the Court must assume that IDOC and/or Defendant 
Haas acted improperly, whether that be with malice, criminal intent, or without a 
reasonable belief as to the accuracy of the allegations against Dr. Noak. In the face of 
that assumption, to blindly immunize the actors simply defies logic and is not consistent 
with the statutory language. 
IDOC apparently concedes that the allegations of the complaint which assert that 
is acted with malice would preclude dismissal as to it. Defendant Haas is critical of the 
complaint, however, in that it does not specifically state malice relative to the allegations 
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found in paragraph 51. In that regard, the complaint states, as noted, that the 
Defendants' actions (including defendant Haas) were done knowingly, unlawfully, and 
with improper intent. The complaint also alleges that there had been a lengthy 
investigation and that Dr. Noak had been cleared of any wrongdoing. (Compl. ,-r. 40). 
Thus, while the complaint does not specifically state "malice" or "criminal intent," 
the allegations that the conduct of the Defendants was unlawful and/or with improper 
intent, and taken with knowledge that Dr. Noak had been cleared, should certainly place 
the Defendants on notice of the Plaintiff's claims. The is particularly so given the liberal 
construction allowed under notice pleading concepts. 
5. Tort Claim Act Immunity 
The Defendants correctly assert that under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, certain 
immunities are provided to governmental entities and their employees who are acting 
within the course and scope of their employment. However, that immunity is lost when 
the employee acts with malice or criminal intent. In their motion, the Defendants again 
argue that the lack of the specific allegations of malice or criminal intent subject the 
complaint to dismissal. 
As noted above, the complaint, as to the defamation counts, alleges that the all 
Defendants, including IDOC, defendant Haas, and IDOC employees and/or agents, 
acted knowingly, unlawfully and with improper intent. Under notice pleading, such 
allegations are sufficient to place the defendant on notice that the Plaintiff is asserting 
that the actors acted unlawfully (criminal intent) and with an improper intent (malice). 
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As to the tortuous interference claim, the complaint does specifically allege that 
the defendant IDOC. thorough its employees and/or agents, acted maliciously and 
wrongfully interfered with the Plaintiffs contract. The Defendants complain, however, 
that the allegations do not include the word "criminal intent" and that even though the 
term malice appears, it is still "fatally insufficient" because it is not defined to include the 
"intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or 
excuse and with ill will". (See Defendant's Memorandum, p. 12). 
Generally, a claim for relief need only contain a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Moreover, a party's 
pleadings should be liberally construed to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive 
resolution of the case. With the advent of notice pleading, a party is no longer slavishly 
bound to stating a particular theory. Rather, a complaint need only state claims upon 
which relief may be granted. The emphasis is to insure that a just result is 
accomplished rather than requiring strict adherence to rigid forms of pleading. The key 
issue in determining the validity of a complaint is whether the adverse party is on notice 
of the claims brought against it. Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp .. 140 Idaho 416 
(2004). (citations omitted). 
As to the noted counts of the complaint, the words wrongfully, unlawfully. 
maliciously, and with improper intent are used. Despite those allegations, and despite 
the fact that the Defendants are clearly on notice as to the nature of the claims 
asserted, the Defendants argue that the complaint is deficient because it lacks specific 
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words and definitions. The defendant is asking this Court to strictly scrutinize the 
complaint searching for specific words and phrases. Such an exercise is neither 
necessary nor consistent with the law. 
6. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The Defendants argue that because they were not parties to the contract 
between the Plaintiff and the defendant, there can be no liability for a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This argument begins at page 13 of 
their brief. Ironically, on page 12 of their brief, the Defendants acknowledge that IDOC 
placed a "demand that PHS replace Plaintiff's services .... If 
Defendant's argument on this point is really a motion for summary judgment. 
The contract between the parties is not before the Court. There is no factual record 
before the Court as to what rights and obligations IDOC had under the contract. IDOC 
had a contract with PHs. PHS had a contract with Dr. Noak. IDOC reserved, however, 
the right to demand termination of PHS's medical director under certain specified 
conditions. Whether or not that clause required that I DOC exercise its right in good faith 
and fair dealing and whether or not that implied covenant inured to the benefit of Dr. 
Noak cannot be determined without a factual record. 
7. Defamation Per Se 
The Defendants correctly note that the Plaintiff's complaint alleges that the 
Defendants made false allegations of criminal and other unprofessional conduct. 
However, the defendant then argues that the only alleged statements that are not 
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barred by the Idaho Tort Claims Act are those relating to IOOC's direction that PHS 
terminate the Plaintiff and defendant Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. This 
argument is based on the previously untenable position that nothing which occurred 
prior to March 7,2004 can be used to factually support any of Plaintiff's claims. 
As discussed above, because there is a discovery provision within Idaho's Tort 
Claim Act, the 180 day time in which to file the tort claim does not necessarily frame the 
window of relevant inquiry for determining the existence of a cause of action. For 
example. the defendant argues that anything which happened prior to March 7, 2004 is 
barred by the statute of limitations because that is outside the six month time period 
established by the filing of Plaintiff's tort claim. However, one of Plaintiff's allegations is 
that the allegations made by inmate Hernandez, aside from being false, were the 
product of manipulation or coercion. Plaintiffs believe the discovery will reveal that 
Jana Nicholson met with inmate Hernandez for a significant period of time following the 
incident in question and that the consequence of that meeting was a complaint against 
the Plaintiff. It is believed that discovery will reveal the IOOC knew, or should have 
known, that Ms. Nicholson was very angry with Dr. Noak and motivated to take action 
that would be detrimental to him. In addition, Plaintiff's believe that discovery will reveal 
that the incident which is alleged to have occurred was video taped. Plaintiff also 
believes that discovery will reveal that IOOC had notice and opportunity to preserve the 
video tape. Plaintiff believes that discovery will reveal that after IOOC obtained the 
complaint from inmate Hernandez, and despite knowing or having reason to know of its 
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falsity, disseminated the information not only to internal IDOC employees but outside 
agencies, including but not limited to, PHS, the Board of Medicine, and perhaps others. 
Some of this conduct occurred in February of 2004 but was not discovered by the 
Plaintiff until much later. 
Again, as argued above, it is believed that the lOCO and/or defendant Haas 
knew or had reason to know that inmate Hernandez's allegations were not well 
grounded. Indeed, the best proof as to what happened was presumably recorded by 
IDOC cameras. Plaintiff believes that IDOC and/or Haas communicated the false 
allegations to others, knowing or having reason to know of the falsity and that such 
actions were done intentionally, unlawfully and/or with improper intent. 
Respectfully, the Plaintiff believes that the complaint states the necessary 
allegations to support the claims asserted and that the Defendants are fairly on notice of 
those claims. As to the technical pleading issues which are raised, i.e., failure to use 
particular words or definitions, and to the extent that such perceived deficiencies are 
problematic, the Plaintiff has filed a motion to amend which should be granted by the 
Court so that this merit can be tested on the merits. 
8. Costs and Attorney Fees 
The Defendants request costs and attorney fees on the basis that Plaintiff's 
complaint was filed frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Obviously, if the 
motion is denied, this a moot issue. If, however, the motion were granted, the Court 
should consider the following. 
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First, the Defendants suggest that the lawsuit was filed without regard for the two 
year statute of limitations period under the ITCA. To the contrary, the litigation was filed 
with the express understanding and belief that the statute of limitation period was tolled 
by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). That provision was an express and included term within the 
stipulation filed by the parties to dismiss the federal lawsuit yet it is a fact that the state 
defendant's ignore in their motion to dismiss. 
Second, the Defendants argue that many of plaintiff's claims are barred by the 
notice requirements of the ITCA and/or statutory immunities. However, again, the state 
Defendants interpretation the notice provisions and its applicability is overly narrow and 
not consistent with the plain language of the statue and its motion to dismiss is based, 
in part, on a strict and technical reading of the Plaintiff's complaint which is contrary to 
the liberal rules of notice pleading. 
Plaintiff's complaint has not been pursued frivolously or without foundation and 
an award of attorney fees is not appropriate. 
t:o
V 
DATED this 1..\ day of February, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
By:-i-"'--I--"'¥-"'---+-_____ _ 
ush 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
C/'l, 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of February, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Colleen D. Zahn 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610 
Boise, 10 83702 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TIORNEY GENERAL 
David G. High 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
Emily A. Mac Master 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
o 
o g 
o 
~ 
o 
o 
Facsimile (208) 383-9516 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile (208) 334-2830 
Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Overnight Delivery 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974,6023 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
dwilkinson@whitepeterson. com 
John A. Bush 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB No. 3925 
jabush@comstockbush.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV OC 0623517 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF ) 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BUSH 
DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
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STATE OF IDAHO) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
I, John A. Bush, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am one of the attorneys for Plaintiff John Noak, M.D., in the above-
referenced lawsuit. I make this affidavit upon my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. That I am an attorney, duly licensed by the State of Idaho Bar Association 
to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
3. That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the 
Stipulation for Dismissal filed in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho 
on November 17, 2006. 
4. That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Order 
for Dismissal signed by the Honorable B. Lynn Winmill and filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Idaho on November 17,2006. 
5. That attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the 
proposed Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
FURTHER YOU AFFIANT SAITH ~ 
-J~-rn~.~B-u-s-;;1-r----------------­
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 2L day of February, 2007. 
&diLl/1M ~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR Idaho 
Residing at: Boise, 10 
My Commission Expires: q -/ Lf -D 7 
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I hereby certify that on this t:\. day of February, 2007, I served a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument, by method indicated below, upon: 
Kirtlan G. Naylor 
Colleen D. Zahn 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
950 W. Bannock St., Ste. 610 
Boise, 10 83702 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TIORNEY GENERAL 
David G. High 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
Emily A. Mac Master 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise, 1083720-0010 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN A. BUSH -p- 3 
o Facsimile (208) 383-9516 
o Hand Delivery 
~ U.S. Mail 
o Overnight Delivery 
o Facsimile (208) 334-2830 
~ Hand Delivery 
o U.S. Mail 
o Overnight Delivery 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974, 6023 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
dWilkinson@whitepeterson.com 
John A. Bush 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB No. 3925 
jabush@comstockbush.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC, a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC; SECURE PHARMACY ) 
PLUS, INC, a subsidiary of AMERICAN ) 
SERVICES GROUP, INC; RICHARD D. ) 
DULL; RODNEY D. HOLLIMAN; NORMA ) 
HERNANDEZ; JANA BETH NICOLSON; 
VICTORIA M. WEREMECKI; KAREN ) 
BARRETT; LISA MAYS; IDAHO ) 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; ) 
THOMAS J. BEAUCLAIR, Director; ) 
RICHARD D. HAAS, Medical Services 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL - I 
Case No. CV-06-39-S-BLW 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
EXHIBIT 
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Manager; STEVEN WOLF, Office of ) 
Professional Standards IDOC; and DOES 1- ) 
10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
----------------------------) 
The Court has before it the parties' StipUlation for Dismissal. (Docket No. 30). 
The Plaintiffs Complaint asserts both federal law and state law claims. The Plaintiffs 
federal law claims are alleged in Counts II, III, IV and VIII of the Complaint. The Plaintiffs 
state law claims are alleged in Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Complaint. 
The Defendants have moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs federal law claims and argue that 
the Court should decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1367. 
The Plaintiff has conceded that the Defendants' motions to dismiss the federal law claims are 
meritorious. The parties have stipulated that dismissal of the federal law claims eliminates 
original jurisdiction for the Court leaving only the state law claims. The parties further stipulate 
that the Court should decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 
ORDER 
Based upon the parties' Stipulation for Dismissal, and good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Idaho Department of 
Correction, Thomas 1. Beauclair, Richard D. Haas and Steven Wolfs Motion to Dismiss 
(Docket No.6) and PHS Defendants' Motion to Grant Motion to Dismiss (Docket No.9) are 
hereby GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs federal law claims. All of the Plaintiffs federal claims in 
the Complaint are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court declines to retain supplemental jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1367 and that all of Plaintiffs state law claims in the Complaint are 
hereby dismissed without prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that State Defendants' Petition for Award of Attorneys Fees 
is hereby GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall pay State Defendants $1,062.50, and 
Plaintiff shall pay PHS Defendants $2,655.00 pursuant to the Court's November 9, 2006 Order. 
Each party shall bear their own costs and fees not subject to the November 9, 2006 Order. 
-;;.'l'I\.Tf;S t~( .. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL - 3 
<-
1-" 
.~ 
DATED: November 17,2006 
D~W~ 
B. WIN MILL 
Chief Judge 
United States District Court 
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John A. Bush 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) 
) Case No. CV06-00039 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
Page 1 of 6 
vs. ) STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; SECURE PHARMACY ) 
PLUS, INC., a subsidiary of ) 
AMERICAN SERVICES GROUP, INC.; ) 
RICHARD D. DULL; RODNEY D. ) 
HOLLIMAN; NORMA HERNANDEZ; ) 
JANA BETH NICOLSON; VICTORIA ) 
M. WEREMECKI; KAREN BARRETT; ) 
LISA MAYS; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; THOMAS J. ) 
STIPULATION FOR DISMISSAL-1 
EXHIBIT 
j UVSO~~ 
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BEAUCLAIR, Director; RICHARD D. . ) 
HAAS, Medical Services Manages; ) 
STEVEN WOLF, Office of Professional ) 
Standards IDOC; and DOES 1-10 ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Filed 111 6 Page 2 of 6 
Come now the Plaintiff John F. Noak, by and through his counsel of record, and 
the Defendants, Idaho Department of Correction, Thomas J. Beauclair, Richard D. Haas 
and Steven Wolf, by and through their counsel of record, and Defendants Prison Health 
Services, Inc., American Services Group, Inc., Secure Pharmacy Plus, Inc., Richard D. 
Dull, Rodney D. Holliman, Jana Beth Nicolson, Victoria M. Weremecki, Karen Barrett. 
and Lisa Mays, by and through their counsel of record, and hereby stipulate and agree 
as follows: 
1. That the Plaintiff's Complaint on file herein asserts claims based on 
federal law and state law. The Plaintiff's federal law claims are alleged in Counts II, III, 
IV and VIII of the Complaint. The Plaintiff's state raw claims are alleged in Counts I, II. 
III. IV, V, VI, VII, VIII and IX of the Complaint. Paragraph 5 of the Complaint alleges that 
the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
2. That the Defendants have each filed motions to dismiss the Plaintiffs 
Complaint arguing, inter alia, that the federal claims fail for various reasons and that the 
Court should decline to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims in the absence of 
original federal jurisdiction. 
3. That the Plaintiff concedes that the Defendants' motions to dismiss which 
challenge the substantive federal law allegations of the Plaintiffs complaint are 
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meritorious. In the absence of original jurisdiction premised on the federal law claims, 
the Plaintiff further agrees that, consistent with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 
the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 
Therefore, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Plaintiffs Complaint 
shall be dismissed. The parties further stipulate and agree that the Court should decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over those state 
law claims asserted in the Plaintiffs complaint. The Plaintiffs federal claims shall be 
dismissed with prejudice and the state claims shall be dismissed without prejudice. 
The parties further stipulate and agree that the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants 
all costs and fees required by the November 9, 2006 Order (Docket No. 28) but each 
party shall bear their own costs and fees not subject to the November 9, 2006 Order. 
DATED this __ day of November, 2006. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Emily Mac Master, 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this __ day of November, 2006. 
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meritorious. In the absence of origInal jurisdiction premised on the federal law claims, 
the Plaintiff further agrees that, consistent with the- provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 
the Court shoUld decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiCtion over the state law claims. 
Therefore, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Plaintiffs Complaint 
shaH be dismissed. The parties further stipulate and agree that the Court should decline 
to exercise supplemental jUrisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C- § 1367(0) over those state 
law claims asserted in the Plaintiffs complaint. The Plaintiff's federal claims shall be 
dismissed with prejudice and the state claims shall be dismissed without prejudice. 
The parties further stipulate and agree that the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants 
all costs and fees required by the No.vember 9, 2006 Order (Docket No. 28) but each 
party shall bear their own costs and fees not subject to the November 9, 2006 Order. 
DATED this IC ..f~ay of November, 2006. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATIORNEY GENERAL 
E~c~~m~b 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this _ day of November, 2006. 
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meritorious. In the absence of original jurisdiction premised on the federal law claims, 
the Pla,intiff further agrees that, consistent with the provisions of 2.8 U.S.C. § 1367(0), 
the Court should decline to exercise supplementa.l jurisdiction OVer the state faw claims. 
Therefore, the parties hereby stipulate and agree tha.t the Plaintiff's Complaint 
shall be dismissed. The parties fllrther stipulate and agree that the Court should decline 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) OVer those state 
law claims asserted in the Plaintiffs complaint. Tile Plaintiffs federal claims shall be 
dismissed with prejudice and the state claims shall be dismIssed witn-out prejudice. 
The partIes further stipulate and agree that the Plaintiff shall pay the Defendants 
all costs and fees required by the November 9, 2006 Order (Docket No. 28) but each 
party shall bear their own costs and fees not subject to the November 9, 2006 Order. 
DATED this_' _day of November, 2006. 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Emi!y Mac Master, 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this ~ day of November, 2006. 
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tv. 
DATED this ~ day of November, 2006. 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
~
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
tv 
DATED this JL day of November, 2006. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
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Kevin E. Dinius 
Dennis P. Wilkinson 
WHITE PETERSON, P.A. 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 
Nampa, Idaho 83687-7901 
Telephone: (208) 466-9272 
Facsimile: (208) 466-4405 
ISB No. 5974, 6023 
ked@whitepeterson.com 
dwilkinson@whitepeterson.com 
John A. Bush 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2774 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2774 
Telephone: (208) 344-7700 
Facsimile: (208) 344-7721 
ISB No. 3925 
jabush@comstockbush.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D. ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV OC 0623517 
) 
-vs- ) 
) FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a) AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; THOMAS BEAUCLAIR, ) 
Director, Idaho Department of Corrections; ) 
STEVEN WOLF; RICHARD D. HAAS; and ) 
DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. 
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1 
COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, John Noak, by and through his 
counsel of record, and hereby complains and alleges against the above-named 
Defendants as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. At all times relevant hereto, the Plaintiff, John Noak, is and has been a 
resident of, Canyon County, Idaho. 
2. At all times relevant hereto, the Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc., was 
doing business in the State of Idaho and is a corporation incorporated under the laws of 
the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in the State of Tennessee. 
3. At atl times relevant hereto, Defendants Thomas Beauclair, Steven Wolf and 
Richard Haas upon information and belief were residents of the State of Idaho residing 
in Ada County. Said Defendants were employees of the Idaho Department of 
Correction in Ada County, Idaho, during all times relevant herein. 
4. At all times relevant herein, Defendants John Does through X are all 
unidentified persons or entities who were involved in the acts contained in this 
Complaint. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
5. All of the events giving rise to this action occurred in Ada County, Idaho 
making jurisdiction proper in this court. 
6. Venue is appropriate pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-404. 
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GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
7. The Idaho Department of Corrections ("IDOC") has jurisdiction and control 
over all of the detention facilities in the State of Idaho. Defendant Beauclair was the 
Director of the IDOC at the relevant times noted herein. 
8. Defendant Prison Health Services ("PHS") is a provider of correctional 
healthcare services in the United States and was the contractual provider of medical 
services for the inmate patients at the I DOC correctional facilities at all times relevant to 
this action. PHS acted through its employees/agents and is responsible for said act 
pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
9. Defendants Beauclair, Wolf and Haas were employed by IDOC at all 
relevant times. Said Defendants took actions under the auspices of IOOC authority but, 
in certain circumstances, acted outside the scope of their authority, with malice and/or 
criminal intent, such that they are or may be subject to personal liability. 
10. The Plaintiff, Dr. John Noak ("Noak"), is a physician licensed to practice 
medicine in the state of Idaho. 
11. On or about April 2002, Noak began working part time as a doctor for PHS 
providing medical services to the inmate population at various IDOC facilities including 
the South Boise Women's Correctional Center in Ada County, Idaho. 
12. In October of 2002, Noak was asked by PHS to become the full time 
Medical Director. He accepted the position. 
13. Noak and PHS executed an employment contract which, inter alia, 
contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
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14. Pursuant to this promotion, an employment contract containing an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was signed between Noak and PHS. 
15. IDOC knew that Noak had been promoted by PHS and was further aware of 
the terms of his employment. 
16. As Medical Director, Noak was charged with overseeing all medical services 
provided by PHS to the various IDOC facilities. Noak diagnosed and medically treated 
the inmate population at various IDOC facilities on behalf of PHS and directly 
supervised the physician assistants and correctional medical specialists employed by 
PHS. 
17. Noak was also responsible for prescribing controlled substances to the 
inmate population. Pursuant to this requirement, Noak was required to acquire a site 
specific certificate issued by the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency. Noak received 
such certification for four of IDOC's facilities including the South Boise Women's 
Correctional Center. 
18. As Medical Director, Noak was an innovative employee who met all the 
requirements of the job and received positive employment evaluations from Richard D. 
Dull ("Dull"), the Idaho Regional Vice President for PHS. During his tenure as Medical 
Director, Noak did not receive any warnings or complaints nor was there any written 
documentation in his employee file indicating that there were any problems with the 
performance of his duties. 
19. On or about January 30, 2004, Noak examined/treated an inmate patient 
named Norma Hernandez ("Hernandez") at the South Boise Women's Correctional 
Center. Inmate Hernandez had been sick for several days and Dr. Noak had been 
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apprised and was familiar with her condition. He examined her at the clinic in the prison 
on January 30, 2004,. Following the examination, and while charting, he indicated that 
inmate Hernandez could be returned to her room and she left accompanied by Jana 
Nicholson ("Nicholson") a Correctional Medical Specialist in the employ of PHS. 
20. As Hernandez and Nicholson were leaving, Noak heard a comment that 
Hernandez was going to faint. Noak immediately left the examination room and 
stepped between Hernandez and Nicholson and assumed the proper position for 
supporting Hernandez to protect her in the event she did faint. 
21. Hernandez did not faint. Noak then assisted her to her room, taking, her by 
the arm in an effort to support her. 
22. After the incident, Nicholson complained about Noak's actions and loudly 
proclaimed that she was quitting her job. 
23. Thereafter, inmate Hernandez was contacted by various IDOC and/or PHS 
employees. Several hours after the incident, and after meeting with Nicholson, and 
perhaps others, Hernandez submitted a complaint to IDOC, claiming that he had 
battered her. 
24. IDOC initiated an investigation of the incident by and through Steven Wolf 
("Wolf') an investigator employed by the Office of Professional Standards for IDOC. 
25. On or about February 3, 2004, Wolf recommended to I DOC that the case be 
investigated for criminal prosecution by the Ada County Sheriff's Department. These 
recommendations were made largely in part due to statements made by Nicholson who 
reported that Noak inappropriately grabbed inmate Hernandez and pushed Nicholson in 
the process. 
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26. Noak was never advised that an investigation was being conducted nor was 
he interviewed or asked to give a statement regarding the allegations as part of IDOC's 
internal investigation prior to Wolf making the recommendations referenced above. 
27. On or about February 5, 2004, at the request of IDOC, the Ada County 
Sheriff's Department began an investigation. 
28. On February 11, 2005, Wolf was contacted by Detective Don Lukasik 
("Lukasik") from the Sheriff's Department and was informed that the County needed the 
reports that had been generated as part of the internal investigation. That same day, 
both Lukasik and Wolf interviewed Hernandez together. They also interviewed a 
Physicians Assistant named Karen Barrett. Again, Noak was not contacted or 
interviewed to discuss or address any of the allegations leveled against him by IDOC or 
PHS employees. 
29. On February 12, 2004, Noak was advised that he would have to leave the 
facility and he was escorted out of the Idaho Maximum Security Institution by IDOC 
personnel and told that he was not allowed back. 
30. After being escorted out of the Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Noak 
went to the PHS regional office and met with Dull who informed him that he was being 
placed on administrative leave with pay pending the outcome of the criminal 
investigation. To this point, Noak was unaware that an investigation of him was being 
conducted. 
31. On February 13, 2004, Noak met with Lukasic. This was the first attempt by 
investigators to discuss the incident with Noak. During the interview Noak denied that 
he battered inmate Hernandez. Subsequently, and on several occasions, Noak advised 
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that the incident should have been recorded on I DOC closed camera system and he 
specifically requested that Lukasic request a copy of the video tape from IDOC. Noak 
also requested a copy of the medical chart to further reflect upon what occurred that 
day. Noak was not permitted access to the medical chart and, to Noak's knowledge, 
I DOC has refused and/or failed to obtain or provide a copy of the video tape. 
32. On or about March 1, 2004, Wolf called Noak and asked him to participate 
in an interview. Noak consented to the interview, but asked that it wait until the criminal 
investigation was complete. Wolf never contacted Noak again for an interview. 
33. On or about March 9, 2004, Dull contacted Lukasic and learned that the Ada 
County Prosecutor's Office had declined to prosecute the alleged battery against Noak. 
34. Despite the fact that no criminal charges were to be filed and that IDOCus 
internal investigation was apparently not yet completed, IDOC contacted PHS and 
directed them to terminate Noak's employment as Medical Director. 
35. On or about March 10, 2004, Noak met with Dull. Dull informed Noak that 
he had received a memo from IDOC requesting that PHS take immediate action to 
replace Noak as Medical Director. Dull informed Noak that he had to follow IDOC's 
request. 
36. Despite Noak's outstanding record of service on behalf of PHS, PHS 
refused to support Dr. Noak and it implicitly accepted the spurious allegations made by 
IDOC and PHA employees and terminated Noak's employment. 
37. Thereafter, and despite Noak's termination, Wolf continued his investigation. 
On March 11, 2004, Wolf interviewed Victoria Weremecki, a Correctional Medical 
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Specialist. During this interview, Wolf was seeking out information regarding how Noak 
may have violated IDOC's policies while employed with PHS. 
38. On March 12, 2004, Wolf conducted an interview with Lisa May, a 
registered nurse who worked with Noak. During the interview, Wolf was seeking 
information regarding how Noak may have violated IDOC's policies while employed with 
PHS. 
39. On March 15, 2004, with the knowledge that Noak had been cleared of any 
criminal charges stemming from the incident at IDOC, David Haas ("Haas") an IDOC 
employee, sent a leUer to the Idaho State Board of Medicine informing them of 
Hernandez' allegations and requesting that the Board investigate Dr. Noak .. 
40. After Noak's termination, and despite a request for their return, PHS and 
IDOC unlawfully continued to use Noak's DEA certificates for the prescription of 
controlled substances from March 10, 2004, until May 6, 2004, when the certificates 
were recovered by an employee of the Board of Pharmacy. PHS and I DOC also 
maintained control of his prescription pads and Form 222's, and it is believed that these 
defendants improperly obtained, and/or stored and/or dispensed medication under 
Noak's license and DEA certificates without authority and consent. 
COUNT I 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract 
41. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 41 as if 
set forth in full herein. 
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42. There existed an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in Plaintiff's 
employment agreement with Defendant PHS. Defendant IDOC similarly had certain 
duties and obligations under the contract and similarly was bound by the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
43. The Plaintiff, at all times relevant herein, performed in good faith, his 
obligation imposed by the contractual agreement. 
44. The defendants violated and significantly impaired the Plaintiff's ability to 
meet his contractual obligations and to receive the benefits of the contract, by 
terminating his employment. 
45. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the defendants, Plaintiff 
has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than $10,000. 
COUNT II 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress 
46. Plaintiff realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 46 if set 
forth in full herein. 
47. As a direct and proximate result of the intentional, unlawful, outrageous, 
malicious, reckless and/or negligent conduct of Defendants I DOC and/or PHS as 
alleged hereinabove, Plaintiff has incurred severe mental suffering, manifested by 
substantial loss of sleep, headaches, stress disorders and/or other physical symptoms. 
48. As such, in addition to the relief requested hereinabove, the Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover monetary damages representing fair and reasonable compensation 
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for all damages including emotional distress suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the 
wrongful conduct alleged hereinabove in an amount to be proven at trial. 
COUNT III 
Defamation Per Se 
(As to all Defendants) 
49. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 
1 through 49 of this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 
50. Defendants by and through their agent and/or employees, knowingly, 
maliciously, unlawfully, and/or with criminal intent and/or a reasonable belief as to the 
accuracy of the information, solicited and/or encouraged and/or made false allegations 
of criminal and other unprofessional conduct against the Plaintiff. 
51. The allegations and accusations that the Plaintiff acted unprofessionally or 
criminally are false. 
52. Defendants published the remarks to third parties with knowledge of the 
falsity of the statements or in a reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. 
53. The publication was not privileged. 
54. The publication of these remarks has resulted in damages to the Plaintiff's 
reputation, general heath, and economic status. 
55. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff 
has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than $10,000. 
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COUNT IV 
Tortuous Interference with Contract and/or Prospective Economic Advantage 
(As against Defendant IDOC) 
56. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 
1 through 56 of this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 
57. The Plaintiff had a valid economic expectancy in his contract with PHS; 
Defendants had knowledge of this expectancy. The Plaintiff also had a valid 
prospective economic advantage given his background and training as a physician, 
should he ever leave the employ or PHS. 
58. The Defendants IDOC, by and through its agents and/or employees, with 
knowledge, intentionally, maliciously and/or without justifiable cause, wrongfully 
interfered with the Plaintiff's contractual relationship with PHS by pressuring PHS to 
terminate his employment with them. Further, IDOC, after Noak was terminated, took 
further steps to interfere with Noak's prospective employment opportunities by 
contacting the Idaho Board of Medicine and urging that it conduct an investigation into 
the false allegations made against Noak. 
59. As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of the Defendant, the 
Plaintiff has suffered general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial, 
but greater than $10,000. 
COUNTV 
Conversion 
60. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 
1 through 60 of this Complaint as if they were fully set forth herein. 
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61. Defendants PHS and IDOC disturbed the Plaintiff's rightful possession of his 
DEA site certificates, Form 222's, and prescription pads, by taking them from his control 
and exercising control and authority over them. 
62. The taking of the Plaintiff's property was done knowingly and without legal 
justification. 
63. The taking of the Plaintiff's property has caused the Plaintiff a great deal of 
worry and concern. 
64. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff 
has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but greater than $10,000. 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
As a result of the Defendants' actions as set forth above, Plaintiff has been 
required to retain the services of an attorney. to prosecute this action and has incurred 
and will continue to incur costs and attorney fees for which Plaintiff is entitled to a 
separate award pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and -121, and Rule 54(e)(1) of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as other applicable statute or rule, in an amount 
to be determined by the Court, or, if judgment is rendered by default, in the amount of 
Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays and requests entry of judgment against both 
Defendants as follows: 
1. For special damages and lost earnings and benefits in an amount to be 
proven at trial; 
2. For general and emotional damages in an amount to be proven at trial; 
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3. For attorney fees in the amount of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) if 
judgment is taken by default, or in an amount the Court deems reasonable and just if 
this matter is contested; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in 
the premises. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiff hereby demands trial by a jury composed of no less than twelve (12) 
persons on all issues so triable, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 38(b). 
DATED this _ day of February, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
By: __________ _ 
John A. Bush 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMIL Y A. MAc MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emily.macmaster@ag.idaho.gov 
RISKJNOAKJp7055Ima.doc 
Attorneys for the State Defendants 
Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
) AND RICHARD D. HAAS' REPLY 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) DISMISS 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------------------
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. Haas 
("'Haas") (collectively, "the State Defendants") should be dismissed from this lawsuit. 
Plaintiff John F. Noak, M.D.'s ("Plaintiff') claims against IDOC are time barred. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not toll the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs state law claims 
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against IDOC. Also, even if 28 U.S.c. § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations on 
Plaintiff's state law claims against Haas, Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial, tiled December 15, 2006, ("Complaint") fails to state a claim against Haas. l 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 28 V.S.C. § 1367(d) Does Not Salvage Plaintiff's Time-Barred Claims 
Against IDOC 
The two-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code § 6-911 of the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act ("I.T.C.A.") bars all of Plaintiff's claims against IDOC. Plaintiff asserts that 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations on his state law claims until 
December 18, 2006, thirty (30) days after the United States District Court dismissed 
Plaintiff's federal court action, entitled Noak v. Prison Health Services, et aI., U.S. 
District Court, District of Idaho (Case No. CV 06-00039) (the "Federal Lawsuit"). 
However, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) did not toll Plaintiff's state law claims against IDOC 
because, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, the 
federal court had no jurisdiction over IDOC in the Federal Lawsuit. 
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal courts against agencies of the State 
of Idaho and against state agency employees where the purpose of the action is to recover 
money from the state treasury. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 
3107, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985). The Eleventh Amendment is founded upon principles of 
states rights not to be haled into federal court. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South 
Carolina Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 751-52, 760-61, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 1870, 1874-75, 
I Hedging bets against a dismissal of IDOC from this lawsuit, Plaintiff has also filed a Motion 
for Leave to Amend Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial to request that two new individual 
defendants be added to this lawsuit ifIDOC is dismissed. Plaintiff's motion to amend implicitly 
concedes that 28 U.S.c. § 1367(d) does not save his time-barred claims against IDOC. On 
February 28, 2007, the State Defendants filed an opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, 
which is incorporated herein by this reference. 
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152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002). In Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1988), the court held 
that IDOC and IDOC employees acting in their official capacities are immune from suit 
in federal court for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment. Id at 632. 
Plaintiff asserts that 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations under 
Idaho Code § 6-911 until December 18, 2006, 30 days after the Federal Lawsuit was 
dismissed. However, in Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, the United States 
Supreme Court held that "the tolling provision [in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d)] does not apply to 
claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting states." 534 U.S. 533, 536, 122 S. Ct. 
999, 1002, 152 L. Ed. 2d 27 (2002). In so holding, the Court emphasized the sovereign 
rights of States to determine when and where they may be sued: 
[R]eading subsection (d) to apply when state law claims against 
nonconsenting States are dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds 
raises serious doubts about the constitutionality of the provision given 
principles of state sovereign immunity .... 
If subsection (d) applied in such circumstances, it would toll the state's 
statute of limitations for thirty days in addition to however long the claim 
had been pending in federal court. This would require a state to defend 
against a claim in state court that had never been filed in state court until 
some indeterminate time after the original limitations period had 
lapsed .... 
Here, allowing a federal law to extend the time period in which a state 
sovereign is amenable to suit in its own courts at least affects the federal 
balance in an area that has been a historic power of the State's, whether or 
not it constitutes abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity. 
Raygor, 534 U.S. at 542-44, 122 S.Ct. at 1005-06, 152 L.Ed.2d 27. The Court also 
rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the University had waived Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in two separate federal lawsuits, by delaying moving to dismiss the claims until 
some ten months after those lawsuits were filed. The Court held that because the 
University raised its Eleventh Amendment defense in its answers, the University raised 
the defense at the "earliest possible opportunity" and thus there was no "unequivocally 
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expressed" consent to be sued in federal court. Raygor, 534 U.S. at 546-47, 122 S.Ct. at 
1008, 152 L.Ed.2d 27. 
Here, the State Defendants timely raised Eleventh Amendment immunity in the 
Federal Lawsuit by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (2) 
and (6). See Defendant Idaho Department of Correction, Thomas 1. Beauclair, Richard 
D. Haas and Steven Wolfs Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement, 
filed August 7, 2006 (U.S. District Court Case No. CV 06-00039, Docket No. 6).2 
Plaintiff's Federal Lawsuit against IDOC was thus barred based upon sovereign 
immunity. As in Raygor, IDOC raised its Eleventh Amendment defense early in the 
Federal Lawsuit. As in Raygor, by asserting the Eleventh Amendment, IDOC never 
consented to suit in federal court. Like the University Defendant in Raygor, IDOC has 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d at 632 (holding that IDOC is 
subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Thus, under Raygor, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) 
did not toll the statute of limitations on Plaintiff s state law claims. 
Plaintiff argues that Raygor does not bar his tolling claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(d) because the Order of Dismissal dismissed the Federal Lawsuit on various 
grounds, rather than "solely" based upon the Eleventh Amendment. See Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Idaho Department of Corrections and Richard 
Haas' Motion to Dismiss ("Opposition Brief'), p. 7. However, the Order of Dismissal 
did not need to render an independent decision regarding the Eleventh Amendment, as 
asserted by Plaintiff. Instead, the United States Supreme Court's holding in Raygor is 
based upon fundamental constitutional principles that where a State asserts the Eleventh 
Amendment in federal court litigation, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) shall not apply to force the 
State to later defend state court litigation after the limitations period expires. The same 
2 The State Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of pleadings filed in the federal 
lawsuit pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 201. See Hunsaker v. Hunsaker, 117 Idaho 192, 193, 
786 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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principle is at issue here. What matters is that IDOC timely asserted the Eleventh 
Amendment in the Federal Lawsuit, not whether the Federal Lawsuit was dismissed upon 
this basis solely or on several meritorious grounds including the Eleventh Amendment. 
Plaintiff also asserts, incorrectly, that the stipulation of the parties and the Order of 
Dismissal were premised on the federal court having jurisdiction. Opposition Brief, p. 7. 
Neither the Stipulation for Dismissal nor the Order of Dismissal states this premise. In 
the Stipulation for Dismissal, Plaintiff expressly agreed: 
2. That the Plaintiff concedes that the Defendants' motions to dismiss 
which challenge the substantive federal allegations of the Plaintiffs 
Complaint are meritorious. In the absence of original jurisdiction premised 
on the federal law claims, the Plaintiff further agrees that, consistent with 
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367( c), the Court should decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims .... 
Stipulation for Dismissal, pp. 2-3 (emphasis added). Thus, in the Stipulation, Plaintiff 
agrced that (1) IDOC's motion to dismiss (which asserted Eleventh Amendment 
immunity) was meritorious and (2) there was an absence of any original jurisdiction 
based upon the federal law claims. The Order ofDismissallikewisc states: 
The Plaintiff has conceded that the Defendants' motions to dismiss the 
federal claims are meritorious. The parties have stipulated that dismissal of 
the federal law claims eliminates original jurisdiction for the Court leaving 
only the state law claims. The parties further stipulate that the Court 
should decline to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims .... 
Order of Dismissal, p. 2. The Order of Dismissal acknowledges Plaintiffs agreement 
that IDOC's motion to dismiss was meritorious, which included IDOC's motion to 
dismiss based upon Eleventh Amendment immunity. The reference to the elimination of 
original jurisdiction in the Order of Dismissal does not mean that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply. Eleventh Amendment immunity must be asserted by the State 
or it can be waived. In the Federal Lawsuit, IDOC's assertion of the Eleventh 
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Amendment along with other meritorious defenses eliminated original jurisdiction over 
the federal claims and, therefore, the basis for maintaining supplemental state law claims. 
To the extent that Plaintiffs Opposition Brief is advancing some sort of waiver 
argument, the Idaho Attorney General has no general authority to waive the State's 
sovereign immunity. See Mazur v. Hymas, 678 F.Supp. 1473, 1474-75 (D. Idaho 1988), 
citing Howard v. Cook, 59 Idaho 391, 397-98,83 P.2d 208,211 (1938) (addressing 
authority of the Idaho Attorney General in regards to suits involving the State). In the 
context of litigation, an Attorney General can waive Eleventh Amendment immunity in 
very limited circumstances by voluntarily and purposefully invoking federal court 
jurisdiction, by removing a case to federal court, voluntarily intervening in a federal court 
lawsuit or voluntarily filing a new claim in federal court. See Lapides v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 624.122 S.Ct. 1640,1646,152 
L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). Other than these few situations, unless the State authorizes the 
Attorney General to waive sovereign immunity, he or she cannot do so. See Ford Motor 
Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459., 468-69, 65 S.Ct. 347, 352-53, 89 L.Ed. 389 
(1945) (holding that Attorney General could not waive Eleventh Amendment absent clear 
authorization under state law), overruled in part by Lapides, 535 U.S. at 623, 122 S.Ct. at 
1645-46, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (limiting Ford in cases where Attorney General voluntarily 
invokes federal court jurisdiction); see also Terrell v. United States, 783 F.2d 1562,1566 
(11 th Cir. 1986) (holding that pre-trial stipulation in federal court was not a waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
Idaho's Attorney General did not remove Plaintiffs Federal Lawsuit to federal 
court, or voluntarily intervene in Plaintiffs Federal Lawsuit, or voluntarily file any 
counterclaims in that action. Instead, Plaintiff filed the Federal Lawsuit and forced IDOC 
to litigate in federal court. In response, IDOC asserted the Eleventh Amendment and 
then simply consented to Plaintiffs request for a stipulation to dismissal of the Federal 
Lawsuit. IDOC promptly asserted and maintained its defense of sovereign immunity. 
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Under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff should never have filed his claims 
against IDOC or Haas, in his official capacity, in federal court. The Eleventh 
Amendment barred the Federal Lawsuit against IDOC, and the tolling provisions of 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(d) are inapplicable. Plaintiffs claims against IDOC should be dismissed. 
B. Even if 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) Tolled Plaintifrs Claims Against Haas, Plaintifrs 
Claims in the Complaint Fail to State a Claim Against Haas 
To the extent Haas acted in his individual, rather than official, capacity in regards 
to the claims alleged against him in the Federal Lawsuit, the State Defendants agree that 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(d) tolled Plaintiffs state law claims against him. That said, Plaintiffs 
causes of action against Haas should be dismissed because they fail to state a claim. 
Plaintiffs claims against Haas arise solely out his letter to the Idaho Board of 
Medicine, dated March 15, 2004. Complaint, ~ 40. On this single factual allegation, 
Plaintiff seeks to hold Haas liable Under Count III of the Complaint for Defamation 
Per Se and under Count II of the Complaint for Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. Opposition Brief, pp. 9-10, 16-17. Plaintiff also argues that he has 
stated additional unnamed defamation claims against Haas based upon unidentified 
statements. Id. at 16-17. These contentions are flawed on several grounds. 
First, Plaintiff argues that Paragraph 40 of the Complaint states a claim for 
defamation per se against Haas because inmate Hernandez' allegations about Plaintiff 
were allegedly false, or at least "not well grounded." See Complaint, ~ 40; Opposition 
Brief, pp. 16-17. However, as alleged in the Complaint, Haas simply informed the Board 
of Medicine that an inmate had made allegations about Plaintiff, an Idaho physician, and 
requested that the Board investigate. See Complaint, ~ 40. 
Plaintiffs theory is that Haas, on behalf of IDOC, should have withheld this 
information from the Board of Medicine. However, the Idaho legislature charges the 
Board of Medicine with investigating complaints about physicians. See Idaho Code § 54-
1802 (citing Board's purpose to protect the public health, safety and welfare); Idaho Code 
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§ § 54-1806 and 54-1806A (governing investigations and discipline); IDAP A 
§§ 22.01.14.010-023 (requiring Board staff to accept public complaints for investigation). 
Under Plaintiffs theory, IDOC should not have deferred to the Board of Medicine's 
investigative expertise and judgment, despite the statutory authority given to the Board of 
Medicine to address such matters. If Plaintiffs theory were adopted as Idaho law, it 
would have a chilling effect on the willingness of state agencies (e.g., agencies with 
oversight of correctional facilities, hospitals, juvenile facilities, nursing homes and 
residential care facilities) to forward patient complaints to the Board of Medicine where 
alleged physician conduct may be a potential threat to public safety. 
Additionally, the defense of truth defeats Plaintiffs claim of defamation per se 
based upon Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. As alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint, 
the sole issue is whether Haas reported to the Board of Medicine, truthfully, that an 
inmate made a complaint against an Idaho physician that might fall within the Board's 
jurisdiction to investigate. The inmate did make this complaint to IDOC. Complaint, 
'124. Accordingly, (1) as inmate Hernandez submitted this complaint to IDOC about 
Plaintiff, then (2) the gist of Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine, to inform the Board 
that inmate Hernandez had made allegations to IDOC about PlaintitT, was true. See 
Complaint, ~~ 24,40; Laughton v. Crawford, 68 Idaho 578,582,201 P.2d 96,98 (1948). 
Finally, Plaintiff speculates that IDOC and/or Haas communicated inmate 
Hernandez' allegedly false claims about him to "others" and that if Plaintiff is just given 
more time, he should be able to find more instances of defamation against him. 
Opposition Brief, pp. 16-17. But mere speculation is not enough to keep Haas or IDOC 
in this lawsuit. As Plaintiff has failed to identify any additional alleged defamatory 
statement, he has failed to meet the pleading requirements of I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) and, 
therefore, Count III of the Complaint should be dismissed. See e.g., Liguori v. 
Alexander, 495 F.Supp. 641, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that under the notice 
pleading requirements of F .R.C.P. 8(a), plaintiffs allegation that her personnel records 
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contained false material was insufficient to state a claim for defamation); Emerson v. 
North Idaho College, No. CV 05-425-N-LMB, slip. op., 2006 WL 3253585, at * 10 (D. 
Idaho 2006) (holding that where the complaint failed to identify what the defamatory 
statements were, the plaintiff could not maintain a defamation claim). 
Plaintiff also asserts that Count II for Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of 
Emotional Distress is based upon Haas' letter to the Board of Medicine. Opposition 
Brief: pp. 9-10. On this basis, however, Count II is duplicative of Plaintiff s defamation 
claim against Haas and should be dismissed. See Idaho Code § 6-702 (limiting to one 
cause of action all claims for libel or slander or any other tort founded upon a single 
publication); see also, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188,1193 fn. 2 
(9th Cir. 1989) ("[a]n emotional distress claim based on the same facts as an unsuccessful 
libel claim cannot survive as an independent cause of action" [citation omitted]). 
C. Plaintiff Has Not Identified Any Contract Between Himself and the State 
Defendants to Support Count I for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and 
Fair Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract 
Plaintiff s Opposition Brief concedes that there was no contract between himself 
and IDOC or Haas. In his Opposition Brief, Plaintiff states: "IDOC had a contract with 
PHS. PHS had a contract with Dr. Noak." Opposition Brief: p. 15. 
Under well-established Idaho case law, Plaintiff cannot maintain his breach of 
covenant claim against the State Defendants based upon IDOC's contract with PHS, nor 
can Plaintiff maintain his breach of covenant claim against the State Defendants based 
upon PHS' contract with Plaintiff. See Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253,260-61, 
92 PJd 503, 510-11 (2004); Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 953, 
782 P.2d 1230,1235 (1989); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,197-98,983 P.2d 848, 851-
52 (1999). Plaintiff has not cited a single Idaho case to controvert these cases. Plaintiff s 
contract claim can be stated, if at all, only against PHS. Count I against the State 
Defendants should be dismissed. 
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D. Pursuant to the Notice of Claim Requirements Under the I.T.C.A., Plaintiff's 
Lawsuit Remains Untimely as to All Claims Against the State Defendants 
That Arose Prior To March 7, 2004 
The LT.C.A's notice of tort claim requirement bars all claims against the State 
Defendants that Plaintiff failed to file with the Secretary of State within one hundred 
eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been 
discovered. See Idaho Code §§ 6-905; 6-908. Trying to skirt the mandatory notice 
requirement, Plaintiff argues that his claims arising before March 7, 2004, are not barred 
by the LT.C.A. because either (1) the State Defendants have not clearly identified which 
of his claims are time-barred or (2) the "reasonably discovered" prong of Idaho Code 
§ 6-905 salvages his otherwise untimely noticed claims. Opposition Brief, pp. 8-9. 
As to Plaintiffs first contention, the State Defendants have clearly identified that 
Plaintiffs timely claims included only those alleged based upon the factual allegations of 
Paragraphs 34 through 41 of the Complaint, which allegedly took place, if at all, after 
March 7, 2004. All others claims by Plaintiff against the State Defendants are time-
barred. It is not the State Defendants' burden to guess about claims that Plaintiff has not 
clearly stated in the Complaint. 
As to Plaintiff s second contention, he argues that if a claim was unbeknownst to 
him until after March 7, 2004, he should be allowed to maintain that claim. However, 
Plaintiffs Opposition Brief fails to identify any previously unknown claim. Plaintiff asks 
this Court to allow him to go on a fishing expedition to develop a record and tind out 
whether he has any claim (as yet undiscovered) that he could not reasonably have 
discovered until after March 7, 2004 (indeed, until some undefined date in the future). If 
PlaintifT does not already have facts to support his claims in the Complaint, he has no 
right to maintain these speculative claims against the State Defendants. 
Therefore, the LT.C.A. notice of claim provisions limit Plaintiffs claims in 
Counts I through V to those based upon the factual allegations of Paragraphs 34 through 
41 of the Complaint or other factual allegations, if any, that occurred after March 7, 2004. 
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If this Motion to Dismiss is not granted in its entirety, the State Defendants request the 
Court to limit the scope of any surviving claims to those arising after March 7, 2004. 
For the reasons discussed in the State Defendants' moving brief and in this reply 
brief, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be granted and IDOC and Haas 
should be dismissed from this lawsuit. 
DA TED this 5th day of March, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff~ 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. 
Defendants . 
Case No. CV-OC-0623517D 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case is before the Court on Defendant Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) and 
Richard D. Haas's (Haas's) motion to dismiss, and Plaintiff John Noak's (Noak's) motion to 
amend. For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss is denied and the motion to amend is 
denied. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In April 2002, Plaintiff John Noak (Noak) began working part-time as a doctor for 
Defendant Prison Health Services (PHS) providing medical services to the inmate population at 
various facilities ofthe IDOC. In October, 2002, Noak was asked by PHS to become the full-time 
medical director and he entered into an employment contract with PHS. As the medical director, 
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Noak was responsible for overseeing all medical services provided by PHS to various IOOC 
facilities, and for prescribing controlled substances to the inmate population. 
On January 30, 2004, Noak examined and treated an inmate patient, Norma Hernandez 
(Hernandez), who had been sick for several days. Noak alleges that following Hernandez's 
examination, he instructed Jana Nicholson (Nicholson), a PHS correctional medical specialist, to 
return Hernandez to her cell. Noak further alleges that while Nicholson and Hernandez were 
leaving he overheard a comment that Hernandez was going to faint and because Nicholson had not 
assumed the proper position to protect Hernandez, he assumed the proper position to support her if 
she did faint. After this incident Nicholson complained about Noak's conduct. Subsequently 
Hernandez submitted a complaint to IOOC claiming that Noak had battered her. As a result of this 
complaint, IOOC initiated an investigation of the incident and the matter was eventually referred 
to the Ada County Sheriff's Office and to the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, who 
ultimately refused to prosecute Noak for the alleged battery. On March 10,2004, Noak was 
tern1inated from his position as Medical Oirector of PHS. He alleges that this termination was 
\VTOngful. Noak also alleges that, after his termination, PHS and IOOC unlawfully continued to 
use his license and drug certifications to issue prescriptions of controlled substances to irunates 
from March 10, 2004, through May 6, 2004. Finally, Noak alleges that Haas, an IOOC employee, 
wrongfully reported him to the State Board of Medicine. 
On September 3, 2004, N oak filed a notice of tort claim with the Idaho Secretary of State. 
On January 30, 2006, Noak filed a federal action against PHS, IOOC, Haas, and other defendants, 
including Thomas 1. Beauclair (Beauclair), the director ofIDOC, and Steven Wolf (Wolf), the 
IOOC chief investigator who investigated Hernandez's complaint, in the U.S. District Court of 
Idaho (Case No. CV-06-00039). In that suit he alleged both federal and state claims. OnOOO 12 
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November 16,2006, the federal court entered an order of dismissal, dismissing Noak's federal law 
claims with prejudice and dismissing his state law claims without prejudice based on the 
stipulation of the parties. 
On December 15,2006, Noak brought the present action. In Noak's complaint he alleges 
the following counts: (1) conversion, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and 
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing against PHS and IDOC; (2) tortious interference 
of contract and prospective economic advantage against IDOC; and (3) defamation per se against 
all Defendants. On January 9, 2007, Haas and IDOC filed the pending motion to dismiss together 
with a supporting memorandum and affidavit ofMiren Artiach, the Deputy Secretary for the Idaho 
Secretary of State's Office, concerning Noak's notice of tort claim. On February 21,2007, Noak's 
counsel filed the pending motion for leave to amend his complaint and an affidavit enclosing 
exhibits of: (l) the stipUlation for dismissal from the Idaho U.S. District Court, dated November 
17, 2006; (2) a copy of the order of dismissal signed and filed by the Honorable Lynn Winmill; 
and (3) a copy of the proposed amended complaint. On February 28,2006, Hass and IDOC filed a 
brief in opposition to Noak's motion for leave to amend complaint accompanied by supporting 
atTidavits of Beauclair and Wolf. On March 2,2007, Noak filed a reply brief concerning his 
motion for leave to amend complaint together with a supplemental affidavit of counsel. On March 
5,2007, Haas and IDOC filed a reply brief in support of their motion to dismiss. 
At hearing on the motions the Court denied the motion to dismiss except as to the question 
of whether the federal action tolled the running of the statute of limitations. The Court took this 
issue under advisement, along with the motion to amend, since tolling is implicated in that motion 
as well. 
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ANALYSIS 
1. Motion to Dismiss 
On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(a)(6) I.R.C.P., the non-moving party is entitled to 
have all inferences drawn in his favor. Such a motion may be granted only when it appears that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Company, 116 
Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989). The court can consider only the facts alleged in the complaint, 
and those facts of which the court may properly take judicial notice. When affidavits are 
submitted and considered, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment. Hellickson v. 
Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 796 P.2d 150 (Ct.App. 1990). Here, the Court did consider the affidavits 
of Artiach and Noak's counsel. Therefore, the motion is considered based on the summary 
judgment standard. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other 
evidence in the record demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Rule 56(c), I.R.C.P., Hines v. Hines, 129 
16 
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Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20 (1997). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court 
"liberally construes the record in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and draws 
all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor." Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 
576, 944 P.2d 709, 711 (1997). In this case the facts relevant to the statute of limitations issue are 
not really in dispute. 
The statute oflimitations for claims under the Idaho Tort Claims Act is Idaho Code § 6-
911, which provides for a two-year period. Unless the statutory period was tolled by the filing of 
the federal suit, all parties agree that the present action is barred. 
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28 USC § 1367 provides in relevant part: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise 
by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction 
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United 
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that 
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(d) The period oflimitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for 
any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as 
or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the 
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law 
provides for a longer tolling period. 
IDOC argues that § 1 367(d) does not apply to states such as Idaho that have not waived 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, which states: 
AMENDMENT 11 
[Suits against states - Restriction of judicial power.] - The judicial power 
of the Untied States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another 
state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state. 
IDOC cites Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533 (2002) in 
which the court held that § 1367 did not toll the statute of limitations for claims against non-
consenting states that are filed in federal court and subsequently dismissed on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. 
The parties do not dispute that Idaho is a non-consenting state. Noak argues, however, that 
Raygor is not applicable where, as here, the federal suit was dismissed by stipUlation of the parties 
and not necessarily on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. IDOC responds that Raygor 's 
holding is not limited only to cases actually dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds, but that it 
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has broader constitutional implications. It further argues that the stipulation for dismissal includes 
the Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
The relevant portions of the stipulation state: 
3. That the Plaintiff concedes that the Defendants' motions to dismiss which 
challenge the substantive federal law allegations of the Plaintiff s complaint are 
meritorious. In the absence of original jurisdiction premised on the federal law 
claims, the Plaintiff further agrees that, consistent with the provisions of28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367( c), the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state law claims. 
Therefore, the parties hereby stipulate and agree that the Plaintiffs Complaint 
shall be dismissed. The parties further stipulate and agree that the Court should 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367( c) over 
those state law claims asserted in the Plaintiffs complaint. The Plaintiffs federal 
claims shall be dismissed with prejudice and the state claims shall be dismissed 
without prejudice. 
The Court concludes that Raygor is limited to suits that are actually dismissed on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. The holding of the court states: 
We hold that respondent never consented to suit in federal court on petitioners' 
state law claims and that § 1367( d) does not toll the period of limitations for state 
law claims asserted against non-consenting state defendants that are dismissed on 
Eleventh Amendment grounds. Therefore, § 1367( d) did not operate to toll the 
period oflimitations for petitioners' claims, ... 
548 U.S. at 547. 
Here, while it appears IDOC raised the Eleventh Amendment immunity in its motion to 
dismiss the federal action, the stipulation for dismissal indicates that the motion to dismiss also 
addressed the substantive federal law allegations of the complaint, and that was what the plaintiff 
conceded. In any event, the federal case was dismissed by stipulation, and not on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds. Therefore, the complaint in this case, filed within 30 days of dismissal of the 
federal suit, is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
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2. Motion to Amend. 
Noak filed a motion to amend the complaint in response to the motion to dismiss, which 
raised issues as to whether the original complaint adequately pled malice and/or criminal intent 
and the Eleventh Amendment issue addressed above. The proposed amended complaint removes 
rDOC as a defendant, adds former IDOC director Beauclair and IDOC investigator W 01 f as 
defendants, and contains allegations of malice and criminal intent. In light of the disposition of the 
motion to dismiss, it is questionable whether the amendment is necessary. However, in the event 
.1 
that the motion to amend must be decided, it will be granted in part and denied in part. 
Rule 15( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governs the motion to amend insofar as it 
seeks to change the language of the complaint. It provides: 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(a) Amended and Supplemental Pleadings--Amendments. A party may 
an1end the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the 
party may so amend it at any time within twenty (20) days after it is served. 
Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by \\Titten 
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so 
requires, and the court may make such order for the payment of costs as it deems 
proper. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time 
remaining for response to the original pleading or within ten (10) days after service 
of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court 
otherwise orders. 
Granting or denying a motion to amend under this rule is discretionary. Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, NA., 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 900 (1991). 
Given the liberal standard of the rule, the motion regarding allegations of scope of authority, 
malice and/or criminal intent is granted. 
00012 
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Rule 15(c), I.R.C.P., governs the addition of Beauclair and Wolf as defendants. It states: 
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS 
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against 
whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, 
within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party, the 
party to be brought in by amendment (1) has received such notice of the institution 
of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the 
merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 
identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. 
The relation back of an amendment joining or substituting a real party in interest 
shall be as provided in Rule 17(a). The delivery or mailing of process to the Idaho 
attorney general or designee of the attorney general, or an agency or officer who 
would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses 
(1) and (2) hereof with respect to the state ofIdaho or any agency or officer thereof 
to be brought into the action as a defendant. (emphasis added) 
The primary issue is whether the amendment addition of Beauclair and Wolf would relate 
back to the date of filing the original complaint. The parties also agree that the claims against 
Beauclair and Wolf would be time-barred if they do not relate back. Critical to the determination 
of the relation-back question is whether Beauclair and/or Wolf had notice of the institution of this 
action within the limitation period, and whether there was a mistake as to the identity of the proper 
pmiy. Noak and IDOC agree that the claims against Beauclair and Wolf were barred after the 
expiration of the 30-day period following dismissal of the federal suite, December 18, 2006. Noak 
argues that both Beauclair and Wolf were parties to the federal action. They had knowledge of the 
institution of that action and cannot be prejudiced in maintaining their defense. He cites Hayward 
v. Valley Vista Care Corporation, 136 Idaho 342, 33 P.3d 816 (2001) and Conda Partnership, Inc. 
v. }vfD. Construction Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 (Ct.App. 1989). These arg~ 127 
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and authorities are not applicable. Rule 15( c) does not refer to just any action; the reference to 
notice of the institution of the action clearly means the action in which relation back is sought. 
The cases cited address amendments changing the plaintiff, rather than "the party against whom a 
claim is asserted;" thus, the notice provisions of Rule 15(c) are not applicable. The only issue 
regarding Rule 15(c) in Hayward is whether a wrongful death claim arose out of the same conduct, 
transaction or occurrence alleged in the original complaint. That is not an issue in this case. 
Likewise in Conda, the issue was whether the plaintiff had been correctly identified. 
Here, Beauclair and Wolf each filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion to amend. In 
Beauclair's affidavit he states that he had no knowledge of this state court lawsuit until February 
27,2007. Since this is clearly beyond December 18,2006, the claim against Beauclair cmmot 
relate back under Rule 15(c). Wolfs affidavit, on the other hand, states only that after the 
dismissal of the federal suit, he "later" learned that Noak had instituted this action. It thus cannot 
be determined whether he had notice prior to December 19, 2006. Therefore, the issue of 
"mistake" as to the identity of the proper party must be discussed as to him. 
The law is clear that the omission of a known party who may be liable for all or part of the 
plaintiff's claims is not a "mistake" within the meaning of Rule 15(c). In 3 Moore, Federal 
Practice - Civil § 15.19[3] [d], it is stated: 
[d]-Party Named in Amendment Knew or Should Have Known It Would 
Have Been Sued But for Mistake 
The third factor in determining whether an amendment should relate back is 
whether the newly-named defendant knew or should have known the plaintiff 
would have sued it, but for a mistake in identity. The rationale behind this 
requirement is that a legitimate legal claim should not be squelched by a party 
mistakenly identifying the party to be sued. This factor has two elements, both of 
which must be satisfied: (1) a mistake of identity, and (2) knowledge or 
constructive knowledge that the action would have been brought against the party 
but for the mistake. 
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The classic example of mistake is misnomer; that is, when a plaintiff misnames or 
misidentifies a party in its pleadings but correctly serves that party. In these cases, 
relation back is appropriate because the defendant is already before the court. For 
example, a court may find misnomer when the proper corporate name is not easily 
attainable and the name used is close enough to the correct corporate name for the 
newly-named defendant to know that it was being sued. Misnomer may also apply, 
for example, when a plaintiff names a corporation instead of a partnership, a parent 
corporation instead of a subsidiary, a building instead of its corporate owner, or a 
corporation in liquidation instead of its successor. In some cases a legal mistake 
can lead to misnomer, as when a plaintiff names an institutional defendant because 
of confusion as to whether an individual or an institutional defendant is the proper 
party, but the individual is properly served and, therefore, has notice of the mistake. 
In contrast, a conscious choice to sue one party and not another does not 
constitute a mistake and is not a basis for relation back. This result is also justified 
on the grounds that, when the plaintiff sues one possible defendant but not another, 
the second defendant has no reason to believe that it was an intended party or, in 
other words, the second defendant does not know that "but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the 
party." (Footnotes omitted) 
This reasoning applies here. Wolf was a party to the federal suit. Although in this case it 
is claimed that there may have been some confusion as to whether IDOC or the individuals were 
actually liable, it is clear that initially a choice was made not to name Beauclair and Wolf, 
although Haas was named, thus indicating no confusion between institutional and individual 
defendants. There being no mistake as to Wolfs identity, the proposed amendment cannot relate 
back as to him. 
Based on the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is denied and the motion to amend is granted 
as to the pleading of scope of authority, malice and/or criminal intent, but denied as to the addition 
of Beauclair and Wolf as parties. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this lb~ day of April 2007. 
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The classic example of mistake is misnomer; that is, when a plaintiff misnames or 
misidentifies a party in its pleadings but correctly serves that party. In these cases, 
relation back is appropriate because the defendant is already before the court. For 
example, a court may find misnomer when the proper corporate name is not easily 
attainable and the name used is close enough to the correct corporate name for the 
newly-named defendant to know that it was being sued. Misnomer may also apply, 
for example, when a plaintiff names a corporation instead of a partnership, a parent 
corporation instead of a subsidiary, a building instead of its corporate owner, or a 
corporation in liquidation instead of its successor. In some cases a legal mistake 
can lead to misnomer, as when a plaintiff names an institutional defendant because 
of confusion as to whether an individual or an institutional defendant is the proper 
party, but the individual is properly served and, therefore, has notice of the mistake. 
In contrast, a conscious choice to sue one party and not another does not 
constitute a mistake and is not a basis for relation back. This result is also justified 
on the grounds that, when the plaintiff sues one possible defendant but not another, 
the second defendant has no reason to believe that it was an intended party or, in 
other words, the second defendant does not know that "but for a mistake concerning 
the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the 
party." (Footnotes omitted) 
This reasoning applies here. Wolf was a party to the federal suit. Although in this case it 
is claimed that there may have been some confusion as to whether IDOC or the individuals were 
actually liable, it is clear that initially a choice was made not to name Beauclair and Wolf, 
although Haas was named, thus indicating no confusion between institutional and individual 
defendants. There being no mistake as to Wolfs identity, the proposed amendment cannot relate 
back as to him. 
Based on the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is denied and the motion to amend is granted 
as to the pleading of scope of authority, malice and/or criminal intent, but denied as to the addition 
of Beauclair and Wolf as parties. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this LQ '& day of April 2007. 
~(}a~f.4,...... 
Kathryn . Stlcklen 
District Juage 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
) 
) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
v. ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
) AND RICHARD D. HAAS' MOTION 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) THE ALTERNATIVE 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) CLARIFICATION, OF ORDER ON 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) MOTION TO DISMISS 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
----------------------------
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. Haas ("Haas") 
(collectively, the "State Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, Emily A. Mac 
Master, Deputy Attorney General, pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), move for reconsideration, or 
in the alternative clarification, of the Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, filed April 11, 
2007, (the "Order") denying the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed January 9,2007 (the 
"Motion to Dismiss"). 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE CLARIFICATION· 1 
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1 t 
In this motion, the State Defendants request reconsideration of the Court's denial of the 
Motion to Dismiss and seek a limited dismissal of claims, as follows: (1) the State Defendants 
should be dismissed from Count I of the Complaint, filed December 15,2006, (the "Complaint") 
for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment 
Contract, for lack of any alleged contract binding Plaintiff John F. Noak and either of the State 
Defendants; and (2) the State Defendants should be dismissed from all claims arising out of 
factual allegations in the Complaint that occurred prior to March 7,2004, as pled in Paragraphs 1 
through 33 of the Complaint, as all such claims are barred by the notice provisions of the Idaho 
Tort Claims Act, at Idaho Code § 6-905. Alternatively, the State Defendants request clarification 
of the Order to explain the bases for denial of the Motion to Dismiss on these two grounds. 
This motion is based upon Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. 
Haas' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Alternative 
Clarification, of Order on Motion to Dismiss, filed herewith, the Order, and all other pleadings 
on file with the Court in this action. 
H-
DATED this ~ day of April, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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ByJ. EARle 
DEPUTY 
Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
) 
) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
) AND RICHARD D. HAAS' 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
) OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
) CLARIFICATION, OF ORDER ON 
) MOTION TO DISMISS 
) 
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. Haas 
("Haas") (collectively, the "State Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, 
Emily A. Mac Master, Deputy Attorney General, pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), hereby 
submit this memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration, or in the 
Alternative Clarification, of Order on Motion to Dismiss, filed herewith. 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE CLARIFICATION - 1 
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IlL 
The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order, filed April 11, 2007, (the "Order") 
denies the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, filed January 9, 2007, (the "Motion to 
Dismiss") on all grounds asserted. However, the Order provides the Court's rationale for 
denial of the Motion to Dismiss only as to the issue taken under advisement at the 
hearing, regarding Raygor v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 122 
S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) and the tolling provisions of 28 U.S.c. § 1367(d). 
The State Defendants move for reconsideration, or in the alternative clarification, 
on two grounds asserted in the Motion to Dismiss which the Order denies but does not 
fully address, as follows: (1) the State Defendants should be dismissed from Count I of 
the Complaint, filed December 15, 2006, (the "Complaint"), for Breach of the Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract, because 
Plaintiff John F. Noak ("Plaintiff') has not alleged any contract binding him and either of 
the State Defendants; and (2) the State Defendants should be dismissed from all claims in 
Counts I through V of the Complaint that are based upon alleged wrongful conduct or 
omissions prior to March 7, 2004, as pled in Paragraphs 1 through 33 of the Complaint, 
because these claims are barred by the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act 
("LT.C.A"), at Idaho Code § 6-905. 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
LR.C.P. II(a)(2)(B) provides, in pertinent part: "A motion for reconsideration of 
any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of 
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." 
A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives, LLP, 143 Idaho 812, 153 
I Numerous issues were before the Court at the hearing. Respectfully, the State Defendants disagree with the 
Order's holding that Raygor and the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution do not bar Plaintiff's 
claims against moc. However, rather than request reconsideration of that ruling, the State Defendants reserve all 
rights to appeal the Order in the event that a final judgment is later entered against them in this action. 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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P.3d 1158, 1161 (2007). Under Idaho law, "case law applying Rule 11(a)(2)(B) permits a 
party to present new evidence when a motion is brought under that rule, but does not 
require that the motion be accompanied by new evidence." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 
Idaho 468,147 P.3d 100,104 (Ct. App. 2006). 
ARGUMENT 
A. Count I, for Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and/or 
Public Policy in Employment Contract, Should be Dismissed as to the State 
Defendants 
Under fundamental principles of contract law, a plaintiff cannot maintain claims 
that sound in contract where the plaintiff and the defendant are not both parties to the 
contract at issue. Tolley v. Thi Company, 140 Idaho 253, 260-61, 92 P.3d 503, 510-11 
(2004). The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant that sounds in 
contract, not in tort. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. 121 Idaho 266, 
288,824 P.2d 841,863 (1992) (citation omitted). 
In Tolley, the plaintiff signed a Spousal Consent to signify consent to her 
husband's Stock Purchase and Redemption Agreement (the "Agreement"). When the 
couple later divorced, the court awarded the plaintiff her spouse's shares of stock under 
the Agreement. The plaintiff then sued the company for distribution of the stock, 
asserting claims for (1) breach of contract and (2) breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. Tolley, 140 Idaho at 259, 92 P.3d at 509. The district court granted 
summary judgment against the plaintiff on both claims. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was not a party to the Agreement and, therefore, that 
she could not maintain her claim for breach of contract nor her claim for breach of an 
implied covenant in the Agreement. Tolley, 140 Idaho at 260-61,92 P.3d at 510-11. 
Under Tolley, on the facts alleged in the Complaint, the State Defendants cannot 
be held liable to Plaintiff under any contract theory. Count I of the Complaint is based 
solely upon an alleged employment agreement between Plaintiff and defendant Prison 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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Health Services ("PHS"). Paragraph 43 of the Complaint alleges: 
43. There existed an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
Plaintiff's employment agreement with Defendant PHS. Defendant 
IDOC similarly had certain duties and obligations under the contract and 
similarly was bound by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Complaint, ~[43 (emphasis added). There is no allegation or evidence of a contract 
between IDOC and Plaintiff, or between Haas and Plaintiff. Complaint, ~[15, 16, 43. 
There is also no allegation or evidence that IDOC and/or Haas are in privity with the 
alleged contract between Plaintiff and PHS. 
In sum, there is no basis under Idaho law to impose upon IDOC or Haas any duties 
and obligations under the alleged employment contract between Plaintiff and PHS, or to 
bind IDOC or Haas to any implied covenants in that alleged employment contract. 
Indeed, Plaintiff's claim against IDOC for breach of implied contract covenants (Count I) 
is inconsistent with Plaintiff's claim against IDOC for tortuous interference with contract 
(Count IV). See Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Idaho, Inc., 123 Idaho 650, 
654, 851 P.2d 946, 950 (1993) ("The general rule is that a party cannot tortiously 
intedere with its own contract.") 
As a matter of law, Count I should be dismissed as to IDOC and Haas. 
B. Plaintiff's Failure to File a Timely Notice of Tort Claim Bars All of His 
Claims Against the State Defendants That Arose and Were Known Prior to 
lVIarch 7, 2004 
The I.T.C.A., at Idaho Code § 6-905, requires that all claims against the state or 
employees acting within the course or scope of employment must be filed with the 
Secretary of State within 180 days "from the date the claim arose or reasonably should 
have been discovered, whichever is later." On September 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed his 
Notice of Tort Claim. Affidavit of Miren E. Artiach, ~[ 4 and Exhibit A, filed January 9, 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
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2007 with Motion to Dismiss. Under Idaho Code § 6-905, the 180-day period covered by 
Plaintiff's Notice of Tort Claim was March 7,2004, through September 7,2004. 
No claim or action is allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless 
the claim has been presented and filed within the 180-day period. Idaho Code § 6-908. 
"The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held that 'the filing of a notice of claim as 
required by the Act is a mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit, the failure of 
which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate.'" Greenwade v. Idaho State Tax 
Commission, 119 Idaho 501, 503, 808 P.2d 420, 422 (Ct. App. 1991), citing Banks v. 
University of Idaho, 118 Idaho 607, 608, 798 P.2d 452, 453 (1990). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has also long held that "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent 
person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start the 
running of the 120 [now 180]-day period." McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 
719,722,747 P.2d 741,744 (1987), quoting Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711,535 P.2d 
1348 (1975). 
In Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977), the plaintiff 
alleged that he was criminally battered by third persons on or about May 25, 1974, when 
the city's Chief of Police was present at the scene. The plaintiff's injuries and damage 
from the attack did not become known to him until August 10,1975. The plaintiff filed a 
notice of claim with the City on November 5, 1975. Ralphs, 98 Idaho at 226-27, 560 
P.2d at 1316-17. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's notice of 
claim was not timely filed under the I.T.C.A. (which, at the time, provided a 120-day 
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notice period) because the plaintiff was aware of his claim on the day of the event in May 
1974: 
Here, it is clear that on the date of the incident plaintiff Ralphs was aware 
that he had been attacked, assaulted and battered, that the Chief of Police 
was allegedly negligent in permitting the attack and that the city of Spirit 
Lake was negligent in employing a man of Newton's [the Chief of Police] 
alleged characteristics and in failing to discharge him. 
Ralphs, 98 Idaho at 228, 560 P.2d at 1318. 
Under Ralphs, the date of the incident giving rise to a claim is the trigger date for a 
notice of tort claim, where the plaintiff is aware of the incident. Here, on the face of the 
Complaint, several factual allegations took place, if at all, prior to March 7, 2004, and 
Plaintiff admittedly knew about these alleged incidents prior to March 7, 2004, including 
the following: (1) the incident with inmate patient Norma Hernandez on January 30, 
2004 (Complaint, ~[~[ 20-23); (2) Hernandez' alleged January 30, 2004 discussions with 
IDOC employees and her complaint to IDOC about Plaintiff (Complaint, ~[ 24); (3) 
IDOC's initiation of an investigation (Complaint, ~m 25-33); (4) IDOC's alleged refelTal 
of Hernandez' allegations to the Ada County Sheriff's Department (Complaint, ~[~[ 26, 28-
29, 31); (5) IDOC's alleged escort of Plaintiff out of the Idaho Maximum Security 
Institution on February 12, 2004 (Complaint, ~[ 30); and (6) PHS' alleged placement of 
Plaintiff on administrative leave on February 12, 2004, pending outcome of the criminal 
investigation (Complaint, ~[ 31). 
The Order should be modified to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims contained in 
Counts I through V that are based upon any of these factual allegations in Paragraphs 1 
through 33 of the Complaint. Plaintiff should not be allowed to salvage these admittedly 
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known and time-barred claims merely by lumping them (by incorporation through 
reference) into the allegations of Counts I through V of the Complaint. 
Also, in Plaintiff's opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff argued that the 
Court should not make a blanket ruling to prospectively bar all claims that he might 
discover at a future date. However, Plaintiff's concern is unfounded under the clear 
mandates of the I.T.C.A. In the event that Plaintiff later discovers a new claim against 
the State Defendants, Idaho Code § 6-905 will require him to present a new notice of tort 
claim to the Secretary of State, to allow the state to receive notice of, and the opportunity 
to address, the new claim prior to being required to defend the claim in court. See Idaho 
Code §§ 6-905-6-908. Plaintiff cannot slip new claims into this lawsuit without first 
presenting a new and timely notice of tort claim to the Secretary of State. If and when 
the State rejects a new claim presented, Plaintiff can then move to amend the Complaint. 
For the reasons discussed above, the State Defendants respectfully request that the 
Court modify the Order to dismiss Count I as to the State Defendants and to dismiss all 
claims in Counts I through V of the Complaint against the State Defendants that are 
based upon alleged wrongful conduct or omissions pled in Paragraphs 1 through 33 of the 
Complaint. In the alternative, if the Court denies this motion for reconsideration, the 
/II 
III 
III 
III 
III 
STATE DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE CLARIFICATION -7 
000141 
State Defendants respectfully request that the Order be modified to address the bases for 
denial of the Motion to Dismiss as to these two grounds. 
0/J,-L-
DATED this ~ day of April, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By: 4(Qhm~ 
EMILY A. C MASTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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The Plaintiff, John Noak, M.D., respectfully submits this Memorandum in 
response to the State Defendants Motion for Reconsideration or in the Alternative for 
Clarification. The State requests that the Court dismiss Count I of the Complaint and it 
restates its argument relative to its interpretation of the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The 
Plaintiff will address each argument in turn. 
1. Count I - Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing 
Plaintiffs Complaint alleges, in pertinent part, that he had a contractual 
agreement with the Defendant PHS and that Defendant IDOC had certain duties and 
obligations under the contact. (Complaint ~~ 15, 43). The contract is not before the 
Court as the State has chosen not to place the terms and conditions of the contract at 
issue. Rather, the State argues that there are no allegations or evidence of a contract 
between IDOC and the Plaintiff. 
First, as to the whether or not there is evidence of a contract, the State chose to 
file a motion to dismiss challenging the pleadings. Thus, there is necessarily a lack of 
evidence before the Court because of the manner in which the State has proceeded. 
Second, the allegations of the Complaint, and all favorable inferences, must be 
accepted as true. Plaintiff plainly alleged that "IDOC similarly had certain duties and 
obligations under the contract and was similarly bound by the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing." (Complaint, ~ 43). 
The State argues that there is no basis under Idaho law to impose upon IDOC 
any duties and obligations under the alleged employment contract between Plaintiff and 
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PHS because it was not a party to the contract. However, based on the allegations of 
the complaint, it is the contract which imposes certain duties and obligations upon 
IDOC. Indeed, IDOC directed that PHS terminate Dr. Noak, implicitly a right reserved to 
IDOC in the contract. (Complaint, 1[36). 
Given the allegations of the Complaint, it must be accepted as true that IDOC 
had certain obligations and duties under the contract between Dr. Noak and PHS which, 
in turn, required that IDOC exercise those duties and obligations consistent with the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It is not accurate to suggest that IDOC had no 
rights under the contract between Dr. Noak and PHS. As such, the State's motion for 
reconsideration should be denied. 
2. Tort Claim Notice 
The State reasserts the same argument made previously, arguing that any claim 
which arose prior to March 7, 2004 is barred by the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The State 
does not identify a single claim which is the subject of the motion. Rather, the State 
simply requests that the Court issue a blanket ruling that any claim or allegation which is 
based on any conduct or omission that occurred prior to the noted date is not 
actionable. 
Respectfully, the Plaintiff cannot respond in a vacuum and neither should the 
Court be forced to rule in a vacuum. The Plaintiff's tort claim notice is timely and the 
State has not suggested otherwise. What the State is seeking from the Court is 
essentially a motion in limine which deems anything that happened prior to March 7, 
2004 as per se irrelevant. However, many of the events which transpired prior to March 
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7 , 2004 were part of an the ongoing inquiry into Dr. Noak's purportedly criminal conduct 
that ultimately led to his improper and wrongful termination and the subsequent 
interaction with the Board of Medicine. 
When the State first raised this motion, it did not address nor concern itself with 
the language of Idaho Code § 6-905 which states that the tort claim notice must be filed 
within one hundred eighty (180) days of when the claim arose or reasonably should 
have been discovered. Because of the discovery language, Dr. Noak contended that it 
was inappropriate to issue a blanket ruling without regard for any specific claim or 
factual allegation. The State made no effort to make such a showing in the first motion. 
Now, in its Motion for Reconsideration, the State identifies the following specific 
factual allegations and argues that any claim which is based on said facts must 
necessarily be dismissed: 
a. Incident with inmate Hernandez which occurred on January 30, 2004. 
b. Hernandez's alleged discussions with IDOC employees regarding the 
alleged incident which similarly occurred on January 30, 2004. 
c. IDOC's initiation of an investigation and referral of the Hernandez 
complaint to the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
d. IDOC's alleged escort of Dr. Noak out of the prison on February 12, 2004. 
e. PHS's alleged placement of Dr. Noak on Administrative Leave on 
February 12, 2004. 
There is no doubt that Dr. Noak was aware of the "incident" with inmate 
Hernandez on January 30, 2004. However, that incident did not and does not 
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independently form the basis of any cause of action. Subsequent to the "incident", the 
complaint alleges that inmate Hernandez was contacted by various IDOC and PHS 
employees and that several hours after the incident a complaint for battery was filed. 
(Complaint, 1f 24). Even assuming that this isolated factual scenario is independently 
actionable, and contrary to the State's assertion, there is nothing in the complaint nor is 
there any evidence submitted by the State that identifies when Dr. Noak knew that 
IDOC and/or PHS employees met with inmate Hernandez. Certainly, there is no record 
to suggest that he knew of that information prior to March 7, 2004. 
The Complaint alleges that IDOC initiated an investigation which took place and 
led to a recommendation that the matter be referred for potential criminal prosecution 
and that all of that activity took place without Dr. Noak's knowledge or participation. 
Furthermore, Ada County conducted an investigation similarly without Dr. Noak's 
knowledge or participation. Dr. Noak was not advised that an investigation had been 
ongoing until February 12, 2004 when he was escorted out of the prison and placed on 
administrative leave. (Complaint, 1f1f 30, 31). The Complaint does not allege, nor has 
the State offered any evidence to suggest that Dr. Noak was aware of the particulars of 
the investigation, what representations had been made by IDOC employees regarding 
his actions, or what IDOC employees had said about him. The fact that he was 
escorted from the facility and placed on administrative leave pending the investigation 
does not independently form the basis of any claim stated in Plaintiff's Complaint. 
Rather, it is part of the overall process which ultimately led to his termination and Dr. 
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Noak did not begin to learn, until much later, the particulars of the purported 
investigation relative to what and how IOOC was gathering information. 
Importantly, the notice provisions of Idaho Code § 6-905 do not constitute a 
statute of limitations. Rather, consistent with the legislative intent of the notice 
requirement, the purposes of Idaho Code § 6-905 are to: (1) save needless expense 
and litigation by providing an opportunity for amicable resolution of the differences 
between the parties; (2) allow authorities to conduct a full investigation into the cause of 
the injury in order to determine the extent of the State's liability, if any; and (3) allow the 
State to prepare defenses. Farberv. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981). 
Thus, Idaho Code § 6-905 does not serve to eliminate facts from the record or 
otherwise make them irrelevant to the proceedings based on some theory of preclusion. 
Rather, if there is a particular claim which had accrued prior to the time when Plaintiff 
filed his tort claim notice, then that claim could be subject to dismissal. The problem 
with the State's motion is that it does not identify a claim which purportedly accrued or 
arose such that the time for filing a notice of tort claim began. 
Interestingly, the Farber case, noted above, addressed the concept of continuing 
torts involving damage to property. The Court noted that in those instances where the 
tortuous acts and resultant damages occur over a period of time, rather than in a single 
independent occurrence, then the time to file a tort claim does not begin to run until the 
damage is compete, or, as in Farber, until the contract period was complete. Id., 102 
Idaho at 401. 
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The Farber Court specifically noted that it was aware that "noncontract" activities 
undertaken by the State may occur over a long period of time and similarly constitute a 
"continuing tort" without a definite date of completion which would trigger the notice 
period of the tort claims act. The Court declined to address the issue of when the time 
period would commence to run. Id., 102 Idaho at 402, f.n. 4. The Court did note, 
however, that its ruling was consistent with its announced policy of liberally construing 
the notice provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act so as to meet the "aims and 
purposes" of the statute and to attain substantial justice. Id. 
Given the reasoning of Farber, there seems to be little question that the Court 
would apply its holding to noncontract cases. In the instant case, if the Court accepts 
the State's view, the Plaintiff would have been required to file numerous tort claim 
notices to protect and preserve his rights regardless of when the claim accrued and 
regardless of when he learned of the tortuous activity. Such piecemeal litigation is 
contrary to the purposes of the Tort Claims Act and clearly frowned upon by the Farber 
Court. 
The State's motion is not well taken. The State simply states that because 
certain conduct occurred prior to March 7, 2004, which is outside the one hundred 
eighty (180) day window established by the Plaintiff's Tort Claim Notice, it cannot be the 
basis for some unidentified claim. What the State cannot establish is that the particular 
facts and/or conduct to which it refers is independently actionable or the sole basis of a 
stated claim, or that the claim arose at the noted time, or that Dr. Noak was aware of the 
alleged conduct at the time asserted by the State. Moreover, since IDOC's actions 
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which form the basis of Plaintiff's claims were ongoing, and continued even after it 
directed that PHS terminate the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff's claims likely did not accrue until 
such actions were complete. Respectfully, the State's Motion for Reconsideration 
should be denied. 
V 
DATED thisjr day of May, 2007. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
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Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. Haas 
("Haas") (collectively, the "State Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, 
Emily A. Mac Master, Deputy Attomey General, hereby submit this reply brief in support 
of their Motion for Reconsideration, or in the Altemative Clarification, of Order on 
Motion to Dismiss. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Plaintiff's Implied Covenant Claims Should be Dismissed as to the State 
Defendants 
Plaintiff has still not identified any contract alleged in the Complaint to which he 
and the State Defendants were parties. Plaintiff's novel legal theory that the State 
Defendants should be contractually bound to a contract to which they are not parties (i.e., 
Plaintiff's alleged contract with PHS) is unsupported by any citation to case law. 
Plaintiff asserts that "[g]iven the allegations of the Complaint, it must be accepted 
as true that IDOC had certain obligations and duties under the Contract between Dr. 
Noak and PHS .... " Plaintiff is correct that in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for 
dismissal of a complaint, the non-moving party is entitled to all inferences from the 
record viewed in his favor. However, although defendants must accept the factual 
allegations of a complaint as true in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, neither defendants nor the 
court are bound by legal conclusions cast by a complaint as allegations of fact. Papasan 
v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285, 105 S. Ct. 2932, 2944, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986). See also 
Clegg v. Cope Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994) (statement that 
defendant operated place of public accommodation is legal conclusion, not allegation of 
fact, for purpose of 12(b)(6) motion). In addition, a liberal interpretation may not supply 
essential elements of a claim which were lacking in the original pleadings. Ivey v. Bd. of 
Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). To overcome a 
motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must offer more than conclusory assertions of law. [d. 
The State Defendants concede (as they must) the Complaint's factual allegations 
solely for purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but they do not concede and they 
vigorously contest Plaintiff's conclusions of law cast as factual allegations. Plaintiff's 
allegation in the Complaint that IDOC had "duties and obligations under the contract and 
was similarly bound by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" is plainly a 
legal conclusion. When this conclusion of law is stripped from the Complaint, Plaintiff's 
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implied covenant claim against the State Defendants based upon his employment 
agreement with PHS collapses. 
Additionally, Plaintiff's quotation of Paragraph 43 of the Complaint is incomplete 
and thus misleading. Paragraph 43 of the Complaint alleges: 
43. There existed an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
Plaintiff's employment agreement with Defendant PHS. Defendant IDOC 
similarly had certain duties and obligations under the contract and was 
similarly bound by the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
(Complaint, ~[43.) The entire paragraph makes clear that the only implied covenant 
alleged in the Complaint is, if at all, in "Plaintiff's employment agreement with 
Defendant PHS." On the face of the Complaint, the State Defendants were never a party 
to the alleged PHS employment agreement. The State Defendants should be dismissed 
from Count I of the Complaint. 
B. Plaintiff's Failure to File a Timely Notice of Tort Claim Bars All of His 
Claims Against the State Defendants Arising Prior to March 7, 2004 
There are five separate and distinct alleged wrongful acts for which Plaintiff did 
not timely file his Notice of Tort Claim. As stated in Plaintiff's brief, they are as follows: 
1. January 30, 2004: the incident with Hernandez. (Complaint, ~[~[ 20-23.) 
2. January 30, 2004: Hernandez's alleged discussions with IDOC and PHS 
employees about the alleged incident. (Complaint, ~[24.) 
3. On or before February 5, 2004: IDOC's initiation of an investigation and 
referral of the Hernandez complaint to the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 
(Complaint, ~[q[ 25-29, 32-34.) 
4. February 12, 2004: IDOC's alleged escort of Dr. Noak out of the prison. 
(Complaint, ~[ 30.) 
5. February 12, 2004: PHS' alleged placement of Dr. Noak on administrative 
leave. (Complaint, ~[q[ 31-32.) 
(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 4.) In asserting claims against the State Defendants based upon these 
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incidents, Plaintiff argues that the State's motion for reconsideration is a motion in limine 
and that these alleged incidents constitute one or more continuing torts. The State 
Defendants will address each of these contentions. 
First, Plaintiff miscasts the motion for reconsideration as seeking to exclude 
evidence, rather than seeking to dismiss claims that were not timely noticed. This motion 
is not a motion in limine. Instead, the State Defendants seek a ruling that makes clear 
that any liability alleged against them does not extend back to claims that occurred and 
that Plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have discovered, prior to March 7, 2004. The 
problem is that Plaintiff's tort claims are based upon alleged incidents that are 
incorporated by reference throughout the Complaint. See Complaint, Counts I-V. The 
determination of this motion for reconsideration will mandate the scope of the State 
Defendants' discovery, pre-trial motion and trial strategies. The State Defendants should 
not be required to defend claims in this lawsuit that are barred by the I.T.C.A. 
Second, Plaintiff suggests that the five separate and distinct events that occurred 
prior to March 7, 2004, as identified above, are salvaged by the continuing tort doctrine. 
Plaintiff's assertion threatens to turn a narrow exception to the I.T.C.A.'s mandatory 
notice requirements into an exception that swallows the whole. In support, Plaintiff cites 
Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 (1981). 
However, as Plaintiff correctly recognizes, Farber is not controlling here. (See 
Plaintiff's brief, p. 7.) In Farber, the plaintiffs alleged that a State of Idaho street 
reconstruction projected damaged their real property. Farber, 102 Idaho at 399-400, 630 
P.2d at 686-87. The construction was completed and approved by the State on April 29, 
1974. [d. The plaintiffs first alleged a claim for damages on October 10, 1973, but did 
not file the operative notice of tort claim until August 12, 1974. [d. The State challenged 
the timeliness of the August 12, 1974 notice of tort claim, based upon the plaintiffs' 
knowledge of alleged damages as of October 10, 1973. [d. However, the Court held that 
the State construction contract gave rise to a continuing tort. Farber, 102 Idaho at 402, 
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630 P.2d at 689. In that limited circumstance, the Court held the date the State accepted 
the contract for the completed work was the trigger for the notice requirement. ld. 
As Plaintiff correctly notes, the Farber Court expressly limited its holding to State 
construction projects and refused to extend its holding to other scenarios: 
We are fully aware that other noncontract activities undertaken by the state 
may occur over a long period of time and thus constitute a "continuing 
tort," but without a definite date of completion to trigger the running of the 
notice period. We do not address the question of when the notice 
period begins to run in these noncontract continuing tort cases. 
ld. fn. 4 (emphasis added). 
In contrast to Farber, Plaintiff's claims here are not based upon a finite State 
construction project with a definite date of completion as required by a contract. To the 
contrary, the five incidents alleged prior to March 7, 2004 in this case are five separate 
and distinct incidents. Also, Farber was decided in 1981, long before recent cases 
defining "continuing" violation theories. 
This past week, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Ledbetter 
v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., _ U.S. _, _ S.Ct. _, 2007 WL 
1528298 (May 29, 2007). At issue in Ledbetter was the scope of the continuing violation 
doctrine for purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Ledbetter, the 
female plaintiff claimed that she was paid lower than her male colleagues because of the 
unfair performance evaluations she had received over many years. The defendant argued 
that the plaintiff's claims arose out of performance evaluations for which she had not 
filed a timely administrative charge as required by Title VII. 2007 WL 1528298 at *3. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's claims were time-barred and 
were not salvaged by the continuing violation doctrine. ld. at 12. 
In so holding, the Court reasoned that "what Ledbetter alleged was not a single 
wrong consisting of a succession of acts" but rather "a series of discrete discriminatory 
acts ... each of which was independently identifiable and actionable." ld. The Court 
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further cited its extensive analysis regarding continuing violations in National Railroad 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). The 
Court cautioned, "Ultimately, 'experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural 
requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded 
administration of the law." 2007 WL 1528298 at *9 (citation omitted). "Respectful of 
the legislative process that crafted this scheme, we must 'give effect to the statute as 
enacted,' (citation omitted) and we have repeatedly rejected suggestions that we extend 
or truncate Congress' deadlines." [d. at *7. 
On April 19, 2007, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued a decision on continuing tort 
violations, in the case of McCabe v. Craven, _ P.3d _,2007 WL 1229095 (App. Ct. 
April 19, 2007). A petition for review has been filed and thus the opinion is not yet final. 
See I.A.R. 38(b). However, the judicial analysis is sound and should be upheld. In 
McCabe, the plaintiff claimed that he was wrongly imprisoned after the full term of his 
criminal sentence had run. On March 7, 2005, two years from his last day of 
imprisonment, the plaintiff filed his lawsuit. 2007 WL 1229095 at **1-2. The state 
defendants argued thatthe plaintiff's claims were untimely, but the plaintiff asserted that 
his alleged wrongful incarceration was a continuing tort. In a well-reasoned decision, the 
court rejected the plaintiff's theory by analyzing the state of the continuing tort doctrine 
in Idaho and the distinction between "a series of separately actionable torts" and "a single 
tort with continuing damages or a continuing tort." [d. at *3. 
In refusing to find a continuing tort, the Court of Appeals reasoned that even 
where tortuous conduct is "serial in nature," a "recurring wrong does not in itself justify 
characterization as a continuing tort." [d. at *3. Instead, the court held that a continuing 
tort is limited to where the wrongful acts are "so numerous and continuous that it is 
impractical to allocate damages across them." Id. (emphasis added), citing Curtis v. 
Firth, 123 Idaho 598, 603-04, 850 P.2d 749, 754-55 (1993) (holding that domestic abuse 
over many years was a continuing tort). "Since usually no single incident in a continuous 
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chain of tortuous activity can 'fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of 
significant harm' it seems proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as 
actionable." Curtis v. Firth, 123 Idaho at 603, 850 P.2d at 754 (citation omitted). 
The McCabe court held that the wrongful incarceration was not continuing 
conduct "irreducible to particular wrongful acts." McCabe, 2007 WL 1229095 at *3 
(emphasis added). Instead, the court analogized the wrongful incarceration to the 
ongoing, but discrete, instances of nuisances cased by dust from speeding cars. [d., citing 
Cobbley v. City of Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P.3d 959 (2002). Relying on Cobbley and 
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 
L.Ed.2d 106 (2002), the court distinguished the facts from Farber and Curtis. McCabe, 
2007 WL 1229095 at *3. 
Here, each of the five incidents occurring before March 7, 2004 is a separate and 
distinct incident that is reducible to an alleged particular wrongful act. For example, the 
alleged conversation between IDOC employees and Hernandez on January 30, 2004 
constitutes one separate and distinct incident. IDOC's February 2004 decision to initiate 
an investigation is another separate and distinct incident. IDOC's alleged escort of Dr. 
Noak out of the prison on February 12, 2004 is also a separate and distinct act. In fact, 
each of the five incidents identified above are separate and distinct incidents; they are 
unlike the construction project in Farber or the domestic battery in Curtis. 
Also, Plaintiff knew on January 30, 2004 about his incident with irnnate 
Hernandez. (Complaint, ~[~[ 20-24.) Plaintiff became aware of the investigation on 
February 12, 2004. (Complaint, ~~ 30-31). Plaintiff knew on February 12, 2004 that he 
was being escorted out of the IDOC prison and placed by PHS on administrative leave. 
Plaintiff knew about each of these incidents but failed to timely file a Notice of Tort 
Claim about them. Accordingly, his claims against the State Defendants based upon 
these alleged incidents are barred, as a matter of law. See Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 
/II 
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98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1977) (holding that known incident giving rise to a claim 
triggered the notice of tort claim requirement). 
All of Plaintiff's claims contained in Counts I through V that are based upon any 
of the factual allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 33 of the Complaint should be 
dismissed. Plaintiff should not be allowed to salvage these stale claims merely by 
lumping them (by incorporation through reference) into the allegations of Counts I 
through V of the Complaint. 
DATED this 1 st day of June, 2007. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF TI;IE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1 st day of June, 2007, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
COLLEEN D ZAHN 
NA YLOR HALES 
950 W BANNOCK STE 610 
BOISE ID 83702 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
P. O. BOX 2774 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 E FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
IZl u.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
IZl Facsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
IZl U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
IZl Facsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
IZl U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
IZlFacsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
EM~ A. MAC MASTER 
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ECEIVED 
082001 
Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 35091' County Clerk 
Colleen D. Zahn [ISB No. 6208] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
ORDER OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Any party in this litigation producing copies of documents and/or any other 
representative of a producing party may designate some or all of such documents as "confidential" 
by clearly designating documents as confidential in a written statement provided to counsel for all 
parties, but only if the producing party believes in good faith that such documents contain private 
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or confidential information for which a protective order would be legally justified under Rule 26( c) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. As used in this Order, "qualified person" means, in addition to this Court, an 
individual who is: 
a. Counsel to any of the parties in this litigation, including paralegals, 
secretaries, and other such employees of counsel who are assisting 
counsel in this litigation. 
b. An expert consulted by counsel in connection with the prosecution or 
defense of this litigation, provided that the expert may examine 
confidential information solely for the purpose of providing 
assistance to counsel in connection with the litigation and may not 
reveal such confidential information to any other person not bound by 
this Order. 
c. Court reporters while in the performance of their official duties, 
provided that these persons may retain confidential documents only 
as long as is necessary for the conduct oftheir duties in this litigation. 
d. Plaintiff and defendants reserve the right to make applications on 
motion for the inclusion of any additional category of qualified 
persons. 
e. Parties or their representatives may examine confidential information 
solely for the purpose of providing assistance to counsel in 
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connection with the litigation, and may not reveal such information 
to persons not bound by this order. 
3. Confidential materials and information provided by or on behalf of any person 
shall not be made available to persons other than qualified persons except as provided in this Order. 
Prior to the disclosure of any confidential information to any person authorized to inspect such 
information under Paragraph 2 above, with the exception of persons referenced in Paragraphs 2(a) 
and 2(c), such person shall be provided with a copy of this Order. 
4. Information disclosed or documents referred to at the deposition of any 
witness, including a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employers, agents, or 
independent experts, may be designated by any party as confidential, in accordance with the criteria 
set forth in Section 1 of this Order, by indicating to the other parties which pages, page or portions 
of a page of a deposition transcript and which documents contain such confidential information. The 
party wishing to designate such material as confidential must do so within twenty (20) days after 
receipt of the transcript. Until such time as that designation is made or the twenty (20) days expire, 
the whole transcript and all documents referred to in the transcript shall be deemed confidential. 
5. All confidential discovery material and the information contained therein or 
derived therefrom may be used solely for purposes of this litigation and may not be used for any 
other purpose. 
6. Upon the resolution of the disputes between the parties, the receiving party 
shall return to the Producing Party all documents containing confidential information, or, if the 
parties agree, cause such documents to be destroyed. On request, a letter certifying such return or 
destruction shall be delivered by the receiving party to the Producing Party. 
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7. Any party may seek to modify, expand, cancel, or supersede this Order by 
stipulation of the parties or by motion or notice. 
8. Material designated as confidential shall not be filed with regular court 
documents but shall be filed under seal. 
9. Nothing in this Order shall: 
a. Operate as an admission by any party that any particular discovery 
material contains or reflects confidential matters; or 
b. Prejudice in any way the rights of a party to seek a Court 
determination of 
1. Whether particular discovery material shall be produced; or 
11. If produced, whether such material should be subject to the 
terms of this Order; or 
c. Prejudice in any way the rights of a party to apply to the Court for a 
further order relating to any confidential information. 
10. This Order does not purport to govern the handling of confidential discovery 
material introduced at trial or in other court proceedings related to this lawsuit. Protection of 
confidential discovery material in such proceedings is left to the further agreement ofthe parties and 
order of this Court. 
11. In the event additional persons become parties to this litigation, they shall not 
have access to confidential information produced by or obtained from any other party to this 
litigation until the newly-joined party by its counsel has executed and filed with the Court a 
Stipulation agreeing to be bound by this Order. 
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12. All counsel of record in this litigation and all members and employees of their 
respective firms will take all steps reasonably necessary to comply with this Order. 
13. Designation of any document as confidential does not mean that for any 
purposes that the document necessarily contains or reflects confidential information or other 
confidential matters. Such designation as confidential cannot be either a presumption, inference, or 
evidence that such document contains or reflects confidential matters. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ti~ day of August, 2007. 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMIL Y A. MAC MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise, 10 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emilv.macmasterrw,ag.idaho.gov 
RISK/NOAK/P7219Ime (Ordcr).doc 
Attorneys for the State Defendants 
Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
JOHN F. NOAK, ) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
) 
) ORDER 
) 
) 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a ) 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES ) 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
OF CORRECTION; RICHARD D. ) 
HAAS; and DOES 1-10. ) 
Defendants. ) 
---------------------------
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) and Richard D. Haas' (Haas') 
motion for reconsideration, or in the alternative clarification, of order on motion to 
dismiss having come before this Court at the hearing on June 5, 2007, and good cause 
appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration, or 
in the alternative clarification, is granted in part and denied in part as follows: 
/ / / 
ORDER -1 00165 A 
1. The motion is granted as to the request that Haas be dismissed, with 
prejudice, from Count I of the Complaint but is denied as to the request that IDOC be 
dismissed from Count I of the Complaint. 
2. The motion is granted as to the request that IDOC and Haas be dismissed, ( ~Ib) 
with prejudice, from all claims in the Complaintl\o~a1te~ rh~rlo~onduct is 
tortious: (1) the fainting incident involving Plaintiff John Noak (Plaintiff) and Norma 
Hernandez (Hernandez) which occurred on January 30, 2004; (2) Hernandez's alleged 
discussions with IDOC and Defendant Prison Health Services (PHS) employees about the 
fainting incident with Plaintiff and Hernandez which similarly occurred on January 30, 
2004; (3) IDOC's initiation of an investigation and referral of Hernandez' complaint 
against Plaintiff to the Ada County Sheriffs Office; (4) IDOC's alleged escort of 
Plaintiff out of the prison on February 12, 2004; and/or (5) PHS' alleged placement of 
PlaintitT on administrative leave on February 12, 2004, pending an outcome of the 
criminal investigation. The motion is granted because these five alleged incidents are not 
torts. This Order shall not preclude the offering of evidence about these incidents to 
show what ultimately led up to other alleged torts, nor any objection thereto. 
DISTRICT JUDGE KATHRYN A. SnCKLEN 
ORDER-2 00:165'0 
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BOISE ID 83702 D Overnight Mail 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
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BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 E FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
EMIL Y A MAC MASTER 
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PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0010 
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D Statehouse Mail 
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D Overnight Mail 
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D Statehouse Mail 
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D Statehouse Mail 
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LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
A TTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMIL Y A. MAC MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emily.macmaster@ag.idaho.gov 
Attorneys for the State Defendants 
Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
Noak2\P81121ma (Answer) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
) 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D. ) Case No. CV OC 0623517 
) 
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANTS IDAHO 
) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
v. ) AND RICHARD D. HAAS' 
) ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., et al. ) COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR 
) JURY TRIAL 
Defendants. ) 
--------------------------------) 
Defendants Idaho Department of Correction ("IDOC") and Richard D. Haas 
(,'Haas") (collectively, the "State Defendants"), by and through Emily A. Mac Master, 
Deputy Attorney General, answer Plaintiff John F. Noak, M.D.'s ("Plaintiff') Complaint 
on tile herein as follows: 
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1. The State Defendants deny each and every allegation contain in Plaintiff s 
Complaint not herein specifically and expressly admitted. The State Defendants reserve 
the right to amend this and any other answer or denial stated herein, once they have had 
an opportunity to complete discovery regarding the allegations contained in Plaintiff s 
Complaint. 
2. With respect to paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sut1icient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
3. Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint is a conclusion of law and not an 
allegation of fact. If paragraph 2 contains allegations of fact, the State Defendants deny 
that IDOC is a "subdivision" of the State of Idaho, as IDOC is defined by Idaho law as an 
executive department of state government established pursuant to Idaho Code § 20-201. 
4. With respect to paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS") has done business in the 
State of Idaho. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon 
which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 3 and so deny 
the allegations. 
5. With respect to paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that Haas has been a resident of the State of Idaho residing in Ada County 
from approximately February 6, 2003 through present and that Haas was an employee of 
IDOC from approximately January 26, 2003 to approximately November 17,2006. 
6. With respect to paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sutTIcient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
7. Paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint are conclusions of law and 
not allegations of fact. If paragraphs 6, 7, and 8 contain allegations of fact, the State 
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Defendants deny that the Court has jurisdiction or that venue is proper over matters pled 
in Plaintiff's Complaint against IDOC or Haas in his official capacity as such claims are 
time-barred under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, at Idaho Code § 6-91l. See also Raygor v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 122 S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002). 
The State Defendants acknowledge that this Court would have jurisdiction over properly 
pled matters against Haas in his individual capacity, and to the extent this Court would 
have jurisdiction over such matters, venue would be proper. However, in making this 
acknowledgement, the State Defendants do not admit that any such matters against Haas 
are actually properly pled in Plaintiff's Complaint, or that the facts set forth in Plaintiff's 
Complaint actually justify the exercise of such jurisdiction over Haas. 
8. With respect to paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit that IDOC operates correctional facilities for felons as mandated by Idaho law. 
The State Defendants deny that IDOC "has jurisdiction and control over all of the 
detention facilities in the State ofIdaho." 
9. With respect to paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that PHS is a provider of correctional healthcare services in the United States 
and that PHS provided privatized medical services to IDOC pursuant to Contract Award 
CPO 698 (the "PHS/IDOC Contract"), from approximately October 1, 2001 until after 
May 6, 2004, the date of the last alleged incident in Plaintiff's Complaint. As a further 
answer to paragraph 10 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants aver that Plaintiff 
was not a party to the PHS/IDOC Contract and has no standing to assert any alleged 
contract rights against the State Defendants. 
10. Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint is a conclusion of law and not an 
allegation of fact. If paragraph 11 contains allegations of fact, the State Defendants lack 
sutlicient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
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11. With respect to paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that while providing services at IDOC correctional facilities on behalf of PHS 
and as a PHS employee, Plaintiff was a physician licensed to practice medicine in the 
State ofIdaho. 
12. With respect to paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on behalf of PHS Plaintiff provided medical services to patients 
incarcerated at IDOC correctional facilities identified in the PHS/IDOC Contract, 
including the South Boise Women's Correctional Center in Ada County, Idaho 
("SBWCC"). However, the State Defendants are presently without sufficient information 
upon which to admit or deny Plaintiffs dates and terms of employment by PHS and so 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 13. 
13. With respect to paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that PHS offered full-time employment to Plaintiff which included duties as 
PHS' statewide medical director, which employment Plaintiff accepted. However, the 
State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which to admit or 
deny Plaintiff s dates and terms of employment by PHS and so deny the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 14. 
14. With respect to paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that Plaintiffs and PHS had an employment relationship. The State 
Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 15 and so deny the allegations. As a further 
answer to paragraph 15 of Plaintiff s Complaint, the State Defendants aver that Plaintiff 
was not an employee of either IDOC or Haas at any time relevant hereto. 
15. With respect to paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that IDOC knew PHS had designated Plaintiff as PHS' medical director. The 
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State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which to admit or 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 16 and so deny the allegations. 
16. With respect to paragraph 17 of Plaintiff s Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that Plaintiff, as PHS' medical director, had significant responsibilities for 
oversight of the medical services provided by PHS under the PHS/IDOC contract and for 
the supervision of PHS' medical staff, in addition to Plaintiffs responsibilities as a PHS 
physician to diagnose and treat patients seen by him at IDOC facilities. 
17. Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs Complaint is a conclusion of law and not an 
allegation of fact. If paragraph 18 contains allegations of fact, the State Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiff prescribed controlled substances to patients at IDOC facilities and was 
required to comply with Idaho and federal law governing controlled substances. The 
State Defendants are presently without sufficient infonnation upon which to admit or 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 18 and so deny the allegations. 
18. The State Defendants deny paragraph 19 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
19. With respect to paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about January 30, 2004, Plaintiff saw patient Norma Hernandez 
(""Hernandez") at SBWCC, that Hernandez had been sick, that Plaintiff had been notifIed 
of Hernandez's condition, that after seeing Hernandez Plaintiff indicated she could return 
to her cell and that Hernandez left accompanied by PHS employee Jana Nicholson 
("Nicholson"). The State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon 
which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 20 and so deny 
the allegations. 
20. With respect to paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that subsequent to Plaintiff indicating Hernandez could return to her cell, 
Plaintiff shoved Nicholson away and grabbed Hernandez's arm. The State Defendants 
deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
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21. With respect to paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that after Plaintiff shoved Nicholson away and grabbed Hernandez's arm, 
Plaintiff forced Hernandez against her will to walk all the way back to her cell. The State 
Defendants deny that Plaintiff s conduct was "an effort to support" Hernandez and 
further deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 22. 
22. With respect to paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about January 31, 2004, Nicholson submitted a written information 
report documenting the incident. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient 
information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 23 and so deny the allegations. 
23. With respect to paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that Hernandez submitted an Inmate Concern Form to IDOC about Plaintiff's 
conduct. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which 
to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 24 and so deny the 
allegations. 
24. With respect to paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that the IDOC Office of Professional Standards ("OPS") conducted an internal 
investigation regarding the incident in which Steve Wolf ("Wolf') participated. 
25. With respect to paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that a memorandum to IDOC management from Wolf, dated February 3, 
2004, discusses whether the matter should be referred to the Ada County Sheriffs 
Department C'ACSD") for further investigation. The State Defendants deny the 
remaining allegations in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
26. With respect to paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
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27. With respect to paragraph 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about February 5, 2004, ACSD began an investigation of a 
complaint by Hernandez against Plaintiff, in response to a request made on behalf of 
Hernandez. 
28. With respect to paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about February 11, 2004, Wolf and ACSD Detective Don Lukasik 
("Lukasik") interviewed Hernandez and PHS employee Karen Barrett, a Physician 
Assistant. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which 
to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 29 and so deny the 
allegations. 
29. With respect to paragraph 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about February 12, 2004, IDOC personnel escorted Plaintiff out of 
an IDOC facility and IDOC barred Plaintiff from entering any IDOC site until further 
notice. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient information upon which to 
admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in paragraph 30 and so deny the 
allegations. 
30. With respect to paragraph 31 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
31. With respect to paragraph 32 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
deny that there was a surveillance camera over the hallway where the incident took place 
on or about January 30, 2004, or an IDOC videotape of the incident. The State 
Defendants lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny the remaining 
allegations contained in paragraph 32 and so deny the allegations. 
DEFENDANTS IDAIIO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND RICHARD D. HAAS' ANSWER TO PLAINO{)0 172 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 7 
32. With respect to paragraph 33 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
33. With respect to paragraph 34 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
34. With respect to paragraph 35 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that in a letter dated March 9, 2004, IDOC properly directed PHS to take 
immediate action to replace Plaintiff as the medical director providing services at IDOC 
facilities under the PHS/IDOC Contract. The State Defendants deny that IDOC did not 
consider the investigations of Plaintiff's conduct. The State Defendants lack sufficient 
knowledge or information to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 35 and so deny the allegations. 
35. With respect to paragraph 36 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
lack sufficient knowledge or information to admit or deny all of the allegations contained 
therein and so deny the allegations. 
36. With respect to paragraph 37 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that PHS and Plaintiff terminated their employment relationship. The State 
Defendants are presently without sufficient infonnation upon which to admit or deny the 
remaining allegations contained in paragraph 37 and so deny the allegations. 
37. With respect to paragraph 38 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about March 11, 2004, Wolf interviewed Victoria Weremecki and 
that they discussed Plaintiff's conduct. The State Defendants are presently without 
sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained 
in paragraph 38 and so deny the allegations. 
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38. With respect to paragraph 39 of Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only that on or about March 16, 2004, Wolf interviewed Lisa Mays and that they 
discussed Plaintiffs conduct. The State Defendants are presently without sufficient 
information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations contained in 
paragraph 39 and so deny the allegations. 
39. With respect to paragraph 40 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State Defendants 
admit only on or about March 15, 2004, Haas sent a letter to the Board of Medicine 
informing the Board of Hernandez' allegations. The State Defendants are presently 
without sufficient information upon which to admit or deny the remaining allegations 
contained in paragraph 40 and so deny the allegations. 
40. The State Defendants deny paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's Complaint. As a 
further ans\ver to paragraph 41 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State De1endants aver that 
PHS was responsible under the PHS/IDOC Contract for the provision of pharmaceutical 
services at IDOC facilities in accordance with federal and state law. 
ANSWER TO COUNT I 
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
and/or Public Policy in Employment Contract 
41. With respect to paragraph 42 through 46 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State 
Defendants aver that Haas has been dismissed from Count I of Plaintiff's Complaint and 
therefore paragraphs 42 through 46 relate solely to Defendants other than Haas, and as 
such no response is required from Haas. However, to the extent any response is required, 
Haas responds with IDOC as set forth below in paragraphs 42 through 43 of this Answer. 
42. With respect to paragraph 42, which purports to repeat and incorporate 
prior allegations, to the extent any response is required to such allegations the State 
Defendants reassert and incorporate by this reference their prior responses to all of such 
allegations. 
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43. The State Defendants deny paragraphs 43, 44, 45 and 46 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COUNT II 
Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress 
44. With respect to paragraph 47, which purports to repeat and incorporate 
prior allegations, to the extent any response is required to such allegations the State 
Defendants reassert and incorporate by this reference their prior responses to all of such 
allegations. 
45. The State Defendants deny paragraphs 48 and 49 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COUNT III 
Defamation Per Se 
46. With respect to paragraph 50, which purports to repeat and incorporate 
prior allegations, to the extent any response is required to such allegations the State 
Defendants reassert and incorporate by this reference their prior responses to all of such 
allegations. 
47. The State Defendants deny paragraphs 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 of 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COUNT IV 
Tortious Interference with Contract and/or Prospective Economic Advantage 
48. With respect to paragraph 57 through 60 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the State 
Defendants aver that Plaintiff's Complaint alleges Count IV as against IDOC only and as 
such no response is required from Haas to paragraphs 57 through 60. However, to the 
extent any response is required, Haas responds with IDOC as set forth below in 
paragraphs 49 through 50 of this Answer. 
49. With respect to paragraph 57, which purports to repeat and incorporate 
prior allegations, to the extent any response is required to such allegations the State 
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Defendants reassert and incorporate by this reference their prior responses to all of such 
allegations. 
50. The State Defendants deny paragraphs 58, 59 and 60 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
ANSWER TO COUNT V 
Conversion 
51. With respect to paragraph 61, which purports to repeat and incorporate 
prior allegations, to the extent any response is required to such allegations the State 
Defendants reassert and incorporate by this reference their prior responses to all of such 
allegations. 
52. The State Defendants deny paragraphs 62, 63, and 64 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint. 
53. The State Defendants deny that paragraph in Plaintiff's Complaint entitled 
'"Attorneys' Fees." 
54. Plaintiff's Complaint last contains Plaintiff's "Prayer for Relief," and to the 
extent any answer is required thereto, the State Defendants deny the allegations contained 
therein, deny that the Plaintiff has stated any valid cause of action and deny that the 
Plaintiff is entitled to any of the relief requested therein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
As a further answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, the State Defendants assert the 
following affirmative defenses. In asserting such defenses, the State Defendants do not 
concede or admit liability, nor do the State Defendants waive any right to assert that 
Plaintiffbears the burden of proof as to any matters. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The State Defendants have not been able to engage in sufficient discovery to learn 
all of the facts and circumstances relating to the matters described in Plaintiffs 
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Complaint and therefore request the Court to permit the State Defendants to amend their 
Answer and assert additional affirmative defenses or abandon affirmative defenses once 
discovery has been completed. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the State Defendants 
upon which relief can be granted and should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Rule 
l2(b)( 6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Some or all of the Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff has failed to act reasonably or to otherwise mitigate his damages, if any. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Some or all of the Plaintiff's claims are barred by Plaintiff's contributory or 
comparative negligence. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused by the negligent 
or careless misconduct and acts or omissions of other persons or entities with whom the 
State Defendants have no legal relationship or responsibility for. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The State Defendants are absolutely immune, or have qualified immunity, to the 
claims alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, including, without limitation, pursuant to the 
immunity provisions of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-901, et seq., and/or 
the Idaho Medical Practice Act, at Idaho Code § 54-1S06A(l2). 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The Court lacks jurisdiction over some or all of the claims alleged in Plaintiff's 
Complaint against IDOC and/or Haas. 
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NINTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, including but 
not limited to, the statute of limitations provided by the Idaho Tort Claims Act, at Idaho 
Code § 6-911. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The State Defendants were privileged and/or justified In their actions and/or 
omissions towards Plaintiff and, therefore, cannot be held liable for Plaintiffs damages, 
if any. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The statements concerning Plaintiff alleged in Plaintiff s Complaint, if made, were 
true. 
TWELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The statements concerning Plaintiff alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint, if made, were 
statements of opinion. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
The statements concerning Plaintiff alleged in Plaintiff s Complaint, if made, were 
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
FOURTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
To the extent that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code § 6-901, et seq., as to claims alleged in 
Plaintiffs Complaint, those claims are barred. 
FIFTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Haas is not liable for any injury caused by the act or omission of another person 
under the theory of respondeat superior. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
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SIXTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff lacks standing with respect to one or more of the claims asserted In 
Plaintiff s Complaint. 
SEVENTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs claims alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint are barred by the 
doctrines of unclean hands and/or laches. 
EIGHTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs claims alleged in Complaint are barred based upon 
Plaintiff s failure to post an adequate bond as required by Idaho Code § 6-610. 
NINETEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Some or all of Plaintiffs claims alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint are barred by 
illegality. 
TWENTIETH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
There is no privity of contract between Plaintiff and either of the State Defendants. 
TWENTY-FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiff is precluded from recovering attorneys fees under Idaho Code § 6-918A. 
JURY DEMAND 
The State Defendants, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, hereby demand a trial by jury of the Plaintiffs action for damages. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The State Defendants have been required to retain counsel, the Office of 
Attorney General, to defend this action and are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's 
fees in accordance with applicable rules and case law, including, but not limited to, Idaho 
Code §§ 6-918A, 12-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
/ / / 
/ / / 
DEFENDANTS IDAIIO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AND RICHARD D. HAAS' ANSWER TO PLAr~I()O 179 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 14 
WHEREFORE, the State Defendants pray for judgment against Plaintiff as 
follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that Plaintiff 
take nothing thereunder. 
2. That the State Defendants be awarded their costs, including reasonable 
attorney's fees, in accordance with applicable statutes, rules and case law. 
3. That judgment be entered in favor of the State Defendants on all claims for 
relief. 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable 
under the circumstances. 
5) 
DATED this l,l day of April, 2008. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Deputy Attorney General 
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************************ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this :;z ( 51 day of April, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the "Defendants Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. 
Haas' Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial" by the following 
method to: 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Ste 500 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
KEVIN E DINIUS 
WHITE PETERSON 
5700 E FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMPA ID 83687 
COLLEEN D ZAHN 
NA YLOR HALES 
950 W BANNOCK STE 610 
BOISE ID 83702 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
~ U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile 
D Statehouse Mail 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
A TTORNEY GENERAL 
STEVEN L. OLSEN 
Chief, Civil Litigation Division 
EMIL Y A. MAC MASTER, ISB No. 6449 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Statehouse, Room 210 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2830 
emiiy.macmaster({Z;ag.idaho.gov 
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Attorneys for the State Defendants 
Idaho Department of Correction and Richard D. Haas 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
Plaintiff: 
vs. 
ORDER MODIFYING ORDER OF 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Order of Confidentiality entered August 10,2007, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A, shall be modified as follows: 
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l. Section 2(a) of the Order of Confidentiality shall be modified to read as follows: 
"2. As used in this Order, "qualified person" means, in addition to this Court, an 
individual who is: 
a. Counsel to any of the parties in this litigation, including paralegals, 
secretaries, and other such employees and agents of counsel who are 
assisting counsel in this litigation." 
2. All other terms and conditions of the Order of Confidentiality shall remain in full 
force and effect. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this ~ day of September, 2008. 
Judge Kat A. Sticklen 
District Judge 
State of Idaho ) 
County of Ada ) 5S 
Certificate pf Service } 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Colleen D. Zahn [ISB No. 6208] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
Plaintiff, 
ORDER OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and for good cause shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Any party in this litigation producing copies of documents and/or any other 
representative of a producing party may designate some or all of such documents as "confidential" 
by clearly designating documents as confidential in a written statement provided to counsel for all 
parties, but only if the producing party believes in good faith that such documents contain private 
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or confidential information for which a protective order would be legally justified under Rule 26( c) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. As used in this Order, "qualified person" means, in addition to this Court, an 
individual who is: 
a. Counsel to any of the parties in this litigation, including paralegals, 
secretaries, and other such employees of counsel who are assisting 
counsel in this litigation. 
b. An expert consulted by counsel in connection with the prosecution or 
defense of this litigation, provided that the expert may examine 
confidential information solely for the purpose of providing 
assistance to counsel in connection with the litigation and may not 
reveal such confidential information to any other person not bound by 
this Order. 
c. Court reporters while in the performance of their official duties, 
provided that these persons may retain confidential documents only 
as long as is necessary for the conduct oftheir duties in this litigation. 
d. Plaintiff and defendants reserve the right to make applications on 
motion for the inclusion of any additional category of qualified 
persons. 
e. Parties or their representatives may examine confidential information 
solely for the purpose of providing assistance to counsel in 
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connection with the litigation, and may not reveal such information 
to persons not bound by this order. 
3. Confidential materials and information provided by or on behalf of any person 
shall not be made available to persons other than qualified persons except as provided in this Order. 
Prior to the disclosure of any confidential information to any person authorized to inspect such 
information under Paragraph 2 above, with the exception of persons referenced in Paragraphs 2(a) 
and 2(e), such person shall be provided with a copy of this Order. 
4. Information disclosed or documents referred to at the deposition of any 
witness, including a party or one of its present or former officers, directors, employers, agents, or 
independent experts, may be designated by any party as confidential, in accordance with the criteria 
set forth in Section 1 of this Order, by indicating to the other parties which pages, page or portions 
of a page of a deposition transcript and which documents contain such confidential information. The 
party wishing to designate such material as confidential must do so within twenty (20) days after 
receipt of the transcript. Until such time as that designation is made or the twenty (20) days expire, 
the whole transcript and all documents referred to in the transcript shall be deemed confidential. 
5. All confidential discovery material and the information contained therein or 
derived therefrom may be used solely for purposes of this litigation and may not be used for any 
other purpose. 
6. Upon the resolution of the disputes between the parties, the receiving party 
shall return to the Producing Party all documents containing confidential information, or, if the 
parties agree, cause such documents to be destroyed. On request, a letter certifying such return or 
destruction shall be delivered by the receiving party to the Producing Party. 
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7. Any party may seek to modify, expand, cancel, or supersede this Order by 
stipulation of the parties or by motion or notice. 
8. Material designated as confidential shall not be filed with regular court 
documents but shall be filed under seal. 
9. Nothing in this Order shall: 
a. Operate as an admission by any party that any particular discovery 
material contains or reflects confidential matters; or 
b. Prejudice in any way the rights of a party to seek a Court 
determination of 
1. Whether particular discovery material shall be produced; or 
ii. If produced, whether such material should be subject to the 
terms of this Order; or 
c. Prejudice in any way the rights of a party to apply to the Court for a 
further order relating to any confidential information. 
10. This Order does not purport to govern the handling of confidential discovery 
material introduced at trial or in other court proceedings related to this lawsuit. Protection of 
confidential discovery material in such proceedings is left to the further agreement of the parties and 
order of this Court. 
11. In the event additional persons become parties to this litigation, they shall not 
have access to confidential information produced by or obtained from any other party to this 
litigation until the newly-joined party by its counsel has executed and filed with the Court a 
Stipulation agreeing to be bound by this Order. 
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12. All counsel of record in this litigation and all members and employees oftheir 
respective firms will take all steps reasonably necessary to comply with this Order. 
13. Designation of any document as confidential does not mean that for any 
purposes that the document necessarily contains or reflects confidential information or other 
confidential matters. Such designation as confidential cannot be either a presumption, inference, or 
evidence that such document contains or reflects confidential matters. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 3-day of August, 2007. 
Judge Kathryn A. Sticklen 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of September, 2008, I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the following method to: 
KIRTLAN G. NAYLOR 
NA YLOR HALES 
950 W BANNOCK STE 610 
BOISE ID 83702 
JOHN A BUSH 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
800 W IDAHO STE 300 
BOISE ID 83701-2774 
DA VIS F. VANDERVELDE 
WI-lITE PETERSON 
5700 E FRANKLIN RD STE 200 
NAMP A ID 83687 
EMIL Y A. MAC MASTER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE,ID 83720-0010 
Du.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
Du.s. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivery 
D Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
D Overnight Mail 
D Facsimile: 
D Statehouse Mail 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce J. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.c. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES GROUP, 
INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
DEFENDANT PRISON HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant, Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS"), by and through its counsel of record, 
Naylor & Hales, P.C., hereby moves the Court for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on all 
claims in the Plaintiff's Complaint. PHS asserts that there are no material facts that are in dispute, 
and !hat PHS is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the Plaintiff's claims. 
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In support hereof, PHS concurrently submits the following in support of its motion: 
1. Defendant PHS's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
2. The Affidavit of Bruce 1. Castleton in Support of PHS's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
And, Defendant PHS hereby refers to and incorporates the Joint Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts from Defendants PHS and Richard Haas filed by Defendant Haas, 1 and the affidavits of Emily 
MacMaster, Richard Haas, Thomas Beauciair, and William Fruehling filed by Defendant Haas in 
Support of Defendant Haas's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2009. 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
By __ -£~ ________________________ _ 
Bruce J Castleton, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendant PHS 
IThe Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SOF') is provided for the Court's convenience to 
facilitate the Court's review of the record for this motion and Defendant Richard Haas's concurrent Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This SOF is also provided due to the extensive nature of the record, which record includes the 
deposition of eleven (II) separate witnesses, several of which were deposed multiple times (including Dr. Noak, who 
was deposed on six (6) separate occasions). Should leave of the Court be required to file the SOF, Defendant PHS 
hereby moves the Court for leave to file the SOF in accordance with Rule 8 of the Local Rules of the District Court 
for the Fourth Judicial District. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of September, 2009, I caused to be served, 
by the methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Davis F. VanderVelde ~ U.S. Mail 
White Peterson, P.A. Hand Delivered 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 Federal Express 
Nampa, ID 83687-7901 Fax Transmission 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 466-4405 
John A. Bush L U.S. Mail 
Comstock & Bush Hand Delivered 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 Federal Express 
P.O. Box 2774 Fax Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701-2774 344-7721 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Emily A. Mac Master i- U.S. Mail 
Deputy Attorney General Hand Delivered 
Office of the Attorney General Federal Express 
p.o. Box 83720 Fax Transmission 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 854-8073 
Attorneys for Defendant Haas 
Bruce J. Castleton 
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Kirtlan G. Naylor [ISB No. 3569] 
Bruce 1. Castleton [ISB No. 6915] 
NAYLOR & HALES, P.C. 
Attorneys at Law 
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 610 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone No. (208) 383-9511 
Facsimile No. (208) 383-9516 
Attorneys for Defendants Prison Health Services, Inc. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES GROUP, 
INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV OC 0623517 
AFFIDA VIT OF BRUCE J. 
CASTLETON IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT PRISON HEALTH 
SERVICES, INC.'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BRUCE J. CASTLETON being duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law before all courts of the state of Idaho, 
including this Court. I am an attorney with Naylor & Hales, P.c., counsel of record for the 
Defendant Prison Health Services, Inc. in the above-referenced matter. 
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2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of portions of the 
transcript and exhibits of the Deposition of Rick Dull, which deposition was conducted on 
February 27,2009. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of portions of the 
transcript and exhibits of the Deposition of Lee Harrington, which deposition was conducted on 
February 10,2009. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of portions of the 
transcript and exhibits of the Deposition of Karen Barrett, which deposition was conducted on 
January 28,2009. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the transcript and 
exhibits of the Deposition of Janna Nicholson, which deposition was conducted on February 2 and 
June 12,2009. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the transcript and 
exhibits of the Deposition of Norma Hernandez, which deposition was conducted on May 7, 2009. 
r?Yv( 
DA TED this 2- day of September, 20uz.---... 
Residing in Meridian, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: }-";;I ' Jot;) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREB Y CERTIFY that on the ~"\ay of September, 2009, I caused to be served, 
by the methodes) indicated, a true and correct copy of the foregoing upon: 
Davis F. VanderVelde )( U.S. Mail 
White Peterson, P.A. Hand Delivered 
5700 East Franklin Road, Suite 200 Federal Express 
Nampa, ID 83687-7901 Fax Transmission 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 466-4405 
(Affidavit only without 
exhibits) 
John A. Bush \( U.S. Mail 
Comstock & Bush Hand Delivered 
199 N. Capitol Blvd., Suite 500 Federal Express 
P.O. Box 2774 Fax Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701-2774 344-7721 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Emily A. Mac Master U.S. Mail 
Deputy Attorney General L Hand Delivered 
Office of the Attorney General Federal Express 
P.O. Box 83720 Fax Transmission 
Boise,ID 83720-0010 854-8073 
Attorneys for Defendant Haas 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JOHN F. NOAK, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. CV OC 0623517 
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES, INC., a 
subsidiary of AMERICAN SERVICES 
GROUP, INC.; IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTION; RICHARD D. HAAS; and 
DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
REPORTED BY: 
DEPOSITION OF RICK DULL 
FEBRUARY 27, 2009 
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A. To Rod Holliman. 
Q. And who was he? 
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3 A. He was the senior vice president -- group vice 
4 president I believe he was called at that time. Group 
5 vice president. 
6 Q. SO what is a regional manager') 
7 A. The regional manager in the contract was -- and 
8 the role played by PHS, regional vice president. 
9 Q. Okay. You mentioned that you supervised 
10 physicians. Did that include all physicians working tor 
11 PHS in Idaho? 
12 A. Administratively, all physicians reported to 
13 the regional vice president. Clinically, they reported to 
14 the corporate medical director. 
15 Q. Was that Carl Keldig? 
16 A. Carl Keldig. And, yes, that was all 
17 physicians. 
18 Q. What does HSA mean? 
A. Health service administrator. 19 
20 Q. And what was their basic job responsibility? 
21 A. They managed the provision of health care 
22 services at the site level. 
23 Q. Are they considered management, or 
24 administrative type employees, or health care employees? 
25 A. Management. 
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1 Q. Okay. In 2003 under the Idaho contract, did 
2 HSAs have supervisory responsibility? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Over who? 
5 A. Administratively, over every employee at their 
6 site, including the physician, who reported clinically to 
7 the site -- to the corporate -- to the regional medical 
8 director. 
9 Q. And when you use the word physician, are you 
10 talking about on-site physicians? All physicians? 
11 A. On-site physicians. 
12 Q. There was a position for a statewide medical 
13 director, correct --
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. -- in Idaho? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And that was the position held by Dr. Noak, 
18 correct? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And did Dr. Noak report administratively to 
21 HSAs? 
22 A. Dr. Noak's position had two responsibilities, 
23 that is, as the State's medical director, and as the site 
24 physician at SICI and IMSI. So Dr. Noak would have 
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1 to the health service administrator. 
2 MR. BUSH: Mark that as I. 
3 (Deposition Exhibit No. I was 
4 marked for identitication.) 
5 Q. (BY MR. BUSH) Mr. Dull, I've handed you what 
6 I've marked as Deposition Exhibit No. I. Is that a 
7 document that you are familiar with? 
8 A. It is ajob description for a statewide medical 
9 director. 
10 Q. Do you recognize it as a PHS job description? 
11 A. It indicates it's a PHS job description. 
12 Q. It appears to have been signed by Dr. Noak and 
13 your predecessor, Lee Harrington? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. On the first page of that document it indicates 
16 that as the statewide medical director, that position is 
17 supervised by the regional medical director who we've 
18 indicated being Carl Keldig, and the regional manager for 
19 administrative issues, which would be you, correct? 
20 A. I am the regional manager. I filled in that 
21 role, yes. 
22 Q. Okay. At least at the time that you were in 
23 Idaho? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 Q. I understand where you're going. 
1 So the fact that Dr. Noak held a separate --
2 well, strike that. 
3 Is it your understanding that in addition to 
4 being statewide medical director, he also held the title, 
5 or the responsibility, as site physician for the two 
6 facilities that you mentioned? 
7 A. Yes. The statewide medical director was not a 
8 full-time position. Part of that 40-hour equivalent, the 
17 
9 full-time position, was that Dr. Noak provided -- was the 
10 medical -- was the physician on site at SICI and IMSI. 
11 Yes, that was part of his job responsibilities. 
12 Q. Do you recall whether you had a similar job 
13 description? When I say similar, in the context that it 
14 was unique to the Idaho position that required you to sign 
15 that you agree to abide by the foregoing duties. 
16 A. I do not recall that. 
17 MR. BUSH: Okay. Let's mark that 2. 
18 (Deposition Exhibit No.2 was 
1 9 marked for identification.) 
20 MR. BUSH: You may have to look over his 
2 1 shoulder. Is that okay? 
22 MR. NAYLOR: Oh, yeah. 
23 Q. (BY MR. BUSH) Mr. Dull, handing you what's 
24 been marked as Deposition Exhibit No.2. I will represent 
25 reported administratively in those roles at SICI and IMSI 25 to you that is ajob description found in the bid of PHS 
5 
(208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC. 
(Pages 14 Oyj0117~9 
(208) 345-8800 (~x~ 
19437 e4e-15f24ee4-a33d-e3e91 83a4473 
Page 18 
1 to IDOC. It's marked IDOC 1445, 1446, and 1447. Are you 
2 familiar with that document at all, either generally or 
3 specifically, as to the Idaho contract? 
A. I don't recall this document. 4 
5 Q. Okay. At least in terms of the first -- well, 
6 strike that. 
7 If you compare one and two in terms of the 
8 statewide medical director and the medical director, it 
9 appears that the supervised by and the supervises 
10 provisions are the same, would you agree? 
11 A. I haven't had the opportunity to compare them. 
12 Q. Yeah. That's what we're going to do right now. 
13 If you just look at the front sheet of it --
14 A. Yeah. 
Q. -- and look at the -- under the --
A. Just that much. 
Q. -- physician title --
A. Oh. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Q. -- then under two you have supervised by. 
A. Yes, they're the same. 
21 Q. Okay. And under the qualifications, do they 
22 appear to be the same with one exception, which we'll talk 
23 about in a minute? 
24 A. It appears to be the same with one exception. 
25 Q. And that exception is that the statewide 
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1 medical director job title, which Dr. Noak signed, 
2 indicates that he is required to maintain an Idaho State 
3 pharmacy license, correct? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Why is that, if you know? 
6 MS. MAC MASTER: Objection. Foundation. 
7 THE WITNESS: I do not know. 
8 Q. (BY MR. BUSH) Okay. I would assume that --
9 understanding the qualifications which are listed on the 
10 job description for the statewide medical director, which, 
11 for example, requires that he maintain a license to 
12 practice medicine, maintain a DEA license, a pharmacy 
13 license, that in order to remain qualified for that job, 
14 PHS would expect the statewide medical director to keep 
15 and maintain the respective licenses that are mentioned 
16 there; is that fair? 
17 A. Your assumption, is it fair? 
18 Q. Yeah. 
19 A. That seems fair. 
20 Q. I mean, as a person who administratively 
21 supervises the medical director, one of the things that 
22 you would have expected your medical director to do is 
23 keep and maintain his medical license, true? 
24 A. True. 
25 Q. And he keep and maintain his DEA license, true') 
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1 A. True. 
2 Q. Keep and maintain apparently the Idaho State 
3 pharmacy license') 
A. True. 4 
5 Q. And as a consequence of that, although not 
6 getting into the specifics, you would also expect him 
7 to -- or her, whoever the medical director would be, to 
8 comply with the various rules and regulations of the 
9 entities who administer those licenses, fair') 
A. That's a fair assumption, yes. 10 
11 Q Don't take that away yet. On the second page 
12 of the job description for Dr. Noak, which would be 
13 Exhibit No. I, under administrative responsibilities, 
14 Section E, there's a provision in there that says he is to 
15 assume a leadership role in the quality improvement, 
16 infection control, and pharmacy therapeutics committees. 
17 Do you see that? 
18 A. I see that. 
1 9 Q. What is a pharmacy therapeutic committee? 
20 A. There is -- the phannacy therapeutic committee, 
21 it's part of the medical administration committee. It's a 
22 quality improvement function where any pharmacy issues are 
23 brought up. 
24 Q. Who sat on that committee') 
25 A. The health service administrator. The director 
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1 of nursing, Various nurses. 
2 Q. Did they meet? 
3 A. That was part of the quality improvement 
4 meeting. 
5 Q. On the third page of the document under part 0, 
6 it says: The statewide medical director will periodically 
7 review the use of ancillary services such as pharmacy --
8 and then paren -- with regard to prescribing practices by 
9 physicians and clinical associates -- closed paren. Do 
1 0 you see that? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. In terms of your role in administratively 
13 supervising Dr. Noak, how, if at all, did that particular 
14 job responsibility play into your role of supervising him? 
15 In other words, what did you expect him to do? 
16 A. Part of the function of the medical director 
17 was utilization review and management. This was the 
18 review of services, pharmacy utilization, and lab 
19 utilization. It also dealt with consults, requests for 
20 consults. This was a URA function that was the 
21 responsibility of the statewide medical director. 
22 Q. Okay. As it relates to prescribing practices 
23 by physicians and clinical associates, what do you 
24 understand that to mean? 
25 A. Generally, do peer reviews lor the physicians 
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